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Introduction
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Health is commonly perceived as the most valuable or even invaluable asset in life. State-
ments like “Health is the greatest wealth” (European Commission 2007), “Work is important.
Success has benefits; but health is everything” (WSO 2013), or “The right to health is the
most valuable and important human right” (EESC 2003) emphasize the fundamental impor-
tance of health in everyday life. Indeed, to be in good health is one of the most important
prerequisites of social participation nowadays, to choose between opportunities and thereby
to take advantage of modern life. Nevertheless, health is not a static endowment which is
equally distributed among the population and which remains constant over time. In con-
trast, health is constantly subject to impairment and shocks during the course of one’s entire
life span, it depends on randomly distributed and uncertain factors as well as on individual
behavior. Medical science has made enormous progress in acquiring knowledge regarding
the prevention and treatment of diseases over the last few decades. As a result, average life
expectancy has increased dramatically. Moreover, the quality of life with regard to health
conditions has substantially improved.
The ability to benefit from these achievements depends essentially on one’s access to
health care. However, access to health care and provision of health care is often contingent
upon the financial power of the health care system and the financial endowment of health
care users. This underscores the fact that although health is perceived as lifes most valuable
and priceless asset, health care, which is necessary to preserve and improve health, happens
to be a commodity available only for a certain price.
Grossman (1972) developed a model for the demand of health care (as a derived demand
for the commodity “good health”) in which he accounted for the depreciating nature of
health. He attributes two targets to health. First, health is part of the overall utility of a
person and second, health (in terms of healthy days and associated income) determines the
opportunities for consumption which in turn become part of the overall utility. Therefore, he
interprets the consumption of health care as an investment in health that can be optimized
with respect to the maximization of overall utility. Because overall utility does not depend
exclusively on an individual’s health condition but also on the consumption of other goods,
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the optimal health stock is not necessarily equal to the maximum health stock. Hence, the
optimal amount of investment (demand for health care) can be derived from this model: the
optimal investment in health reflects the trade-off between health and the consumption of
other goods in the overall utility.
A broader interpretation of consumption leads to what can be observed in everyday life.
Although health is perceived as the most valuable asset, individuals do not decide their
actions with exclusive respect to health. In contrast, decisions are based on consideration of
the trade-off between health and other goods. Smoking and drinking are leading examples
of utility increasing behaviors that are perils to one’s own and others’ health. Running red
lights exemplarily reflects the time-consuming and therefore costly nature of health protective
behaviors. This and many such examples emphasize that health-protective measures are
indeed not priceless and individuals balance costs for health care by their respective benefits.
In general, health care services and products can be exclusive and rival in consumption
and this defines them as private and scarce commodities which are traded on markets.
Nevertheless, the consumption of health care can give rise to external effects (e.g. prevention
of communicable diseases) and turn the particular purpose of a health care measure into a
public good. If markets were perfectly competitive, the price mechanism could efficiently
equalize supply and demand for health care. But, certain characteristics of the commodity
health care can render the market equilibrium inefficient. These characteristics which are
typical for but not confined to health care include uncertainty, externalities, and information
asymmetries. Most actions in the health care market are affected by at least one of these
characteristics but often a combination of them determines the agents’ behavior and can
lead to substantial market failures.
In addition, the overall health care market is different from other markets as it is closely
interrelated with the health insurance market. In contrast to other insurances, health insur-
ance does not directly compensate for a financial loss in the asset. The monetary value of
health is not clearly identifiable since no markets and hence prices for this asset per se exist.
Instead, health insurances pay for the consumption of health care products and health care
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services to either restore, preserve, or improve health. Health insurance leads to consumer
prices for health care products and services which are below the prices that the suppliers
receive. This differential in prices for a commodity creates incentives for inefficient market
behavior both for consumers and suppliers.
In addition, health insurance providers interfere with the health care market itself. De-
pending on the institutional design of a particular health insurance, strong incentives for
risk selection may appear. Systematic selection of risk types influences the amount and
allocation of health care benefits. Furthermore, risk selection can – in its extreme form –
lead to a collapse of the health insurance market, thereby affecting the accessibility of health
care. Adverse selection, ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard and supplier-induced demand are
keywords for distorted competition in health care and health insurance markets.
Without regulation, the above-mentioned features of health care render market equilibria
(if existent at all) and the corresponding allocation of health care different from Pareto-
optimal allocations. Applying the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, external effects of
the consumption of health care (and the associated public good nature of health care) as well
as the distortive competition in health insurance markets justify governmental interventions
from an economic perspective. Today’s extent of governmental regulation in health care
markets around the world is hardly found in other markets.
Finally, technological change plays a particular role in the health care market. The
demographic structure of population is continually changing (although not exclusively) due to
technological progress in health care. In turn, demographic changes influence the way health
insurance and therefore health care is financed. The optimal allocation of the corresponding
changes in costs and benefits among the population raises important issues regarding equity
and efficiency.
The uniqueness and complexity of topics and issues in health care markets make it im-
portant to analyze them discretely within economics.
Williams (1987) outlined the discipline of health economics in his famous “plumbing
diagram”. The established sub-disciplines in the field were discussed, amongst others, by
4
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Maynard and Kanavos (2000) with regard to the developments in health economics until
the end of the last millennium. On the basis of their definitions and following the slightly
edited structure of the “plumbing diagram” by Culyer and Newhouse (2000), the scope of
health economics can be summed up in eight main topics. The central four topics (A1-A4)
outline the “engine room” of health economics. The other four topics (B1-B4) represent the
“periphery” of health economics for which the “engine room” exists. The health economics
“engine room” consists of:
A1. Health.
In this topic, the conceptual framework of health is outlined. This includes attributes
of health, indexes of health status, the measurement of health, and the valuation and
utility of health. In this field, for example, quality-of-life measures are developed
which are increasingly used for the economic evaluation and prioritization of health
care measures.
A2. Determinants of health.
This topic is concerned with the determinants of health other than health care. Ana-
lyzed influencing factors include, for example, the level and distribution of income and
education, work activity, consumption patterns, and nutrition. In this field, health is
analyzed as a capital stock that depreciates and which can be invested in.
A3. Demand for health care.
This topic concerns the demand for health care which is derived from the demand
for health. The demand for health care is influenced by the first two topics as they
differentiate the demand across different groups in the population (e.g. depending
on socio-economic characteristics). But the demand for health care is also influenced
by barriers to the access to health care such as prices, institutions, the definition of
“needed health care”, time costs, and psychological hurdles.
Positive and negative externalities as well as information asymmetries in the principal-
agent relationships between patients and health professionals play an important role
5
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in the amount of health care that is demanded.
A4. Supply of health care.
This topic is broad and research questions in this field refer, for instance, to production
technologies and costs of the production of health care, the markets for health care
labor and capital, and the market for pharmaceuticals. Another strand of literature
within this field analyzes the role of incentives in the supply of health care. Incentives
for efficient health care supply generated by paying schemes for hospitals and physicians
are broadly discussed in this field.
Culyer and Newhouse (2010) emphasize that the “engine room” does not exist uniquely
for its own sake but that the findings of these fields deliver the necessary insights to deal
with the issues of the four “peripheral” topics. These topics are:
B1. Market analysis.
This topic addresses how the desired equilibria defined by policy objectives in the
markets described above can be attained. This includes the analysis of market mecha-
nisms. Monetary prices, time prices, waiting lists and non-price rationing systems are
analyzed as tools to balance needs on the demand side and capacities on the supply
side. Direct and indirect influences of rationing devices are objects of investigation in
this field. Health insurance and institutions providing health care play an important
role. The results in this field are mainly positive but also normative based on the
evaluation of the performance of markets and tools.
B2. Microeconomic appraisal.
This topic attends to the microeconomic evaluation at the treatment level. This in-
volves applied cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, and cost-utility analyses of alternative
ways of delivering care at all phases of the health care process. Mode, place, and timing
of detection, diagnosis, treatment, and aftercare are evaluated in this field. Analyses in
this field are often normative as they specifically evaluate technologies and mechanisms
under certain concepts of utility and value judgment.
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B3. Planning, budgeting, regulation and monitoring mechanisms.
This topic is concerned with the evaluation of the effectiveness of available instru-
ments for optimizing the health care system. The performance of budgetary controls,
manpower allocation, norms and regulations, and the incentive structures generated
by these instruments form part of this field. Explicit policy goals are required for
the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of planning, budgeting and monitor-
ing mechanisms so that analyses in this field mainly concern particular health care
systems and their respective institutional structures.
B4. Evaluation at the whole system level.
Within this topic, the performance of the outcomes of B1 and B2 on system objectives
such as equity and allocative efficiency is analyzed. Further topics include differences in
expenditure rates, mechanisms and outcomes across systems and countries. Not only
explanations for the observed differences but the comparability of different systems
and what and how to learn from other systems are discussed in this field.
In this dissertation three different topics in health economics are analyzed and discussed.
These topics either contribute to the “engine room” or provide applications of central topics
and contribute to the “periphery” of health economics. The core of each empirical study
provided in this dissertation is a positive analysis to improve the understanding within the
respective subfield. In addition, normative discussions of the results and insights derived from
the positive analyses are provided for each topic in order to contribute to the discussion of
current and challenging issues that health care systems are actually facing today.
In the following, I briefly outline the topics of the remaining chapters in this dissertation
and their contributions to the respective subfields in health economics.
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Reference-Dependent Effects of Unemployment on Mental
Well-Being
Levels of health not only impact economic performances and create costs and benefits,
but conversely, economic circumstances also have an effect on health conditions and create
costs and benefits through the channel of health. Owing to this circular relationship be-
tween economic factors and health, it is of interest for economists, and in particular health
economists, to understand how economic circumstances determine health and how health
conditions affect economic performances. In Chapter 2, we focus on the employment status
as a determinant for mental well-being and analyze the effect of unemployment on mental
well-being. In particular, we analyze how the effect of unemployment on mental well-being
is affected by expectations with regard to employment.
Contributions in this field have analyzed the relationship between health and economic
factors at the aggregated as well as at the individual level. In his seminal contributions,
Ruhm (2000, 2003, and 2005 as examples) provides analyses of the relationship between
economic cycles and health, and shows how economic circumstances at the aggregated level
determine health behavior at the individual level. His general finding is that during eco-
nomic downturns health improves because during such times individuals have more time
to spend on health increasing activities, whereas during cyclical upturns individuals tend
to riskier health behavior. Another strand of literature examines, at the individual level,
how employment status (in particular unemployment) affects health. In this literature, the
outcome variable health is separated into physical and mental health. Ruhm (2003) shows
that mental health (in terms of suicide rates) is affected conversely to physical health when
it comes to economic downturns. He finds that mental health deteriorates during recessions.
This result emphasizes the need to examine the impact of economic determinants on mental
health and associated mental well-being separately from physical health.
In the literature, mental well-being is commonly used as a proxy for mental health for
two reasons. Firstly, the analysis of a distinctive measure for mental health requires a clear
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definition of mental health and the provision of appropriate data for an empirical analysis.
Mental health (illness) is defined as a diagnosable illness such as depression, anxiety, or
schizophrenia which significantly interferes with an individual’s cognitive, emotional or social
abilities (NHSinform 2014). Alternatively, with regard to physical health, one can think
about an overall mental health index, which, in turn, is closely related to the more general
concept of mental well-being. A statement by the WHO (2014) underlines the generality
of the concept of mental well-being: “Mental health is defined as a state of well-being in
which every individual realizes his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses
of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to her or his
community.” Definitions of mental well-being generally include areas such as life satisfaction,
optimism, self-esteem, mastery and feeling in control, having a purpose in life, or a sense of
belonging and support (NHSinform 2014). Secondly, from an economic perspective, mental
well-being can also be interpreted as overall utility, thereby providing a close connection to
theoretical models which are aimed at maximizing overall utility.
The general findings in the literature on unemployment and mental well-being at the
individual level state that unemployment negatively impacts mental well-being. The dis-
cussion of the role of unemployment rates in the perception of unemployment has created
much controversy. The general finding here is that the severity of the negative effect of
unemployment on mental well-being (the perception of unemployment) depends on the rate
of unemployment. Nevertheless, contradictory statements in the empirical literature such as
whether unemployment rates affect the perception of unemployment positively or negatively
reveal that the mechanism behind this relationship is yet to be clarified. Furthermore, the
available empirical literature on unemployment and mental well-being is not based on theo-
retical economic models which can explain the mechanism of this relationship and forecast
the sign of the effect.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation aims to fill this gap by providing a theory-based empir-
ical analysis of the effect of unemployment on mental well-being. The specification of our
econometric model is derived from an underlying theoretical equation for mental well-being
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which is based on models for reference-dependence utility with endogenous reference points.
Reference points in our theoretical model reflect the individual expectations about future
employment status. We assume unemployment rates as an information on which the forma-
tion of the reference point is based, i.e. expectations about future employment status are
derived from unemployment rates in the individually relevant labor market. The reference
point defines a status quo for future employment status. The individual valuation of the
actual employment status depends on deviations from the reference point. In particular, we
hypothesize that the negative effect of unemployment on mental well-being is more severe
in the case of unexpected unemployment. The results of the estimation confirm the stan-
dard finding that unemployment has a negative impact on mental well-being. As the central
outcome, the econometric analysis yields empirical evidence for a reference-dependent rela-
tionship between unemployment and mental well-being. The results suggest that becoming
unemployed unexpectedly hurts individuals harder than when unemployment was expected.
The additional negative effect that is due to the unexpectedness of unemployment is not
only statistically significant but also substantial in its estimated size which is equal to one
standard deviation of mental well-being in the sample and about three-fourths of the mean
difference in mental well-being between the employed and the unemployed.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation contributes to the literature in a twofold way. Firstly, the
empirical analysis that we apply in order to test hypotheses derived from a theoretical model
with endogenous reference points provides an explanation of how unemployment rates affect
the perception of unemployment. Our findings improve the understanding of unemployment
as a determinant for mental well-being. Furthermore, by applying a theoretical model which
has its foundation in the emerging field of behavioral economics, we expand the hitherto
available approaches to this topic. Secondly, the results of our analysis support theoretical
models with endogenous reference points by providing empirical evidence. Although health
economics is usually seen as an applied field of economics that uses toolkits from more
traditional fields, the findings and insights derived from health economics also contribute to
the progress in other fields in economics.
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Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany:
The Ignored Risk Selection Problem
Chapter 3 of this dissertation provides an analysis of risk selection problems in the Ger-
man health insurance market with dual sources of financing. This chapter is based on joint
work with Robert Nuscheler. Theoretical models for health insurance predict certain market
outcomes and failures, depending on the distribution of risks and the observability of risk
types by the insurance companies. If the individual risk is observable, the insurer can offer
actuarially fair premiums to the insured (i.e. premiums which are equal to the expected
health care costs), which would lead to an efficient market outcome. With asymmetric in-
formation about the risk types, full coverage with actuarially fair premiums can no longer
be offered for all risk types. Problems of adverse selection and moral hazard can appear as
long as high-risk individuals have incentives to mimic low-risk individuals and in order to
aquire insurance coverage at low-risk premiums.
Moreover, if the risk is observable but the insurer cannot use this information to discrim-
inate between risk types, the same problems can arise than when risk is unobservable. This
is the case in many health insurance markets. Although the risk type might be common
information, health insurers are obliged to provide community rating and open enrollment.
These institutional characteristics can result from governmental and social objectives of eq-
uity but also from potential adverse selection and crowding out of high risks in the case of
unobservable risk types. Community rating and open enrollment in turn induce incentives
for insurance providers to engage in risk selection. With premiums that are unrelated to
the individual risk, insurance providers have strong incentives to select low-risk individuals
with lower expected health care expenditures compared to high-risk individuals in order to
maximize profits. With successful risk selection, insurance providers may gain a competitive
advantage over other insurance companies which does not stem from superior efficiency.
This market failure justifies public policy interventions targeted at reducing incentives
for risk selection. A common regulatory measure is risk adjustment. Within risk adjustment
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schemes, insurance companies are compensated for different structures of their risk pool in
order to reduce competitive advantages that only stem from a better risk structure.
Risk selection within public health insurance systems has received considerable attention.
Although in many countries there are not only pure public or private sectors but a mixture
of both types, risk selection between systems has largely been ignored so far.
Institutional differences between public and private systems can induce strong incentives
for risk selection between both systems. This is the case for the German health insurance
system where there are two branches of health care financing. Several institutional differ-
ences between public and private health insurance provide strong incentives for risk selection
by the insurance providers and for an elaborate selection of an insurer on part of the insured.
The main institutional difference that affects this self-selection is the calculation of premi-
ums. While in the public system premiums are based on income and are unrelated to the
individual risk, premiums in the private system are risk-based and unrelated to income.
This induces strong incentives for low-risk-high-income-earners to select themselves into the
private system where they can benefit from risk-related premiums that are unaffected by
their relatively high income. Incentives for risk selection on the supplier side in the private
system are straightforward. As soon as claimed health care expenditures impend to exceed
the expected expenditures which are covered by the risk-rated premium, the private insurers
have strong incentives to crowd the high risks out. Due to compulsory health insurance and
open enrollment, high-risk individuals are consequently dumped into the public system. As
there is no risk adjustment between both systems, private insurers do not have to compensate
public insurers for this shift in the risk structure. The empirical analysis in Chapter 3 clearly
shows that the incentives due to institutional differences between the public and the private
health insurance systems in Germany do indeed lead to observable risk selection between
both systems.
Within the “engine room” of health economics, Chapter 3 contributes to the topic A3.
Due to the systematic selection of risk types in the public and private systems, the risk-type-
corresponding-demand for health care is inefficiently shifted between both systems. Access to
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health care and benefits are different between the public and private system. Consequently,
the individual demand for health care is affected by the analyzed risk selection. Neverthe-
less, the main contribution of Chapter 3 is to the “peripheral” topic B1. Health insurance
providers as the financial link between providers and consumers in the market for health care
play a crucial intermediary role in equalizing the demand and supply of health care. There-
fore, a stabilized health insurance market with fair competition is essential for balancing the
health care market as a whole. We identify risk selection as a competition-distorting factor
in the German health insurance market. Derived from our empirical findings, we propose
the integration of the private health insurance market into the risk adjustment scheme that
already exists within the public system, in order to minimize incentives for risk selection and
to increase fairness in the competition between the two systems.
The Effectiveness of Breast Cancer Screening in Germany:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Chapter 4 of this dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of the organized breast cancer
screening in Germany. Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of health care procedures (e.g., cost-effectiveness-analysis, cost-utility-
analysis, cost-benefit-analysis). The need for the evaluation of health care measures is derived
directly from the question of how to allocate the scarce commodity health care. The evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of an action is a classical approach in economics, and the evaluation
of the effectiveness of prevention measures is a central topic in health economics. Prevention
methods have been originally classified into three levels by Caplan (1964, p.16) and can be
summarized as follows:
1. Primary prevention aims to prevent diseases from occurring.
2. Secondary prevention focusses on early detection and treatment of a disease which has
already developed in a person but does not yet show any clinical symptoms, e.g., before
the patient notices any indications of the disease.
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3. Tertiary prevention is applied when the disease already shows symptoms. It aims to
influence the course of disease in order to prevent damages, pain, and complications, to
give better care to the patients, and to cure from the disease or slow down its course.
Organized screening programs for breast cancer are part of secondary prevention. The
current state of medicine cannot prevent the development of breast cancer. But the treatment
of this disease has considerably improved over the last few decades, and survival rates promise
increasing chances of non-lethal courses of breast cancer. Nevertheless, survival rates strongly
correlate with the stage at which breast cancer is treated. The earlier breast cancer is treated,
the higher is the statistical chance of survival. The 5-year relative survival rate for breast
cancer detected at stages 0 and I is 100%, 93% at stage II, 72% at stage III, and only 22%
at stage IV (SEER 2013). Therefore, early detection of breast cancer is the most important
first step in the prevention of this disease today.
Organized mammography screening, e.g., mass screening of clinically asymptomatic women,
has been implemented in many countries around the world to detect breast cancer as early
as possible in as many women as possible. However, while mammography is accepted as a
proven diagnosis tool for breast cancer, the discussion in the literature of the effectiveness
of organized screening programs has attracted some controversy. This includes not only the
effectiveness regarding the detection rates but also the impact of the side effects that are
induced by such mass screening programs. Leading examples of such side effects include
false-positive test results and overdiagnosis with subsequent overtreatment. This means
that patients with no cancer or patients with cancer that during the patient’s lifetime would
never have caused any symptoms are unnecessarily treated. Side effects not only increase
the costs but also lower the benefit of the screening program. The primary goal of orga-
nized mammography screening programs is the reduction of breast cancer mortality. Thus,
a reduction in breast cancer mortality provides a crucial argument for the effectiveness of
organized mammography screening programs. The costs would not only include direct costs
but also indirect costs (e.g. psychological costs) of the screening.
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For Germany, where an organized mammography screening program has gradually been
implemented nationwide since 2001, no analysis of the effectiveness of this program has
been attempted so far. In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, which is based on joint work
with Salmai Qari, an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the German mammography
screening program is provided and discussed. We exploit the step-by-step implementation
of the program at the regional level to analyze the effectiveness of the organized screening
program in the setting of a natural experiment. Our results suggest no effect of the organized
screening program on breast cancer mortality.
The evaluation of the German mammography screening program in Chapter 4 contributes
to the “peripheral” field B2 and to the heated international debate on the impact of orga-
nized screening programs. Although normative analyses with certain assumptions about
utility measures and value judgments are common in this field, our analysis only exploits
the effectiveness of the screening program with regard to mortality without any judgments
on the value of life and health. This becomes necessary if the effectiveness of the program
was weighted against the costs of the program. Data to quantify the costs of the German
mammography screening program is not yet available, and therefore, we only concentrate
on the effectiveness of the program as a first step in the evaluation process. Yet, our results
underscore the importance of further and more detailed investigations in order to reveal the
factors that render the program ineffective. Nevertheless, such analyses require the provision
of more detailed data which are currently unavailable for common scientific use.
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2.1 Introduction
The relationship of unemployment and health was, amongst others, discussed in a se-
ries of papers by Ruhm (e.g. 2000, 2003, 2005), who found for the US that unemployment
rates are negatively correlated with mortality rates, health care utilization and chronic con-
ditions. Interpreting mortality rates as a proxy for health, he concludes that with decreasing
macro-economic circumstances health increases. For Germany, this finding was confirmed by
Neumayer (2004). Ruhm reasons that people have more time for health increasing activities
during recessions and tend to more risky health behavior during economic upturns (smoking,
drinking, etc.). When he analyzes the effect of unemployment rates on case-specific mortality
rates and specific chronic diseases, he finds that only the variation in suicides and mental
illness is procyclical in macro-economic conditions, i.e. suicide rates and the number of men-
tal health problems increase when unemployment rates increase. He concludes that mental
health and mental well-being behave in sharp contrast to physical well-being (Ruhm 2003, p.
655). Therefore, the relationship between mental well-being and economic conditions should
be analyzed separately from physical health conditions.
In addition, the number of reported mental health problems has been steadily increasing
in recent years. Health care expenditures caused by mental illnesses are increasing above
average compared to expenditures for physical health problems (Destatis 2010). As it seems
that mental well-being is affected differently by (macro-) economic circumstances than physi-
cal health, it is of particular importance for health economists to understand what determines
mental well-being.
On the individual level, Clark and Oswald (1994) established the general result that sub-
jective well-being is negatively affected by unemployment. Winkelmann and Winkelmann
(1998) disentangled the negative effect of unemployment on life satisfaction into a pecuniary
and a non-pecuniary effect. The non-pecuniary effect is the psychological burden of un-
employment that arises in addition to the loss of income which characterizes the economic
burden of unemployment. They found that the non-pecuniary effect is much larger than the
effect that stems from the loss of income that is associated with unemployment.
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Other studies (e.g. Stutzer and Lalive 2004, Shields et al. 2008, Clark et al. 2009)
find that the negative effect of unemployment on mental well-being itself is related to the
regional unemployment rate. This result is usually discussed in the context of social norms.
The studies’ general findings state that being unemployed in a region with a high unem-
ployment rate has a smaller negative effect on mental well-being than being unemployed in
a region with low unemployment rates. In high-unemployment-rate regions, being unem-
ployed means to be conform to the social norm of unemployment. The results suggest that
not deviating from the social norm lowers the psychological burden of unemployment. In
contrast, Vatter (2012) found that subjective well-being in East Germany where unemploy-
ment rates are considerably higher than in West Germany is more affected by unemployment.
He argues that lower job prospects in high-unemployment-rate regions increase the negative
effect of unemployment. Clark et al. (2010), and Knabe and Ra¨tzel (2011) provide em-
pirical evidence for this relationship, and show that negative expectations about becoming
re-employed in the future additionally reduce subjective well-being among the unemployed.
These studies conclude that the negative effect of unemployment on mental well-being is
heterogenous among individuals. Furthermore, the size of the negative effect depends on
unemployment rates and future job prospects. Nevertheless, contradictory statements in the
economic literature regarding in which direction unemployment rates affect the perception
of unemployment reveal that the mechanism behind this relationship is yet to be clarified.
De Witte (1999) provides a review of the psychological literature on the relationship
between perceived job insecurity and psychological well-being. He summarizes from the lit-
erature that job insecurity significantly reduces well-being in different psychological domains.
Furthermore, he analyzes the question of how important the factor job insecurity is within
the effect overall of unemployment. His empirical findings suggest that the anticipation of
unemployment has the same impact as unemployment on psychological well-being. His re-
sults confirm a statement which Lazarus already made in 1966, that “the anticipation of
harm can have effects as potent as experiencing the harm itself” (quoted by Roskies et al.
1993, p.619).
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Dekker and Schaufeli (1995, p.58) state that in the psychological literature it has become
apparent that the phase of job insecurity, in which termination is more or less anticipated,
may very well be the most stressful aspect of the whole unemployment process. They compare
two groups of employees in a large Australian public transport organization, who at the
same time faced uncertainties about whether or not they will become unemployed due to
organizational changes. They find that the psychological well-being of those who became
unemployed in the next period improved compared to those who were still uncertain at
this point. This result indicates that uncertainty about the future employment status not
only affects mental well-being directly but also the perception of the unemployment status.
Although one group of employees was finally made redundant, they experienced an increase
in their psychological well-being. They felt relieved from their uncertainty because they
became unemployed according to their expectation.
Green et al. (2000) on the other hand, analyzed which factors determine perceived job
insecurity. They find that for the employed higher levels of unemployment rates increase
perceived job insecurity, and higher levels and increases in unemployment rates also increase
perceived difficulties of re-employment for the unemployed.
In this chapter, we bring together findings from the economic and psychologic litera-
ture on unemployment and mental well-being and provide an explanation of the underlying
mechanism of how unemployment rates and the anticipation of unemployment affect the per-
ception of unemployment. Furthermore, our analysis is based on economic theory. The theo-
retical foundation for the econometric analysis comes from models with reference-dependent
preferences with endogenous reference points, developed in the behavioral economics litera-
ture. These models formalize the effect of the anticipation of an event as well as the effect
of a deviation from an individual’s expectation about the outcome for this event.
Our analysis differs from previous studies in two more points. First, we analyze changes
rather than levels of the employment status. Second, we account not only for the influence
of current unemployment rates or job prospects on current mental well-being, but we also
account for the effect of expectations about future employment status and deviations from
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the expected employment status on the perception of unemployment. From a prospect-
theoretical point of view, it seems more plausible that changes in the employment status
rather than the absolute status influence mental well-being, and that the valuation of un-
employment depends on a certain reference point. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.277)
state: “...the carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states. This
assumption is compatible with basic principles of perception and judgment. Our perceptual
apparatus is attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the evaluation
of absolute magnitudes. When we respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness, or tem-
perature, the past and present context of experience defines an adaptation level, or reference
point, and stimuli are perceived in relation to this reference point.” Therefore, differences
in the perception of unemployment regarding mental well-being are probably not only the
result of social norms that are somehow derived from unemployment rates, but of potential
deviations of the individual employment status from what an individual had expected, i.e.
his reference point.
The literature on reference-dependence provides a discussion of the determination of ref-
erence points and mainly distinguishes exogenous and endogenous reference points. For our
analysis, the concept of endogenous expectation-based reference points introduced by Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) is applied. They propose that the individual’s reference-point
is determined by lagged expectations about outcomes rather than the status quo. Several
recent studies focussed on the empirical evidence of reference points that are determined by
expectations. Abeler et al. (2011) show in a real-effort laboratory experiment that labor
supply is in line with the predictions of models with reference dependent preferences where
reference points are formed by expectations. Crawford and Meng (2011) re-analyze the la-
bor supply of New York City cab drivers and find empirical evidence for reference-dependent
preferences with expectation-based reference points. Card and Dahl (2011) analyze violent
behavior dependent on outcomes of football games. They find that for unexpected losses
of the home team domestic violence significantly increases whereas expected losses of the
football team have no significant effect on domestic violence.
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In our context, unemployment rates serve as an information that determines reference
points of the individuals, and the magnitude of changes in mental well-being is related to the
deviation of this reference point. More precisely, we assume that individuals observe relevant
unemployment rates (e.g. industrial sector specific or regional unemployment rates) and that
this information is used to build expectations about the future employment status. These
current expectations serve as the reference point for future employment status.1 Finally,
the individuals compare the actual outcome of their employment status with their expected
outcome. If the actual employment status deviates from the expected employment status,
we expect a larger effect from this outcome compared to the effect that arises when the
actual employment status was already expected. More precisely for unemployment, we
hypothesize that becoming unemployed has a more severe effect on mental well-being when
unemployment hits the individual by surprise rather than having been anticipated.
To test this hypothesis empirically, it is essential to control for any unobserved individual
level heterogeneity in mental well-being. As we focus on becoming unemployed rather than
being unemployed, this naturally leads to a fixed effects estimator. We use the waves from
1998 to 2009 provided by the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) that provides all
relevant information for our analysis.
In Section 2.2, we develop a simple theoretical model which motivates our empirical
analysis. In Section 2.3, we explain the regression model and the estimation strategy. Sec-
tion 2.4 provides detailed information on the data set and variables used for the estimation.
In Section 2.5, we show and interpret the estimated effects. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Theoretical models for reference-dependent preferences with endogenous reference points
based on expectations from the behavioral economics literature deliver the theoretical back-
1We do not explicitly model the reference points formation process neither in the theoretical model nor in
the empirical models. We can refrain from this as variables that explicitly measure the individual reference
points are available for our empirical analysis.
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ground to our problem. These models support the idea that an individual is more affected
by an outcome of an event that was not expected than when the same outcome was expected
(see Section 2.1).
To motivate and structure the empirical analysis of reference-dependent effects of unem-
ployment on mental well-being, we borrow the formal structure of these theoretical models
and substitute utility with the state of mental well-being. We can then formalize the follow-
ing theoretical model:
Mit(xit, xit−1, qit, qit−1) = u(xit, xit−1) + v(qit, qit−1) + µ ((1− xit)− qit−1) (2.1)
with xit =


1 if i unemployed in t
0 if i employed in t
and qit =


1 if i has positive expectations in t
0 if i has negative expectations in t
Overall mental well-being Mit(·) for individual i at time t depends on the employment
status x in t and t− 1, u(·); on expectations about the future employment status q in t and
t − 1, v(·); and from a deviation of the current employment status in t from the expected
employment status for t, µ(·).
xit describes the current employment status in t and takes the value 1 if the individual
is unemployed in t and 0 if he is employed in t.
Expectations q are defined to be positive if an individual expects to be employed, and
to be negative if the individual expects to be unemployed in the future. For simplicity, we
assume a binary outcome for expectations and qit equals 1 for positive expectations in t
about the employment status in t + 1, and qit equals 0 for negative expectations in t about
the employment status in t + 1.
As Mit(·) depends on employment status at two different points in time, t and t− 1, we
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can distinguish four different cases of employment histories:
(1) i is employed in t and t− 1
(2) i is unemployed in t and employed in t− 1
(3) i is employed in t and unemployed in t− 1
(4) i is unemployed in t and t− 1.
Table 2.1 summarizes the four different cases.
Table 2.1: Employment histories
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
xit−1
xit 0 1
0 (00) (01)
1 (10) (11)
Moreover, Mit(·) depends on expectations in t and t − 1. Similarly to the employment
histories, we can distinguish four different cases for the expectations histories:
(i) negative expectations in t− 1 and t
(ii) negative expectations in t− 1 and positive expectations in t
(iii) positive expectations in t− 1 and negative expectations in t
(iv) positive expectations in t− 1 and t
The four cases of expectations histories can appear in each of the four cases of employment
histories. Therefore, we can finally distinguish 16 different types of individuals regarding
their unemployment status and expectations over two periods in time. Table 2.2 shows the
different combinations of expectations and employment histories.
Table 2.2 can be summarized in a compact employment-expectations matrix form with
j rows and k columns.
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Table 2.2: Expectations and employment histories
xit−1 0 1
qit−1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍❍
qit
xit 0 1 0 1
0
0 (0000) (0100) (1000) (1100)
1 (0001) (0101) (1001) (1101)
1
0 (0010) (0110) (1010) (1110)
1 (0011) (0111) (1011) (1111)
Z =


0000 0100 1000 1100
0001 0101 1001 1101
0010 0110 1010 1110
0011 0111 1011 1111


Each element zjk of the matrix contains the following information:
zjk = (xit−1 xit qit−1 qit) with j = 1, ..., 4 and k = 1, ..., 4. (2.2)
All individuals in the first row of the employment-expectations matrix where employed
in t − 1 and t. All individuals in the second row where employed in t − 1 and unemployed
in t. All individuals in the third row where unemployed in t − 1 and employed in t. All
individuals in the last row where unemployed in t − 1 and t. All individuals in the first
column had negative expectations in t− 1 and t. All individuals in the second column had
negative expectations in t − 1 and positive expectations in t. All individuals in the third
column had positive expectations in t− 1 and negative expectations in t. All individuals in
the last column had positive expectations in t− 1 and t.
For example, the individual denoted (0000) was employed in t−1 and t and had negative
expectations in t−1 and t, whereas the individual (0101) was employed in t−1, unemployed
in t, had negative expectations in t−1 and positive expectations in t. Therefore, individuals
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(0110) and (0111) were employed in t − 1 but became unemployed in t, although they had
positive expectations about their employment status in t−1. Thus, these individuals became
unemployed unexpectedly. Respectively, individuals (1110) and (1111) remained unemployed
unexpectedly.
Based on the current empirical literature on unemployment and mental well-being and
the theoretical literature on reference-dependence, the following two hypothesis on the rela-
tionship between unemployment and mental well-being can be formulated:
1. In the case of becoming unemployed, mental well-being deteriorates and in the case of
becoming employed, mental well-being increases.
2. If an individual expected his current employment status, his mental well-being is less
affected by the outcome of his actual employment status than when he did not have
expect his current employment status. More precisely, in the case of unemployment
if an individual expected to become unemployed then the negative effect of becoming
unemployed on mental well-being is less pronounced than when he did not have expect
to become unemployed.
In Section 2.3, both the structure of the theoretical model and the consequential types of
individuals are used to develop an econometric model which allows us to test these hypotheses
empirically.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
2.3.1 Empirical Model
In order to identify reference-dependent effects of unemployment on mental well-being
empirically, we translate Equation 2.1 into two different econometric models. Firstly, a
dummy variable model for all possible combinations of employment status and expectations
in both periods. Secondly, a model with pairwise interactions for employment status and
expectations in both periods.
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The dummy variable model follows straightforward from the theoretical model, where
16 different cases of employment and expectations histories were distinguished. A dummy
variable d is used for each of the cases. For simplicity, we preliminarily abstract from
any additional influencing factors as well as from unobserved heterogeneity (both will be
introduced in the second regression model). We can write the following compact form of a
linear regression model with yit measuring mental well-being of individual i at time t:
yit = π0 +
4∑
j=1
4∑
k=1
πjkdjkit − π11d11it + ǫit (2.3)
with djkit =


1 if (xit−1 xit qit−1 qit) = zjk
0 otherwise
Expanding Equation 2.3 yields the following dummy variable model:
yit = π0 + π12(0100)it + π13(1000)it + π14(1100)it
+ π21(0001)it + π22(0101)it + π23(1001)it + π24(1101)it
+ π31(0010)it + π32(0110)it + π33(1010)it + π34(1110)it
+ π41(0011)it + π42(0111)it + π43(1011)it + π44(1111)it
+ ǫit
(2.4)
Individual (0000) is arbitrarily chosen as the reference category. This model allows an
immediate comparison of the mental well-being of different individuals. For example, π31
reflects the difference in mental well-being of an individual who in t − 1 expected to stay
employed in t and the reference individual who in t − 1 did not expect to stay employed
in t, all else equal. In spite of its attractiveness for an easy comparison of individuals, this
model does not allow for a non-ambiguous identification of reference-dependent effects of
unemployment on mental well-being. Suppose we were interested in the effect of becoming
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unemployed unexpectedly. As already shown in the theoretical model in Section 2.2, this
situation is given in two cases. In the dummy variable model, the effect of unexpected
unemployment is captured by the coefficients of all individuals who where employed in t− 1
and are unemployed in t and had positive expectations in t − 1. In this example, these are
the coefficients π32 and π42 (for individuals (0110) and (0111)). Both coefficients contain the
effect of a deviation of the current employment status in t from the expected employment
status for t. But, these two individuals differ in their current expectations in t about their
future employment status in t + 1. This difference is also captured by the coefficients π32
and π42. Therefore, such a dummy variable model does not allow the unique identification of
reference-dependent effects of unemployment. However, the structure of this model supports
the later interpretation of the following econometric model with pairwise interactions of
unemployment and expectations.
So far, we have not explicitly distinguished between different expectations about future
employment status of the employed and the unemployed. The employed individuals build
expectations about becoming unemployed or staying employed in the future. In contrast,
the unemployed individuals build expectations about becoming re-employed or staying un-
employed in the future. In the pairwise interacted model, we will differentiate between the
expectations of the employed and the unemployed (as it is also done in the data, see Sec-
tion 2.4). For the employed individual i, the expectation in t about his employment status
in t + 1 is denoted by qit. The expectation of an unemployed individual i in t about his
employment status in t + 1 is denoted by q
it
. The outcomes of both variables are defined
analogous to the general expectation qit in Equation 2.1:
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qit =


1 if the employed i in t expects to stay employed in t + 1
0 if the employed i in t expects to become unemployed in t+ 1
q
it
=


1 if the unemployed i in t expects to become re-employed in t+ 1
0 if the unemployed i in t expects to stay unemployed in t+ 1
In order to keep the notation easy, we formerly abstracted from the distinction between
expectations of employed and unemployed. Nevertheless, because expectations qit and qit
are mutually exclusive for individual i in t, the distinction between qit and qit was implicitly
done before in the theoretical and the dummy variable model.
With qit and qit, the following pairwise interacted model that corresponds to Equations 2.1
and 2.3 can be obtained:
yist = β0 + β1xist + β2xist−1
+ β3qist + β4qist
+ β5qist−1 + β6qist−1
+ β7 (xist × xist−1)
+ β8
(
qist × qist−1
)
+ β9
(
qist × qist−1
)
+ β10
(
q
ist
× qist−1
)
+ β11
(
q
ist
× q
ist−1
)
+ β12
(
qist−1 × xist
)
+ β13
(
q
ist−1
× xist
)
+ β14 (qist × xist−1) + β15
(
q
ist
× xist−1
)
+ wistβ + αi + δs + λt + (δs × λt) + εist
(2.5)
yist measuring mental well-being of individual i in federal state s at time t. As afore-
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mentioned, it is only assumed that people use the information of a certain unemployment
rate to build expectations about their own employment status (see Section 2.1). In the
empirical analysis, we focus on unemployment rates at the federal state level.2 In order to
control for possible correlation between individuals at this level, the federal state in which
each individual lives is is incorporated through the subscript s.
As before, xist takes the value 1 if the individual i in federal state s is unemployed in
t. qist and qist take the value 1 for positive expectations in t about the future employment
status in t+ 1 of the employed and the unemployed in federal state s, respectively.
To measure causal effects of unemployment on mental well-being, it is necessary to con-
trol for any other factors that influence mental well-being as well as unemployment. wist is a
vector of control variables at the individual level. αi captures all time-invariant unobserved
individual heterogeneity. δs captures all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the fed-
eral state level, and λt captures time-fixed effects. The interaction of δs and λt controls for
all federal state specific effects that vary over time. This includes, for example, unemploy-
ment rates at the federal state level, but also, more generally, all time-variant unobserved
heterogeneity between federal states. Modeling explicitly federal state specific time-variant
heterogeneity, captures all possible correlation between individuals in the same federal state.
Instead of interactions, clustered standard errors at the federal states level could have been
used to allow for correlation between individuals in the same federal states. But, clustered
standard errors at this level impose problems regarding those individuals who move between
federal states. Clustering in this case would need additional correction of degrees of freedom
in the model. We also avoid the alternative to just exclude all individuals who moved be-
tween federal states as this would not only impose a general loss of information, but could
also lead to biased estimates due to selection if individuals, who move between federal states,
systematically differ in their characteristics from individuals who do not move. εist is the
2However, as a robustness check, we have run the same regression models with data on the industrial
sector level (2-digit NACE code) rather than on the federal state level. The regression with industrial sector
fixed effects yields estimates very similar to the estimates of the regression with federal state fixed effects.
Therefore, the results of the regression with industrial sector fixed effects are relegated to the Appendix
of this chapter and are not further discussed (compare Table 2.8 in Section 2.5.3 and Table 2.21 in the
Appendix.)
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usual idiosyncratic error term.
The coefficients β1 to β6 measure direct effects from current and past unemployment
and current and past positive expectations. Therefore, the linear coefficients β1 to β6 reflect
the functions u(·) and v(·) in Equation 2.1 if we assume linearity for u(·) and v(·). The
coefficients β7 to β15 measure the effects of all possible pairwise interactions of the employ-
ment status and expectations in two subsequent periods of time. Although β12 and β13 are
effects of unexpected unemployment, we cannot derive the function µ(·) in Equation 2.1
straightforward from this model. Only certain linear combinations of coefficients allow the
interpretation of effects as a reflection of µ(·). When interpreting the estimated effects in
Section 2.5, this will be explained in detail. Table 2.3 provides a detailed interpretation of
those coefficients in the model that are related to the employment status and expectations.
Table 2.3: Variables, coefficients, and corresponding measured effects
Variable Coefficient Effect of
xist β1 current unemployment
xist−1 β2 past unemployment
qist β3 current positive expectations of the currently employed
q
ist
β4 current positive expectations of the currently unemployed
qist−1 β5 past positive expectations of the previously employed
q
ist−1
β6 previous positive expectations of the previously unemployed
xist × xist−1 β7 continued unemployment
qist × qist−1 β8 continued positive expectations of the continuously employed
qist × qist−1 β9 continued positive expectations of the previously unemployed
and currently employed
q
ist
× qist−1 β10 continued positive expectations of the previously employed and
the currently unemployed
q
ist
× q
ist−1
β11 continued positive expectations of the continuously unemployed
qist−1 × xist β12 past positive expectations of the previously employed and cur-
rent unemployment
q
ist−1
× xist β13 past positive expectations of the previously unemployed and
continued unemployment
qist × xist−1 β14 current positive expectations of the currently employed and the
previous unemployment
q
ist
× xist−1 β15 current positive expectations of the currently unemployed and
the previous unemployment
In order to find the effects that uniquely identify reference-dependent effects of becoming
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or staying unemployed, we can link the pairwise interacted model to the dummy variable
model. Table 2.4 shows the relevant coefficients for each of the 16 cases. As shown in Sec-
tion 2.2, the individuals (0110) and (0111) are those of interest as they became unemployed
unexpectedly in t. The only difference between these two are their expectations in t. From
Table 2.4 we can see that individual (0111) differs from individual (0110) in the coefficients
β4 and β10. Both effects stem from the positive expectations that individual (0110) has in
t compared to individual (0111). The coefficient that is unique for both individuals is β12.
This effect stems from the combination of positive expectations in t−1, employment in t−1
and unemployment in t, i.e. unexpected unemployment. Analogous, for individuals (1110)
and (1111), we find β13 to be the coefficient that identifies the effect of remaining unem-
ployed unexpectedly as β13 stems from the combination of being unemployed in t− 1 and t
but having positive expectations in t − 1. Therefore, for becoming or staying unemployed,
the coefficients β12 and β13 uniquely identify reference-dependent effects from unemployment
on mental well-being, respectively. However, in order to have a meaningful comparison of in-
dividuals, it will be necessary to compare certain linear combinations of coefficients. To test
the hypothesis that an individual who became unemployed unexpectedly suffers more from
becoming unemployed than an individual who already expected unemployment the linear
combination of β5 and β12 (and additionally β10 in the case of positive expectations in t) is
tested whether it is different from zero. The prediction is that this linear combination is neg-
ative, reflecting the additional negative effect that stems from the deviation of the expected
employment status (i.e. ’employed in t’) from the actual employment status (’unemployed
in t’). The detailed outline for the interpretation of the results is given in Section 2.5.2.
2.3.2 Estimation strategy
In order to identify a causal effect of unemployment on mental well-being we need to
control for any heterogeneity that influences both mental well-being and unemployment.
Panel data allow to account for any observed and unobserved determinants that are invariant
over time or invariant over individuals or both. With interactions between federal states
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Table 2.4: Interpretation of coefficients
xit−1 0 1
qit−1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
qit
xit 0 1 0 1
0
0
(0000) (0100) (1000) (1100)
β0 β0 + β1 β0 + β2 β0 + β1 + β2 + β7
1
(0001) (0101) (1001) (1101)
β0 + β3 β0 + β1 + β4 β0 + β2 + β3 + β14 β0 + β1 + β2 + β4
+β7 + β15
1
0
(0010) (0110) (1010) (1110)
β0 + β5 β0 + β1 + β5 + β12 β0 + β2 + β6 β0 + β1 + β2 + β6 + β7
+β13
1
(0011) (0111) (1011) (1111)
β0 + β3 + β5 + β8 β0 + β1 + β4 + β5 β0 + β2 + β3 + β6 β0 + β1 + β2 + β4 + β6
+β10 + β12 +β9 + β14 +β7 + β11 + β13 + β15
Note: qit = 1 if expectations are positive, xit = 1 if unemployed in t
and time, the model additionally controls for any federal state specific factors that vary
over time (see Section 2.3.1). However, correlation over time within individuals which is
not accounted for by any of the effects described above can still exist, e.g., unobserved
factors at the individual level that evolve over time, like life experience, perception of the
relationship status, etc., which probably lead to a trend in mental well-being. This is reflected
in an autocorrelated structure of the error term. Not accounting for such autocorrelation
would lead to biased estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients, and consequently to
biased statistical tests. Therefore, we estimate heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) standard errors by clustering at the individual level.
The dependent variable is subjective life satisfaction, with outcomes on a scale from 0
(low) to 10 (high). Thus, the dependent variable can be assumed to be cardinal or ordinal.
Depending on the assumptions, the regression can be performed using a linear estimator (e.g.
ordinary least squares (OLS)) or a non-linear ordered latent response estimator (e.g. ordered
probit or logit), respectively. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) provide an analysis of
differences in estimated life satisfaction depending on the estimator. They show that using
linear OLS and non-linear ordered response estimators essentially yield the same results
for life satisfaction. They emphasize that controlling for time-invariant unobserved factors
32
Chapter 2 Reference-Dependent Effects of Unemployment on Mental Well-Being
(individual fixed effects) matters to the estimates but not assumptions on cardinality or
ordinality of life satisfaction. Therefore, we estimate mental well-being with OLS and control
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Fixed and Random Effects Estimators
In general, there are two different estimators that allow to control for unobserved indi-
vidual specific heterogeneity: the fixed effects and the random effects estimator. The two
estimators differ in the assumptions on the individual effects. The fixed effects estimator
explicitly models time-invariant individual effects as a determinant of the dependent vari-
able. By averaging the data over time, the fixed estimator controls for all constant individual
heterogeneity but inherently removes variation from the covariates. Identification relies on
variation within individuals. The random effects estimator is based on the assumption that
the time-invariant individual effects are random and uncorrelated with all other explanatory
variables and are modeled as part of a composed error term. Identification with the ran-
dom effects estimator relies on variation within and between individuals. Therefore, if the
assumption of randomness of the time-invariant individual effects holds, the random effect
estimator is more efficient than the fixed effects estimator and should generally be preferred.
Because the random and the fixed effects estimators differ in the source of identification,
one should be aware of the exact question that is to be answered in the analysis. Whereas the
coefficient of unemployment estimated with the random effects estimator can be interpreted
as the effect of being unemployed on mental well-being, the coefficient of unemployment
estimated with the fixed estimator reflects the effect of becoming unemployed on mental
well-being. In this chapter, we analyze the effect of unexpected changes in employment
status rather than levels of the employment status on mental well-being. This leads directly
to the fixed effects estimator. Nevertheless, in our context, the random effects estimator could
still deliver reasonable interpretation of the coefficients when changes rather than levels of
the variables are used in the empirical model. However, it is essential to check whether the
crucial assumption that there is no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the
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observables holds. This can be tested by conducting a variable addition test (VAT), where
the dependent variable is regressed on the regressor matrices X and X (X averaged over
time by individuals).3 The null hypothesis that the coefficients of X are zero is tested with
the classical F-Test.4
Estimation of Effects for Different Parts of the Population
The basic model is estimated for all individuals in the analysis data set (see Section 2.4).
We are also interested to see whether certain groups in the population are affected differently
by reference-dependent effects of unemployment on mental well-being, and if the results of
the basic estimation are robust for different parts of the population. We focus on differences
between gender and age groups. In order to keep the interpretation of results manageable,
the basic pairwise interacted model (Equation 2.5) is estimated for various stratifications
of the data rather than adding interactions terms for different groups in the population.
Furthermore, in the model with individual fixed effects (see Section 2.3.2), only stratifying
by gender allows the examination of gender specific differences. With individual fixed effects,
any time constant variables such as gender become zero when averaging the data over time.
Therefore, a gender effect cannot be estimated with a fixed effects estimator.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sample
For the empirical analysis, we use the waves from 1998 to 2009 from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP started in 1984 with approximately 12,000 individuals
in 6,000 households in West Germany and was extended to East Germany in 1990. Af-
ter various sample refreshments, the SOEP included more than 22,000 adult respondents
3The standard Hausman test in this case is problematic as it does not allow to perform the test with
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation robust standard errors. Arellano (1993) developed a generalized VAT
that is robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of arbitrary forms.
4See Baltagi (1998) and Arellano (1993) for further details and properties of this test.
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in approximately 12,500 households in 2006 (Wagner et al., 2007). The data set contains
information about the current employment status and expectations about the future em-
ployment status in each year. Unemployed individuals are asked for the reason of their job
termination. The SOEP also provides various measures for mental well-being (see below for
further details) and socio-economic characteristics of the individuals.
In order to analyze the relevant part of the population, we reduce the observations for the
final analysis data set. Only those individuals who are part of the economically active popu-
lation are included. Therefore, the sample is restricted to individuals who are of age 30 to 55.
The lower limit is to avoid the part of the population that is most probably still in education,
or in a precarious and instable job situation. The upper limit excludes those individuals who
already could face special incentives for job termination due to proximity to retirement, e.g.
special regulations for early retirement. Among the employed individuals, only those who
are in full-time employment enter the sample. The restrictions imposed on the unemployed
in the sample are in order to make these individuals most comparable to the employed.
Therefore, only legally registered unemployed individuals who intend immediate full-time
re-employment are kept. As the dependent variable in the model is a measure of mental
well-being, most probably reverse causality between mental well-being and unemployment
would appear. People with mental health problems plausibly have a higher probability of
becoming unemployed due to less productivity. Without further restrictions, the estimation
could suffer from an endogeneity problem. Following Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew
(2009)5 and Schmitz (2011)6, we concentrate on those individuals with exogenous entries into
unemployment due to plant closures in order to minimize the potential bias in the estimation
of the effect of unemployment on mental well-being due to the endogeneity of unemployment.
As a proxy for mental well-being, we use life satisfaction which is self rated on a scale
5Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) show that only controlling for exogenous unemployment
entries allows the identification of a causal effect of unemployment on life satisfaction. They find a significant
and substantial negative effect of unemployment for women and men and an additional negative effect of
exogenous unemployment entries due to plant closures for women.
6Schmitz (2011) shows that the general finding of a negative effect of unemployment on health is likely
to be the result of biased estimates and does not reflect a causal relationship. With only plant closures
as exogenous entries into unemployment, he does not find any effect of unemployment on various health
measures.
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of 0 (low) to 10 (high).7 The SOEP data also allows to analyze the relationship between
unemployment and mental health rather than mental well-being as it provides a measure for
mental health, the Mental Component Summary Scale (MCS)8. But, MCS is provided only
every two years. As our model requires observations of two consecutive periods, we lose too
many observations with MCS. Therefore, we concentrate on life satisfaction as a proxy for
mental well-being. Table 2.5 shows correlation coefficients and p-values of life satisfaction
and MCS with particular self-reported mental-health measures provided biannually in the
SOEP.
Table 2.5: Life satisfaction and mental health measures
Variables Life Satisfaction MCS
MCS 0.3940 (0.000)
pressed -0.1937 (0.000) -0.3567 (0.000)
melancholy -0.4158 (0.000) -0.6645 (0.000)
balanced 0.3644 (0.000) 0.6011 (0.000)
energy 0.3534 (0.000) 0.5376 (0.000)
acclessmental -0.3717 (0.000) -0.6737 (0.000)
lesscaremental -0.3325 (0.000) -0.6438 (0.000)
N 23485
Note: p-values in parenthesis
Not surprisingly, the correlations between life satisfaction and certain mental-health mea-
sures are less pronounced than the correlations between MCS and the same mental-health
measures as MCS is calculated on the basis of these variables. However, all correlations show
the same sign as with MCS and are highly statistically significant. The strength of correla-
tion varies more between MCS and mental-health measures than for life satisfaction. The
correlation of life satisfaction and MCS is 0.39 and highly statistically significant. There-
fore, life satisfaction can be interpreted as a proxy for mental health as well as for mental
well-being. Furthermore, we will interpret general life satisfaction as a measure of mental
7For a detailed analysis of the relationship between mental health and life satisfaction see Layard et al.
(2013). Using three different panel surveys from Great Britain, Germany, Australia they show the strong
correlation between these two factors.
8MCS is scale score that is calculated using explorative factor analysis with various self-reported measures
of mental health in the SOEP (see Andersen et al. (2007) for further information on the algorithm).
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well-being as this interpretation seems to be more adequate in the context of utility which
is the dependent variable in the theoretical models for reference-dependence.
2.4.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.6 reports summary statistics for the key variables of the analysis. The total
number of observations in the analysis sample is 62,135. The share of legally registered
unemployed individuals is only 0.74%. Rather than reflecting the true population unem-
ployment rate in Germany, this low share of unemployed is caused by the selection process
of observations described above. The choice of including only exogenous entries into unem-
ployment is very restrictive and a significant number of unemployed individuals do not enter
the sample.
Table 2.6: Summary statistics of life satisfaction, employment status, and expectations
Employed Unemployed
N = 61 678 N = 457
99.26% 0.74%
N = 62 135
Employment Expectations
very somewhat not at all impossible difficult easy
15.4% 44.3% 40.3% 21.2% 74.3% 4.5%
Life Satisfaction
low ∅ high low ∅ high
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.2 0.2 0.9 2.1 3.1 10.3 11.6 25.2 32.8 10.8 2.8 1.1 2.0 5.0 9.6 9.4 25.2 14.2 16.4 13.6 2.6 0.9
Expectations about the future employment status are different for the employed and the
unemployed (see also Section 2.3.1). In the SOEP questionnaires, the employed individuals
are asked about their concerns about their job security and can choose between three possible
answers: very concerned, somewhat concerned, and not concerned at all. The unemployed
are asked about their perceived difficulties to find an appropriate position and can choose
between the categories: easy, difficult, and almost impossible. Comparing the distribution of
answers over the three ordered categories of expectations shows very distinctive patterns for
the employed and unemployed. About 40% of the employed are not concerned at all about
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their job security. But only 4.5% of the unemployed believe that it will be easy for them
to find a new job. 15.4% of the employed are very concerned about their job security and
21.2% of the unemployed expect that it will be almost impossible to find a new job. Whereas
44.4% of the employed report to be somewhat concerned about their job security, 74.3% of
the unemployed expect to have difficulties to find a new job. The descriptive statistics
suggest that the unemployed tend to be more pessimistic about their employment future
than the employed. In order to keep the interpretation of the estimated effects manageable,
we collapse the expectations into binary variables. Therefore, according to the theoretical
model in Section 2.2, we will interpret the effect of positive expectations with reference to
negative expectations. The response categories deliver a natural cut-off between negative
and positive expectations (only the categories ’not at all’ and ’easy’ have a non-negative
comprehension). Therefore, a dummy variable for positive expectations for the employed is
defined as taking the value 1 for individuals who are ’not concerned at all’ about their job
security (corresponding to qit in Section 2.3.1). The choice of the cut-off between categories
for the expectations of the unemployed is unfortunately not that clear-cut. The category
’easy’ would be the natural outcome to define positive expectation. However, it cannot solely
be used because of the low share of respondents in this category. With only 4.5% of the
unemployed in this category, there would not be reasonable enough variation in the binary
variable for positive expectations. Therefore, the cut-off is chosen between ’impossible’ and
’difficult’ and a dummy variable for positive expectations for the unemployed is defined as
taking the value 1 if for individuals who expect that finding a new job will be ’easy’ or
’difficult’ but not ’impossible’ (corresponding to q
it
in Section 2.3.1).
The dependent variable in the model is life satisfaction as a proxy for mental well-being.
Individuals are asked to rate their overall life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (low) to 10
(high). The distribution of answers on this scale, again, is different for the employed and the
unemployed. Whereas about 90% of the employed rate their life satisfaction between 5 and
9 with a peak in 8, the variance of life satisfaction is higher for the unemployed. The average
life satisfaction for the employed is 7.1 and for the unemployed 5.5 (see also Table 2.7).
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The standard errors for life satisfaction for the employed and unemployed are 1.59 and 2,
respectively. Without controlling for any additional factors, the average difference in life
satisfaction between the employed and the unemployed is about 1.6 points.
Table 2.7: Summary statistics or dependent variable and controls
All Unemployed Employed
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Life Satisfaction 7.05 1.60 5.46 2.00 7.06 1.59
Age 42.72 7.00 42.45 6.96 42.72 7.00
Years of Education 12.59 2.70 11.68 2.43 12.60 2.70
Married 0.71 0.45 0.58 0.49 0.71 0.45
Number of Children in Household 0.79 0.97 0.81 1.02 0.79 0.97
Net Income 1675.50 992.77 1.77 37.90 1687.90 985.89
Foreign 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Private Insurance 0.13 0.34 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.34
Blue Collar 0.33 0.47 - - 0.33 0.47
Self Assessed Health 3.55 0.81 3.48 0.91 3.55 0.81
N 62135 457 61678
Table 2.7 additionally reports summary statistics for the control variables by employment
status. We control for age, years of education, marital status (binary), number of children
living in the same household, monthly net income (excluding transfer payments), citizen-
ship (binary), private health insurance (binary), blue-collar employment (binary), and self
assessed health (scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high)). The employed and unemployed are, on aver-
age, very similar in the control factors, except for net income and private health insurance.
The fact that some unemployed individuals have a positive net income at all (on average 1.77
Euro per month) is because the unemployed are allowed to earn a certain amount of money
without having their legal unemployment status and their unemployment benefits affected.
Only 1% of the unemployed are privately insured, compared to 13% of the employed. This
difference can be explained by the German institutions for health insurance. In general, only
high income earners, self-employed, and civil servants are allowed to opt out of the public
health insurance. When becoming registered as unemployed, the privately insured typically
have to switch back into the public system. However, there are some exceptions from this
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and under certain circumstances the unemployed are allowed to stay in the private system
(mainly at their own expenses).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Variable Addition Test for Unobserved Heterogeneity
In Section 2.3.2, the importance of testing for correlation between unobserved hetero-
geneity and the observed variables included in the model in order to decide whether the
random effects estimator is applicable to our analysis was emphasized. We performed a VAT
(see Section 2.3.2) following Arellano (1993). The usual F-Test rejects the joint null hypoth-
esis that all coefficients of the averaged explanatory variables are zero at the 0% significance
level for all models (including all stratifications). This means, it is rejected that none of the
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity captured by means over time is uncorrelated with
the observed explanatory variables. Consequently, the random effects estimator is not appli-
cable in our case as its crucial assumption of independence of the unobserved heterogeneity
is rejected. Therefore, we rely the interpretation of the estimated effects of on the results
from the fixed effects estimation.
2.5.2 Interpretation Strategy of the Results
For the interpretation of effects, the results are examined in three steps following the
structure of the two empirical models that were introduced in Section 2.3.1.
First, individuals that are employed and unemployed in t, each with the same expectations
history and the same employment status in t− 1, are compared pairwise. In particular, we
compare the following pairs that were employed in t − 1: (0000) and (0100), (0001) and
(0101), (0010) and (0110), and (0011) and (0111). We compare the following pairs that
were unemployed in t − 1: (1000) and (1100), (1001) and (1101), (1010) and (1110), and
(1011) and (1111). Applying hypothesis tests for multiple coefficients and calculating linear
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combinations of coefficients, this kind of comparison allows us to analyze whether or not
comparable employed and unemployed individuals differ significantly in their mental well-
being at all, and to quantify the magnitude of such a difference.
In the second step, individuals that were employed in t− 1 and became unemployed in t,
but, who have different expectations regarding their employment status in t, are compared.
In particular, we compare individuals (0101) and (0111), and (0100) and (0101). It is
tested whether individuals who became unemployed unexpectedly differ from individuals
who expected their unemployment.
Finally, the coefficient that uniquely measures the effect that originates from the unex-
pectedness of unemployment on mental well-being is interpreted, in order to quantify the
reference-dependent effect of unemployment on mental well-being.
The interpretation of the results follows the same three step structure for all stratifica-
tions.
2.5.3 Results from Fixed Effects Estimation for All Individuals
Table 2.8 shows the estimated OLS coefficients for the pairwise interacted fixed effects
model applied to the whole sample. The estimates correspond to the coefficients in Equa-
tion 2.5 of the theoretical regression model introduced in Section 2.3.2.
Differences between employed and unemployed
As explained above, we first concentrate on the difference in mental well-being between
employed and unemployed individuals. Table 2.9 shows the results of calculated and F-tested
linear combinations of estimated coefficients that reflect the differences in mental well-being
between comparable pairs of employed and unemployed individuals. The second and the
third columns show comparisons of currently employed and unemployed individuals. While
in the second column both individuals were employed in t− 1, individuals compared in the
third column were both unemployed in t − 1. In the rows, the pairs of currently employed
and unemployed individuals are distinguished by their histories of expectation.
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Table 2.8: Fixed effects estimates for life satisfaction
All
Variable Coefficient HAC SE
xist β1 -0.3032 0.2314
xist−1 β2 -0.1258 0.1371
qist β3 0.2147*** 0.0195
q
ist
β4 -0.4892* 0.2593
qist−1 β5 0.0642*** 0.0190
q
ist−1
β6 0.0399 0.1459
xist × xist−1 β7 -0.6005 0.5949
qist × qist−1 β8 -0.0198 0.0264
qist × qist−1 β9 -0.6130* 0.3709
q
ist
× qist−1 β10 1.4960* 0.8750
q
ist
× q
ist−1
β11 1.2091 0.8602
qist−1 × xist β12 -1.6021** 0.8098
q
ist−1
× xist β13 -0.8131 0.6450
qist × xist−1 β14 0.6851* 0.3513
q
ist
× xist−1 β15 0.0329 0.7730
Age -0.0298* 0.0137
Years of Education -0.0185 0.0174
Married 0.1265** 0.0361
Children in household 0.0189 0.0140
Net Income 0.0001** 0.0000
Foreign 0.1573 0.1233
Private insurance 0.0440 0.0463
Blue collar -0.0359 0.0311
Self assessed health 0.4582** 0.0107
Constant 6.6014** 0.6638
αi yes
δs yes
λt yes
δs × λt yes
N 62135
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Estimated differences in LS: employed and unemployed – All
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/0) vs (0/1) (1/0) vs (1/1)
H0: β1 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 = 0
(0/0) p-value = 0.1902 p-value = 0.1005
β1 = -0.3032 β1 + β7 = -0.9037
H0: β3 = β1 + β4 H0: β3 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β7 + β15
(0/1) p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0021
(β1 + β4)− (β3) = -1.0071 (β1 + β4 + β7 + β15)
−(β3 + β14) = -2.2599
H0: β1 + β12 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 + β13 = 0
(1/0) p-value = 0.0142 p-value = 0.0000
β1 + β12 = -1.9053 β1 + β7 + β13 = -1.7168
H0: β3 + β8 H0: β3 + β9 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β10 + β12 = β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15
(1/1) p-value = 0.0005 p-value = 0.0000
(β1 + β4 + β10 + β12) (β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15)
−(β3 + β8) = -1.0934 −(β3 + β9 + β14) = -1.2509
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
The first cell shows the difference in mental well-being of currently employed and currently
unemployed individuals, where both individuals were employed in t−1 and both had negative
expectations in t− 1 and in t, and all else equal. The mental well-being of these pairs differs
in the coefficient β1, and is on average 0.3032 points lower for those that are unemployed
compared to the mental well-being of those employed. The null hypothesis that β1 equals
zero cannot be rejected at a significance level lower than 19.02%. Therefore, we do not find a
significant difference in the mental well-being of employed and unemployed individuals with
currently negative expectations when both were employed and had negative expectations in
the past period.
Comparing currently employed and unemployed individuals with negative expectations
in both periods but with unemployment in t − 1, the linear combination of β1 and β7 is
not statistically significant different from zero just at the 10% significance level. Thus,
independent from the past employment status, we find no statistically significant difference
in the mental well-being of employed and unemployed individuals if negative expectations
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are present in t and t − 1. The effects of negative expectations in two consecutive periods
seem to dominate any difference in mental well-being between employed and unemployed
individuals which stems from the difference in the employment status.
Mental well-being of currently employed and unemployed individuals differs statistically
highly significant for all other combinations of expectations and employment histories. The
highest difference in mental well-being appears between those employed and unemployed
who had negative expectations in t− 1, but positive expectations in t (between (1001) and
(1101)). In this case, we observe the difference in mental well-being of an individual who
became employed unexpectedly in t (a positive deviation from the reference point) and with
positive expectations in t, and an individual who remained unemployed expectedly (no de-
viation from the reference-point), also with positive expectations in t. This finding may be
interpreted as a first empirical hint to reference-dependence in the context of employment
and unemployment. Also, the average difference of 1.91 and 1.72 points in mental well-being
of the employed and unemployed with positive expectations in t − 1 and negative expecta-
tions in t, given past employment and unemployment respectively, is not only statistically
significant but substantial. In both cases, we observe individuals who became unemployed
unexpectedly and adjusted their expectations in t downwards. Thus, the comparison of em-
ployed and unemployed individuals already shows evidence for reference-dependent effects of
the employment status on mental well-being, because the biggest differences in mental-well
being can be found in those cases, where a change in employment status was unexpected.
Differences between expected and unexpected unemployment and the reference-
dependent effect
In the following, we concentrate on those individuals who became unemployed unexpect-
edly. Becoming unemployed unexpectedly is defined by employment and positive expecta-
tions in t − 1 and unemployment in t. Therefore, the individuals of interest are (0110) and
(0111). Both were employed in t− 1, are unemployed in t, and had positive expectations in
t−1. The only difference between both individuals lies in their expectations in t. Individual
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(0110) has negative expectations in t about becoming re-employed in t + 1, whereas, indi-
vidual (0111) has positive expectations in t. As we are interested in the effect of unexpected
unemployment on mental well-being, we compare the two types of unexpected unemployed
individuals to those unemployed individuals who expected their unemployment but have the
same expectations in t, and all else equal. In this sense, the compared individuals have the
same employment histories and the same expectations in t but differ in their expectations
in t − 1. This makes two comparable pairs: individuals (0100) versus (0110), and (0101)
versus (0111). Both pairs were employed in t and unemployed in t− 1. Within both pairs,
the individuals differ in their expectations in t− 1 but agree in their expectations in t. Be-
tween pairs, the difference lies in their expectations in t, where the first pair has negative
expectations and the latter pair positive expectations.
Table 2.10 shows the results of calculated and F-tested linear combinations of estimated
coefficients that reflect the differences in mental well-being between comparable pairs of
individuals who became expectedly and unexpectedly unemployed.
Table 2.10: Estimated differences in LS: expected and unexpected unemployment – All
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/1)
H0: β5 + β12 = 0
(0/0) vs (1/0) p-value = 0.0575
(β5 + β12) = -1.5379
H0: β5 + β10 + β12 = 0
(0/1) vs (1/1) p-value = 0.9008
(β5 + β10 + β12) = -0.0419
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
The first cell shows the estimated average difference in mental well-being between unex-
pected and expected unemployed with negative expectations in t for both. The difference
in mental well-being between these two individuals is reflected by the linear combination of
β5 and β12. The estimated difference in life satisfaction is 1.54 points. The F-test rejects
the null hypothesis that the linear combination of β5 and β12 equals zero at an acceptable
5.75% significance level. Therefore, an individual that did not expect to become unemployed
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has, on average, a life satisfaction that is 1.5 points lower compared to an individual who
expected unemployment, all else equal. This applies for unexpected unemployment when
expectations about future employment are adjusted downwards in the period of becoming
unemployed. In contrast, we find no statistically significant difference in mental well-being
between unexpected and expected unemployed when expectations remain or become posi-
tive in t, respectively. The distinguishing linear combination of coefficients in this case is
β5 + β10 + β12. The estimated coefficient of this linear combination is -0.04 points in life
satisfaction and is statistically not significant. Thus, individuals who became unemployed
unexpectedly but who still have positive expectations about their future employment status,
are not different from those unemployed who expected to become unemployed but also have
positive expectations about their future employment. Hence, depending on the expectations
in t, we find a reference-dependent effect of unemployment on mental well-being. While
individuals with current positive expectations seem not to be affected by the fact that their
unemployment was not expected, we find a clear negative effect for those individuals who
are pessimistic about their future employment status which stems from the unexpectedness
of their unemployment. A detailed look at the estimated coefficients in the particular linear
combinations reveals the mechanism behind this difference.
Again, Table 2.8 shows in particular the estimated coefficients that contribute to the
calculation of the linear combinations above. First of all, the coefficient of the variable
(qist−1)(xist), β12 is the one which uniquely measures the reference-dependent effect of be-
coming unemployed unexpectedly. For both types of individuals who became unexpectedly
unemployed, this coefficient is part of the linear combinations of coefficients that distinguish
them from the expectedly unemployed. The estimate is -1.6 and is statistically significant
at the 5% level. The estimated size of the reference-dependent effect equals one standard
deviation of overall life satisfaction and about three-fourths of the mean difference in life sat-
isfaction between the employed and the unemployed (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7). For both types
of unexpectedly unemployed individuals, this result shows an average drop in life satisfaction
of almost 2 points. Again, this negative effect only stems from the unexpectedness of their
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unemployment. However, both types benefit from their positive expectations in t− 1. This
effect is reflected in the coefficient of the variable qist−1, β5. The estimate of this coefficient is
0.06 and statistically significant at a level lower than 1%. However, compared to individuals
who expected their unemployment, all else equal, this positive effect is not able to outweigh
the negative effect from the unexpected unemployment. Therefore, the results suggest that
the unexpected incidence of unemployment worsens the situation for the unemployed. Fo-
cusing on those unexpectedly unemployed with ongoing positive expectations, the coefficient
of the variable (q
ist
)(qist−1), β10 is of additional relevance. This coefficient captures the effect
of continued positive expectations in the case of becoming unemployed in t. The estimate
is 1.5 and is statistically significant at the 10% level. In absolute values, the estimate of β10
is close to the estimate of β12. The fact that these individuals, in spite of their unexpected
unemployment, go on with positive expectations makes them statistically not distinguish-
able from individuals who expected their unemployment. The positive effect from ongoing
positive expectations outweighs the negative effect from unexpected unemployment.
In summary, the results show a general reference-dependent negative effect for all indi-
viduals that became unemployed unexpectedly. This effect stems from the unexpectedness
of unemployment, i.e. a negative deviation from the reference point. Individuals who have
negative expectations about their job future after they became unemployed unexpectedly,
i.e. individuals who adjusted their expectations downwards after becoming unemployed
unexpectedly, directly suffer from the negative deviation of their employment status from
their reference point. Their positive expectations in the period prior to their unemployment
cannot outweigh the negative effect from the unexpected unemployment. In contrast, in-
dividuals who became unemployed unexpectedly but with unaffected positive expectations
about their future employment are statistically not different from those who became unem-
ployed expectedly. This similarity is owed to the fact that in this case the positive effect from
ongoing positive expectations outweighs the negative effect from unexpected unemployment.
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2.5.4 Results from Fixed Effects Estimation by Age Groups
In order to estimate different slopes of the regression line for different ages, the data set
is divided into two age groups (similar to using interaction terms). The number of only two
sub-samples is mainly driven by the limited number of observed unemployed individuals.
The first sub-sample includes individuals aged 30 to 40 (24,731 observations) and the second
sub-sample includes individuals aged 41 to 55 (37,404 observations). Table 2.22 in the
Appendix shows the distribution of life satisfaction and expectations over years of age by
employment status. Average life satisfaction in the older age groups (6.99 for the employed
and 5.31 for the unemployed individuals) is slightly lower than in the younger group (7.16
for the employed and 5.18 for the unemployed individuals). However, the average share of
unemployed with positive expectations in the older age group is about 12% points lower than
in the younger age group (83.4% and 71.7%, respectively). There is no such clear difference
in average expectations between younger and older individuals who are employed (40.7%
and 40.1%, respectively).
The estimated coefficients for the younger age group mainly confirm the findings from
the basic estimation, see Table 2.11.
Table 2.12 shows the results for the estimated differences in life satisfaction between
employed and unemployed young individuals.
Again, the highest differences in life satisfaction between employed and unemployed in-
dividuals is found for unexpected outcomes in the employment status with adjusted expec-
tations in the next period. The estimated difference between individuals who became un-
expectedly employed and individuals who expectedly remained unemployed with an upward
adjustment of expectations, (1010) and (1110), is 3.87 points in life satisfaction (0.2% signifi-
cance level). Also, individuals who became unexpectedly unemployed followed by downward
adjusted expectations have a life satisfaction that is 2.8 points lower than comparable em-
ployed individuals (0.0% significance level). In both cases, the difference in life satisfaction
exceeds the overall difference in life satisfaction between employed and unemployed individ-
uals, see Section 2.4.2.
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Table 2.11: Fixed effects estimates for life satisfaction
30 - 40 41 - 55
Variable Coefficient HAC SE Coefficient HAC SE
xist β1 -0.9223* 0.5290 -0.2328 0.2476
xist−1 β2 -0.8241*** 0.2829 0.1703 0.1578
qist β3 0.2397*** 0.0310 0.2118*** 0.0257
q
ist
β4 -0.0409 0.5864 -0.4071 0.2838
qist−1 β5 0.0983*** 0.0298 0.0556** 0.0259
q
ist−1
β6 0.8115*** 0.2905 -0.2497 0.1747
xist × xist−1 β7 -0.8023 1.4722 -0.3582 0.5604
qist × qist−1 β8 -0.0961** 0.0408 0.0115 0.0361
qist × qist−1 β9 -2.0815*** 0.7744 0.0005 0.4393
q
ist
× qist−1 β10 2.3309*** 0.8276 0.6217 1.1881
q
ist
× q
ist−1
β11 0.8471 1.5446 1.0205 0.9507
qist−1 × xist β12 -1.9170*** 0.7040 -1.1909 1.0895
q
ist−1
× xist β13 -0.0606 1.1869 -1.2872* 0.6900
qist × xist−1 β14 1.9672*** 0.7555 0.1033 0.3981
q
ist
× xist−1 β15 0.1054 1.6763 0.1925 0.8119
Age -0.0467* 0.0278 -0.0147 0.0169
Years of Education 0.0003 0.0236 -0.0183 0.0280
Married 0.2077*** 0.0449 0.0406 0.0659
Children in household 0.0263 0.0239 0.0277 0.0209
Net Income 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000
Foreign -0.0952 0.1671 -0.2523 0.2067
Private insurance -0.0752 0.0653 0.1354* 0.0698
Blue collar -0.0774* 0.0469 0.0095 0.0425
Self assessed health 0.4119*** 0.0178 0.4640*** 0.0136
Constant 6.7249*** 1.0561 5.9936*** 0.9546
αi yes yes
δs yes yes
λt yes yes
δs × λt yes yes
N 24731 37404
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.12: Estimated differences in LS: employed and unemployed – 30 - 40
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/0) vs (0/1) (1/0) vs (1/1)
H0: β1 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 = 0
(0/0) p-value = 0.0813 p-value = 0.1677
β1 = -0.9223 β1 + β7 = -1.7246
H0: β3 = β1 + β4 H0: β3 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β7 + β15
(0/1) p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0022
(β1 + β4)− (β3) = -1.2028 (β1 + β4 + β7 + β15)
−(β3 + β14) = -3.8670
H0: β1 + β12 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 + β13 = 0
(1/0) p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0000
β1 + β12 = -2.8392 β1 + β7 + β13 = -1.7852
H0: β3 + β8 H0: β3 + β9 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β10 + β12 = β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15
(1/1) p-value = 0.0584 p-value = 0.0059
(β1 + β4 + β10 + β12) (β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15)
−(β3 + β8) = -0.6928 −(β3 + β9 + β14) = -0.9989
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
For the older age group, the results suggest only minor differences in life satisfaction
between employed and unemployed individuals, see Table 2.13. Moreover, the unexpect-
edness of the employment status outcome in cases with adjusted expectations in the next
period seems not to play a role. Only in the case with unexpected ongoing unemployment
and downward adjusted expectations ((1010) versus (1110)), the estimated difference in life
satisfaction of 1.88 points is significant at the 0.0% level.
These findings for both age groups are also reflected in the estimated differences in life
satisfaction between expectedly and unexpectedly unemployed individuals, see Table 2.14
and Table 2.15.
For the younger age group, the reference-dependent effect (β12) is -1.9 and highly signif-
icant. This effect is only slightly lowered by the highly significant effect of previous positive
expectations (β5), 0.1. Therefore, the overall reduction in life satisfaction that occurs because
the unemployment was not expected is estimated to be 1.8 points (0.1% significance level).
In the case where positive expectations are not affected by unemployment, a significant
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Table 2.13: Estimated differences in LS: employed and unemployed – 41 - 55
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/0) vs (0/1) (1/0) vs (1/1)
H0: β1 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 = 0
(0/0) p-value = 0.3472 p-value = 0.2494
β1 = -0.2328 β1 + β7 = -0.5910
H0: β3 = β1 + β4 H0: β3 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β7 + β15
(0/1) p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.2085
(β1 + β4)− (β3) = -0.8517 (β1 + β4 + β7 + β15)
−(β3 + β14) = -1.1207
H0: β1 + β12 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 + β13 = 0
(1/0) p-value = 0.1787 p-value = 0.0000
β1 + β12 = -1.4238 β1 + β7 + β13 = -1.8782
H0: β3 + β8 H0: β3 + β9 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β10 + β12 = β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15
(1/1) p-value = 0.0019 p-value = 0.0000
(β1 + β4 + β10 + β12) (β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15)
−(β3 + β8) = -1.4324 −(β3 + β9 + β14) = -1.3879
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
Table 2.14: Estimated differences in LS: expected and unexpected unemployment – 30 - 40
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/1)
H0: β5 + β12 = 0
(0/0) vs (1/0) p-value = 0.0098
(β5 + β12) = -1.8187
H0: β5 + β10 + β12 = 0
(0/1) vs (1/1) p-value = 0.2477
(β5 + β10 + β12) = 0.5123
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
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reference-dependent effect does not appear.
Table 2.15: Estimated differences in LS: expected and unexpected unemployment – 41 - 55
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/1)
H0: β5 + β12 = 0
(0/0) vs (1/0) p-value = 0.2972
(β5 + β12) = -1.1354
H0: β5 + β10 + β12 = 0
(0/1) vs (1/1) p-value = 0.2820
(β5 + β10 + β12) = -0.5137
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
As expected from the comparison of life satisfaction levels between employed and un-
employed individuals in the older age group, the results suggest no empirical evidence for
reference-dependent effects of unemployment for this part of the population.
A generally higher fluctuation in the job market for younger individuals and thus a
higher variation in the employment status in the data set could make up for a possible
explanation for this result. Table 2.23 in the Appendix shows the number of observations for
all appearing counts of total unemployment periods per individual. The distribution of total
counts is almost the same for the younger and older age group. Hence, a higher volatility for
younger individuals between employment and unemployment periods seems not to be the
reason for our findings.
Another explanation could be that younger individuals tend to be less risk averse than
older individuals. Therefore, they might choose jobs with generally lower job security, such
as, in young and developing startup companies with a higher probability to become unem-
ployed than more risk averse older individuals. However, estimation of the same regression
model but with industrial fixed effects instead of federal state fixed effects yields similar
results (see Table 2.21 in the Appendix).
We tend towards the level of expertise in the job market as the most plausible explanation
for the difference between younger and older individuals. While older individuals might
be more experienced in the evaluation of information regarding their future employment
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status, younger individuals seem to be less able to anticipate potential unemployment. The
difference in the ability to foresee unemployment between younger and older individuals is
supported by the data, see Table 2.24 in the Appendix. 19.1% of the younger individuals
who became unemployed did not expect their unemployment, whereas, only 5.2% of the older
age group became unemployed without expecting it. Not such a clear but similar pattern
can be found for those individuals who stayed unemployed. 75.8% of the younger individuals
who were unemployed in t − 1 and who stayed unemployed in t had positive expectations
for t, whereas, the share amongst the older unemployed is 70%. These numbers suggest that
too few individuals in the older age group did not expect to become unemployed to show
a statistically significant reference-dependent effect of unemployment on mental well-being
among this group.
2.5.5 Results from Fixed Effects Estimation by Gender
The estimated coefficients for the stratified data by gender mainly confirm the findings
from the basic estimation, see Table 2.16.
For males, we find a statistically significant lower life satisfaction by 1.3 points on av-
erage for unemployed individuals even with negative expectations in both t − 1 and t and
unemployment in t − 1, see Table 2.17. However, there is no significant difference between
employed and unemployed males when both were employed in t− 1, unemployment was not
expected and expectations adjusted downwards in t ((0010) versus (0110)).
This result is also reflected in Table 2.18. While the results of the basic estimation
suggest a statistically significant difference in life satisfaction of expectedly and unexpectedly
unemployed individuals with downward adjusted expectations in t, this is not the case for
males. The linear combination of β5 and β12 shows a lower life satisfaction, by 1.3 points,
for unexpectedly unemployed males but the difference is not statistically significant. For a
deeper insight, we estimate a further stratification for males by age and find that only for
males aged 41 to 55 no reference-dependent effect appears. For males aged 30 to 40, we find
a drop in life satisfaction by 2.3 points on average (0.3% significance level) caused by the
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Table 2.16: Fixed effects estimates for life satisfaction – Gender
Male Female
Variable Coefficient HAC SE Coefficient HAC SE
xist β1 -0.1930 0.3101 -0.5517* 0.3116
xist−1 β2 -0.0874 0.1951 -0.1488 0.1895
qist β3 0.2008*** 0.0259 0.2332*** 0.0296
q
ist
β4 -0.8133** 0.3451 0.1529 0.3543
qist−1 β5 0.0541** 0.0240 0.0755** 0.0306
q
ist−1
β6 -0.0079 0.2042 0.0880 0.2070
xist × xist−1 β7 -1.0904* 0.6440 0.0749 0.9737
qist × qist−1 β8 0.0130 0.0339 -0.0615 0.0419
qist × qist−1 β9 -1.3243*** 0.4752 -0.1012 0.5319
q
ist
× qist−1 β10 1.4514 1.1996 1.9160** 0.8826
q
ist
× q
ist−1
β11 1.0028 0.9886 1.6252 1.2343
qist−1 × xist β12 -1.3649 1.1375 -2.1862*** 0.7146
q
ist−1
× xist β13 -0.4965 0.7184 -1.2393 1.0928
qist × xist−1 β14 1.1417** 0.4468 0.3780 0.5049
q
ist
× xist−1 β15 0.7222 0.8475 -1.4823 0.9835
Age -0.0365** 0.0179 -0.0247 0.0216
Years of Education -0.0185 0.0218 -0.0190 0.0289
Married 0.1350*** 0.0440 0.1056* 0.0610
Children in household 0.0255 0.0168 0.0000 0.0251
Net Income 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0000
Foreign -0.1410 0.1461 -0.2112 0.2319
Private insurance 0.0543 0.0524 0.0087 0.0930
Blue collar -0.0537 0.0387 -0.0136 0.0516
Self assessed health 0.4600*** 0.0144 0.4530*** 0.0160
Constant 6.7223*** 0.8834 6.4740*** 1.0288
αi yes yes
δs yes yes
λt yes yes
δs × λt yes yes
N 34608 27527
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.17: Estimated differences in LS: employed and unemployed – Male
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/0) vs (0/1) (1/0) vs (1/1)
H0: β1 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 = 0
(0/0) p-value = 0.5337 p-value = 0.0192
β1 = -0.1930 β1 + β7 = -1.2834
H0: β3 = β1 + β4 H0: β3 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β7 + β15
(0/1) p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0023
(β1 + β4)− (β3) = -1.2070 (β1 + β4 + β7 + β15)
−(β3 + β14) = -2.7169
H0: β1 + β12 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 + β13 = 0
(1/0) p-value = 0.1544 p-value = 0.0002
β1 + β12 = -1.5579 β1 + β7 + β13 = -1.7800
H0: β3 + β8 H0: β3 + β9 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β10 + β12 = β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15
(1/1) p-value = 0.0014 p-value = 0.0020
(β1 + β4 + β10 + β12) (β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15)
−(β3 + β8) = -1.1335 −(β3 + β9 + β14) = -0.8862
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
unexpectedness of unemployment when expectations are adjusted downwards. Again, this
result reflects the differences between age groups as discussed in Section 2.5.4. Interestingly,
when expectations of younger men are adjusted upwards or remain positive after becoming
unemployed, the effect of ongoing expectations not only outweighs the negative effect from
unexpected unemployment but even exceeds it (β10 = 3.27 at 0.1% significance level).
Table 2.18: Estimated differences in LS: expected and unexpected unemployment – Male
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/1)
H0: β5 + β12 = 0
(0/0) vs (1/0) p-value = 0.2490
(β5 + β12) = -1.3108
H0: β5 + β10 + β12 = 0
(0/1) vs (1/1) p-value = 0.7138
(β5 + β10 + β12) = 0.1406
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
For females, we find similar results as in the basic estimation both in the comparison of
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employed and unemployed (see Table 2.19) and in the comparison of expected and unex-
pected unemployment (see Table 2.18). In the case of downward adjusted expectations after
becoming unemployed unexpectedly, the average reference-dependent effect is -2.11 points
in life satisfaction. For females with constant expectations, we find no reference-dependent
effect for females. The results of the regression for the further stratified female sub-sample
into age groups suggest no differences between older and younger women regarding reference-
dependent effects of unemployment on mental well-being.
Table 2.19: Estimated differences in LS: employed and unemployed – Female
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/0) vs (0/1) (1/0) vs (1/1)
H0: β1 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 = 0
(0/0) p-value = 0.0767 p-value = 0.6326
β1 = -0.5517 β1 + β7 = -0.4768
H0: β3 = β1 + β4 H0: β3 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β7 + β15
(0/1) p-value = 0.0009 p-value = 0.0041
(β1 + β4)− (β3) = -0.6321 (β1 + β4 + β7 + β15)
−(β3 + β14) = -2.4174
H0: β1 + β12 = 0 H0: β1 + β7 + β13 = 0
(1/0) p-value = 0.0000 p-value = 0.0003
β1 + β12 = -2.7379 β1 + β7 + β13 = -1.7161
H0: β3 + β8 H0: β3 + β9 + β14
= β1 + β4 + β10 + β12 = β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15
(1/1) p-value = 0.0870 p-value = 0.0003
(β1 + β4 + β10 + β12) (β1 + β4 + β7 + β11 + β13 + β15)
−(β3 + β8) = -0.8410 −(β3 + β9 + β14) = -1.9303
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
Summarizing this subsection, we find empirical evidence for reference-dependent effects
of unemployment on mental well-being for females and younger males.9 Only for older men
the results suggest no evidence for reference-dependence in the context of unemployment.
9Following the reasoning by Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009) this gender difference can be
explained by family constraints for women. They argue that married women with exogenous entries into
unemployment are flexible in labour market participation as their labour supply is likely conditional on the
labour supply of their partners. They show that the negative effect of exogenous entries into unemployment
is mainly driven by married women.
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Table 2.20: Estimated differences in LS: expected and unexpected unemployment – Female
❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵❵
(qt−1/qt)
(xt−1/xt) (0/1)
H0: β5 + β12 = 0
(0/0) vs (1/0) p-value = 0.0031
(β5 + β12) = -2.1107
H0: β5 + β10 + β12 = 0
(0/1) vs (1/1) p-value = 0.7083
(β5 + β10 + β12) = -0.1947
Note: qt = 1 if expectations are positive, xt = 1 if unemployed in t
2.6 Conclusion
Our empirical results show that mental well-being of individuals who expected to be-
come unemployed is less affected by becoming unemployed than when the unemployment
was not expected previously. We find that current and past expectations about the fu-
ture employment status have an important impact, not only directly on mental well-being,
but also, on the perception of the employment status. Our results are derived from the
estimation of an econometric model which follows the structure of theoretical models with
reference-dependent preferences and endogenous reference points that are determined by
lagged expectations. We assumed that unemployment rates are used as an information to
build expectations about the future employment status, and lagged expectations represent
the reference point. We developed the hypothesis that depending on expectations (i.e. the
reference point) becoming unemployed affects the individuals differently.
The contribution of our study is twofold. First, we add to the literature on unemployment
and mental well-being where the mechanism of how unemployment rates and expectations
affect the perception of unemployment remained unclear so far. While in this strand of
literature only current expectations about the future are taken into account, we show that
past expectations play an important role in the perception of unemployment. We find that
previously expecting unemployment attenuates the negative effect of becoming unemployed.
On the one hand, it seems important to give individuals sufficient notice of their unemploy-
ment so that they are able to anticipate their unemployment and adapt to the situation.
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On the other hand, it could be important for re-employment programs to focus particularly
on individuals who became unemployed unexpectedly as their higher drop in mental well-
being may involve a higher risk of developing serious mental illnesses. This, in turn could
reduce their chances of re-employment. Our results show that positive expectations about
re-employment even in the case of unexpected unemployment are able to keep up mental
well-being at the same level than when unemployment was expected.
Second, our finding that unexpected unemployment has a stronger negative impact on
mental well-being than expected unemployment, supports theoretical models with reference-
dependent preferences and endogenous reference point formation with empirical evidence.
Therefore, we also contribute to the literature on the importance of reference points
(DellaVigna (2009) for an overview). Our results suggest that lagged expectations about
the future employment status indeed serve as a reference point, and that the size of the ef-
fect of unemployment on mental well-being reflects a deviation from an individual reference
point rather than the final state of unemployment.
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2.7 Appendix
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Table 2.21: Estimates for life satisfaction with industrial sector fixed effects
All
Variable Coefficient HAC SE
xist β1 -0.2971 0.5951
xist−1 β2 -0.1499 0.1481
qist β3 0.2140*** 0.0197
q
ist
β4 -0.4840** 0.2609
qist−1 β5 0.0633*** 0.0193
q
ist−1
β6 0.0769 0.1572
xist × xist−1 β7 -0.6100 0.5942
qist × qist−1 β8 -0.0319 0.0267
qist × qist−1 β9 -0.5626* 0.3931
q
ist
× qist−1 β10 1.5273* 0.8878
q
ist
× q
ist−1
β11 1.2361 0.8947
qist−1 × xist β12 -1.5971** 0.8272
q
ist−1
× xist β13 -0.9352 0.6345
qist × xist−1 β14 0.6279* 0.3741
q
ist
× xist−1 β15 0.0855 0.8202
Age 0.0039** 0.0508
Years of Education -0.0149 0.0173
Married 0.1373*** 0.0367
Children in household 0.0210 0.0141
Net Income 0.0001*** 0.0000
Foreign 0.1257 0.1271
Private insurance 0.0549 0.0470
Blue collar -0.0233 0.0317
Self assessed health 0.4555*** 0.0108
Constant 5.3769*** 1.9620
αi yes
δs yes
λt yes
δs × λt yes
N 62135
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 2.22: Summary statistics of life satisfaction and expectations by employment status
and age years
xit = 0 xit = 1
Age Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
30
y 7.255 1.523
1662
5.824 2.430
17
q / q 0.425 0.495 0.882 0.332
31
y 7.276 1.488
1729
5.222 2.108
9
q / q 0.426 0.495 0.778 0.441
32
y 7.229 1.536
1871
6.524 2.205
21
q / q 0.433 0.496 0.905 0.301
33
y 7.198 1.527
2022
6.111 1.779
18
q / q 0.409 0.492 0.944 0.236
34
y 7.209 1.500
2140
5.050 1.820
20
q / q 0.422 0.494 0.800 0.410
35
y 7.192 1.515
2275
5.583 1.311
11
q / q 0.411 0.492 0.667 0.492
36
y 7.157 1.526
2404
5.294 2.085
17
q / q 0.395 0.489 0.941 0.243
37
y 7.124 1.558
2464
5.867 1.767
15
q / q 0.395 0.489 0.933 0.258
38
y 7.060 1.574
2583
5.889 1.530
17
q / q 0.391 0.488 0.611 0.502
39
y 7.124 1.560
2672
5.125 1.893
16
q / q 0.397 0.489 0.813 0.403
40
y 7.095 1.563
2728
5.611 3.183
18
q / q 0.391 0.488 0.833 0.383
41
y 7.027 1.565
2785
5.500 1.713
16
q / q 0.386 0.487 0.875 0.342
42
y 7.048 1.563
2836
5.692 2.175
13
q / q 0.384 0.486 0.769 0.439
43
y 6.960 1.620
2787
5.000 1.440
25
q / q 0.375 0.484 0.750 0.441
44
y 6.970 1.629
2792
5.462 1.964
24
q / q 0.371 0.483 0.731 0.452
45
y 6.961 1.609
2727
4.762 1.921
21
q / q 0.371 0.483 0.762 0.436
46
y 6.971 1.617
2630
5.294 1.993
16
q / q 0.390 0.488 0.765 0.437
47
y 6.965 1.662
2595
5.360 2.378
23
q / q 0.378 0.485 0.600 0.500
48
y 6.953 1.681
2568
5.261 2.220
23
q / q 0.385 0.487 0.783 0.422
49
y 7.010 1.624
2487
5.053 2.041
19
q / q 0.403 0.491 0.895 0.315
50
y 6.995 1.637
2416
5.217 1.882
21
q / q 0.404 0.491 0.609 0.499
51
y 6.998 1.655
2324
4.895 1.792
18
q / q 0.402 0.490 0.684 0.478
52
y 6.994 1.623
2227
5.526 1.806
19
q / q 0.431 0.495 0.684 0.478
53
y 7.033 1.625
2127
5.500 1.900
10
q / q 0.455 0.498 0.500 0.527
54
y 7.016 1.620
1989
6.400 1.776
10
q / q 0.454 0.498 0.700 0.483
55
y 6.972 1.646
1838
6.143 1.864
6
q / q 0.477 0.500 0.429 0.535
y: life satisfaction (0 = low, 10 = high)
q: share of employed with positive expectations
q: share of unemployed with positive expectations
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Table 2.23: Counts of unemployment periods - by age
Counts 30 - 40 41 - 55∑T
t=1 xit Number Percent Number Percent
0 24 081 97.37 36 372 97.24
1 517 2.09 802 2.14
2 107 0.43 175 0.47
3 20 0.08 48 0.13
4 6 0.02 7 0.02
Total 24 731 100.00 37 404 100.00
Table 2.24: Counts of correctly predicted unemployment - by age
30 - 40 41 - 55
xit = 0 xit = 1 xit = 0 xit = 1
qit−1 = 1 10 086 22 14 886 10
qit−1 = 0 13 796 93 21 490 180
Total 23 882 115 36 376 190
q
it−1
= 1 585 50 585 60
q
it−1
= 0 83 16 167 26
Total 668 66 752 86
q: expectations of the employed
q: expectations of the unemployed
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Public and Private Health Insurance
in Germany: The Ignored Risk
Selection Problem∗
∗This chapter is based on the joint work “Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany: The Ignored
Risk Selection Problem” (2014, Health Economics, 23(6), 670 - 687; DOI: 10.1002/hec.2942.) with Robert
Nuscheler. Both authors contributed equally to this work.
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3.1 Introduction
We investigate risk selection between public and private health insurance in Germany.
There are several differences between these two branches of health care financing, and perhaps
the most important one is the calculation of premiums. While public premiums are subject
to community rating, private premiums are risk rated. Moreover, public premiums are
proportional to income (up to some ceiling), and private premiums do not depend on income.
The private system is, thus, particularly attractive for high-income - low-risk individuals.
Using 2000 to 2007 data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), we find
advantageous selection in favor of private insurers as suggested by the differences in premium
calculation. Interestingly, private insurers are unable to select the healthy upon enrollment.
They profit from individuals who experienced a negative health shock: these individuals
lean more towards switching from private to public health insurance. The associated health
care spending then accrues in the public rather than in the private system. Fair competition
between systems calls for a risk-adjusted compensation; that is, the dispensing private insurer
should compensate the receiving public insurer.
Selection problems received considerable attention in both academic circles and policy
debates (for overviews see, e.g., Van de Ven and Ellis 2000, Van de Ven et al. 2003, and for
the German case Buchner and Wasem 2003). In most cases, the focus was on selection issues
within the public system. Selection between public and private health insurance has been
largely ignored. This is surprising, as health systems with sizeable public and private sectors
exist in several countries, USA, Germany, and the Netherlands being the prime examples.
Debate on public-private health care financing, however, extends to other countries, including
Australia, Austria, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and UK (Healy et al.
2006, Mossialos and Thomson 2004). But still, the impact of health care financing on access
to health care and on health outcomes is not well understood (see Tuohy et al. 2004 for an
international survey). The analysis in this chapter aims at improving the understanding of
the effects of parallel health care financing by focusing on risk selection between public and
private health insurance.
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One of the very few studies that investigate risk selection between public and private
health insurance is the analysis offered by Sapelli and Vial (2003). They analyze the Chilean
health insurance market and find advantageous selection in favor of private insurers. As
premium calculations in Chile and Germany are similar, selection incentives are similar as
well. However, there are also differences between countries. In Germany, the purchase of
private health insurance implies that an individual leaves the public system; thus, they have
no access to the public system’s benefits. In Chile, they, de facto, have. This is why Sapelli
and Vial (2003) may, to some extend, be read as a paper on supplementary private health
insurance. There are two studies on Germany that analyze risk selection between systems,
Albrecht et al. (2007) and Greß (2007). While the former article only provides a descriptive
analysis, the latter finds adverse selection against the public plan but does not analyze how
selection actually works or what can be done about it. The current study fills this gap.
This chapter contributes to the literature on risk selection. Cutler and Reber (1998)
and Nicholson et al. (2003) found evidence for selection in favor of Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO). Both studies analyze actual cost data and show that those who switch
to a less generous plan; that is, to an HMO, have lower health care expenses than those who
remain in the pool. Nuscheler and Knaus (2005) find no selection within the German public
health insurance system. Other recent studies on Germany investigate the effectiveness of
competition among public health insurers focusing on the price elasticity of switching (e.g.,
Schut et al. 2003 and Tamm et al. 2007) or on the means of competition (Becker and
U¨belmesser 2007). None of these studies, however, addresses the selection problem between
public and private insurers in Germany.
This remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the institu-
tional background. The dataset is introduced in in Section 3.3, followed by a discussion of
the empirical strategy in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents our results and Section 3.6 offers
concluding remarks.
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3.2 Institutional background
The analysis sample used to identify risk selection ranges from 2000 to 2007. Accordingly,
this section concentrates on the institutions and regulations of that period. As some aspects
of the 2009 reform are relevant to our study, we refer to them whenever we see fit.
While most residents of Germany are obliged to buy public health insurance, there is still
a sizeable share of the population that are allowed to opt for a private alternative. In the
following, we will describe both the public and the private health insurance system in some
detail, including a separate discussion of health care financing for civil servants, the so-called
‘Beihilfe-scheme’. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the most important characteristics of
public and private health insurance. The institutional differences govern the incentives to
switch between systems. Switching regulations and switching incentives are analyzed and
discussed in separate subsections.1
Table 3.1: Characteristics of public and private health insurance
Characteristic Public Insurance
Private Insurance
(regular)
Risk rated premiums no yes
Income related premiums yes no
Community rating yes no
Open enrollment yes no
Risk adjustment yes no
Regulation of benefits medical necessities at least public benefits
Provision of benefits in-kind cash
Family insurance yes no
PAYGO system yes no
Portability of old age provisions NA yes (≤ 100%)
1Note that the public-private-terminology refers to the financing of health care and not to its provision.
Providers are mostly private and usually hold contracts with both public and private insurers.
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3.2.1 Public health insurance
There are currently about 150 non-profit public health insurers (sickness funds) that cover
roughly 90% of the population. In most cases, enrollment in the public system is compulsory.
Since the 1996 reform, publicly insured individuals can freely choose their sickness fund. Due
to the individuals’ remarkably high propensity to switch from one sickness fund to another,
there is considerable competition among public insurers.
Premiums in the public system are subject to community rating; that is, a sickness fund
is legally obliged to demand the same contribution rate from all its enrollees. As a result,
the contribution rate is independent of individual characteristics, including risk status. The
contribution rate is then used to calculate the insurance premium. Table 3.2 provides the
annual gross income ceilings up to which the insurance premiums are proportional to income.
For individuals with incomes higher than the ceiling, the insurance premium is flat and given
by the product of contribution rate and income ceiling. Under these constraints (and a zero-
profit requirement), sickness funds were free to set their contribution rate.
Table 3.2: Contribution ceiling and threshold for compulsory insurance*
Year Income Ceiling Income Threshold
(public premium calculation) (compulsory public insurance)
2000 39576 39576
2001 40034 40034
2002 40500 40500
2003 41400 45900
2004 41850 46350
2005 42300 46800
2006 42750 47250
2007 42750 47700
Note: * Annual Gross Income in Euros.
With community-rated premiums, public insurers have an incentive to engage in risk
selection. As a response to this market failure, several measures were introduced to prevent
risk selection or to mitigate the incentives for risk selection. Open enrollment prevents
insurers from denying coverage to individuals with an unfavorable risk profile. The benefit
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package is highly regulated so that sickness funds cannot design their benefit packages in a
way to attract favorable individuals or to alienate unfavorable ones (about 95% of the benefit
package is set by law, see Buchner and Wasem 2003). Finally, risk adjustment reduces the
incentives to engage in risk selection. As Nuscheler and Knaus (2005) found no evidence for
selection by funds, the aforementioned measures appear to be effective.2
Finally, two additional characteristics of public health insurance are relevant to this
analysis. First, public benefits are provided in-kind. Second, one of the (potential) benefits
of public health insurance is ‘family insurance’; that is, all dependent family members without
income (e.g., married partners and children below the age of 26 years) are covered for free.
3.2.2 Private health insurance
About 10% of the German population is covered by private health insurance. In total,
there are 45 for-profit insurance companies providing such insurance. As already mentioned
in Section 3.1, the most important difference to the public system is premium calculation:
private premiums are risk rated, and typically, underwriting is conducted using a health
questionnaire. Risk assessment is carried out only once; that is, private health insurers must
not adjust the premium when health deteriorates. Unlike in the public system, the resulting
premiums are not directly related to individual income. There is family insurance in the
private system, but in contrast to the public system this insurance is not free; that is, an
insured individual has to pay additional premiums for married partners and children.
Benefits of private health insurance must be at least as comprehensive as public benefits.
In fact, most contracts come with more benefits in terms of services and service quality. It
is noteworthy that all private benefits are provided in cash: patients pay providers and then
seek reimbursement from their insurer.
In contrast to the public system, private health insurance is not a pure pay-as-you-go
2Nevertheless, politicians and several reports came to the conclusion that risk adjustment needed to be
improved (see, e.g. Jacobs et al. 2002 and Lauterbach and Wille 2001). In 2009, a new risk adjustment
mechanism was implemented that, in addition to some socio-economic characteristics, uses as many as 106
hierarchic morbidity indicators to calculate the transfers among funds.
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system. To hold premiums constant over the life cycle, private insurers are legally obliged to
build up old age provisions while the insured is young (and relatively healthy) to subsidize
premiums when he or she is old (and relatively sick).3 Due to technological progress and the
lack of cost-containment measures in the private system, old age provisions are insufficient,
and as a result, premiums increase over time.4
Competition among private health insurers was and still is severely undermined by reg-
ulation. Prior to 2009, old age provisions were not transferrable from one private insurer
to another. Thus, an insured person who switched insurers lost all old age provisions and
with it the financial resources needed to subsidize the insurance premium when he or she is
old. The requirement to build up a new capital stock with the new contract increased the
contract premium. As the premium effect increases with contract duration, consumers were
– after a couple of years – essentially locked in. Competition was, thus, most effective for
new customers but less so for existing customers.
3.2.3 Health care financing for civil servants
Civil servants may be appointed at the federal level or at the level of a regional state.
The respective health authority covers a fraction of the insured benefits via the so-called
‘Beihilfe-scheme’.5 Covered benefits compare to those of the public system, but, in contrast
to the public system, benefits are provided in cash and are financed from general taxation
rather than social security contributions. Depending on marital status and the number of
children, the respective health authority covers 50% to 70% of the costs of insured benefits
(80% for children).
As an example, consider an unmarried civil servant without children. In this case, the
health authority covers 50% of the costs of insured benefits. For the remaining 50%, the
3This obligation implies that premiums depend on the individual’s age at the time private health insur-
ance is purchased.
4Recall that the more important premium risk is insured: private insurers must not adjust premiums
when individual risk changes, e.g., when the individual ages.
5There is no unified ‘Beihilfe-scheme’ applicable to all civil servants in Germany but rather 17 different
laws (1 federal and 16 regional). Differences, however, are negligible and we here concentrate on the common
aspects of these schemes.
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individual may buy health insurance, either private or public. The problem with the latter
option is that no public contract with less than 100% cover is available. As a result, an
individual that opts for public insurance has to pay the full public premium (instead of
50% of it). The first option is usually more attractive, as the remaining 50% coverage can
be purchased at the respective 50% premium. Consequently, most civil servants purchase
private health insurance.6
3.2.4 Switching between insurance systems – regulations
Most residents of Germany must purchase public health insurance. Some professions
(most notably, civil servants and self-employed persons) and high-income individuals, how-
ever, can choose either public or private health insurance. The income threshold above which
individuals are allowed to buy private health insurance varies over time (see Table 3.2).7
Those who purchase private insurance leave the public system; that is, they are not eligible
for publicly financed benefits, and they do not directly contribute to the financing of the
system.8 Individuals who stay in the public system despite their eligibility to purchase the
private alternative are voluntarily insured in the public system.
As individuals aged 55 years or older must not switch from private to public health
insurance, we concentrate on the privately insured below 55 years of age. For our observation
period, a switch was allowed if the insured was enrolled in a public plan for at least 24
consecutive months within the previous five years. These requirements created a problem
for those who dropped out of the private system but did not meet these criteria. Self-
employed individuals who lost their business and with it the ability to pay private premiums
may serve as an example. As a result, some individuals were left without health insurance
(about 0.4% in 2008).
There are several circumstances under which an individual must switch from private to
6In our analysis sample, about 90% of civil servants hold private health insurance.
7In our empirical model, this variation is captured by time fixed effects.
8There are indirect payments through general taxation (4.7% of public health care spending in the first
half of 2009, see BMG 2009) and cross-subsidization via higher reimbursement rates in the private system.
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public insurance. If, for instance, gross annual income regularly falls short of the compulsory
public health insurance income threshold, then public enrollment is obligatory. To a large
extent, this also applies to privately insured individuals who get laid-off. For the unemployed,
there were and still are exemptions from this ‘obligation’. Those unemployed who have been
privately insured for the previous five years (at least) are allowed to stay in the private
system. If they do, however, they are on no account allowed to join the public plan in the
future. The federal employment agency generally pays the health insurance premium for all
unemployed individuals but only up to the amount that would have been due in the public
system. If the private premium is larger, the insured person has to pay the difference. The
inability to pay resulted in a loss of health insurance.9
3.2.5 Switching between systems – incentives
The institutional environment allows us to infer the directional effects of several variables
on the propensity to switch between systems. Table 3.3 shows the predicted signs for a switch
from public to private health insurance and vice versa.
Table 3.3: Switching incentives between systems
Variable Public to Private Private to Public
Health Status + –
Gross Income + –
Civil Servant + –
Self-Employed ? ?
Unemployed – +
Female – +
Age – –
Married – +
Number of Children – +
There are risk-rated premiums in the private market while public premiums are subject
to community rating. All else equal, the public-private premium differential will be larger
9Since the 2009 reform, individuals cannot loose health insurance; they always have access to private
health insurance (see Busse and Stock 2010 for details).
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for healthy individuals so that their incentive to switch to the private system is larger. Now
consider a privately insured individual that turns into a high risk; then, there is a supply side
effect and a demand side effect that both work in the same direction. As the private insurer
must not adjust the premium, the insurer has an incentive to dump the individual into the
public system, and a negative effect of health on switching is expected. This supply side effect
may be reinforced by the demand side. Due to the differences in the provision of benefits,
an individual that experienced a negative health shock may have to seek reimbursement on
a regular basis. The associated (opportunity) costs do not exist in the public system, as
benefits are provided in-kind rather than in cash.
Only individuals with voluntary public health insurance are allowed to purchase private
health insurance. As a sufficiently high gross income is one way to obtain this eligibility,
we expect a positive effect of gross income on the probability to switch (see Table 3.2 for
the income thresholds). If gross income of a privately insured individual regularly falls short
of the income threshold for compulsory public insurance, enrollment in the public system is
obligatory. Thus, gross income is expected to be negatively correlated with the probability
to switch from private to public insurance.
The public private premium differential is particularly large for civil servants. If they
purchase public insurance, then they have to pay the full public premium. In contrast,
private insurance can be tailored to their needs; that is, they can buy coverage only for the
fraction of health care expenses not covered by the ‘Beihilfe-scheme’.
The self-employed are generally exempt from mandatory public health insurance, al-
though the public benefit package is available at the maximum public premium. Depending
on preferences, self-employed individuals may prefer a more comprehensive cover and pur-
chase private health insurance. Although preferences are likely to be correlated with em-
ployment status, it is hard to sign their effect on switching probabilities for both directions.
In contrast, there is a clear prediction for the unemployed. An unemployed publicly insured
individual must not switch to the private system, as neither the income criterion nor the
profession requirement is met. If a privately insured individual gets laid-off, regulation may
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dictate enrollment in the public system.
Women have higher expected health care expenses than men, and this difference is re-
flected in private health insurance premiums. As there is no such difference in the public
system, the incentives to switch to the private system are smaller for females. The private
system is, thus, generally less attractive for women. This also implies that women are more
inclined to switch (back) to the public system.
For both directions, age is expected to have a negative effect on the propensity to switch
between systems. Suppose that a publicly insured individual considers switching to the
private system. The older this individual is, the less time is available for him or her to build
up old-age provisions in the private system. Thus, the private premium is, ceteris paribus,
set at a higher rate the older the individual is at the time the private health insurance is
purchased. The negative age effect for the opposite direction is a direct implication of the
regulations described above. It is, ceteris paribus, less likely that an older individual meets
the criteria that allow him or her to switch from private to public health insurance.
The effects of marital status and the number of children on switching behavior are gov-
erned by family insurance. As this benefit is only available in the public system, the signs
are fairly self-explanatory.
3.3 Data, Sampling, and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 The German Socio-Economic Panel
We use the 2000 to 2007 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to analyze
risk selection between public and private health insurance in Germany. On an annual ba-
sis, this representative survey collects extensive information about the same 11,000 private
households (more than 20,000 individuals). Since its inception in 1984, the SOEP has seen
several extensions and refreshment samples, which are included in our analysis.10
In addition to standard socio-demographic and socio-economic variables (e.g., age, gen-
10For more information on the SOEP data set, see Wagner et al. (1993) and Wagner et al. (2007).
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der, and employment status), the SOEP contains information on health status (e.g., self-
assessed health) and health care utilization (e.g., the number of doctor visits and hospital
stays). This information enables us to come up with a proxy for individual risk. Finally, the
SOEP collects information about health insurance. For every single year, we know whether
an individual was enrolled in the public health care system or whether private health insur-
ance was purchased. Table 3.4 provides a description of all variables used in our analysis.
The corresponding descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 3.5.
One of the advantages of the data set is its panel structure. It allows us to follow the
same set of individuals for a reasonable amount of time and thereby to construct two dummy
variables that indicate a switch from one system to the other. More precisely, the variable
PUB2PRIVit is 1 if individual i was publicly insured in period t but privately insured in
period t+1 and zero otherwise. Similarly, the variable PRIV 2PUBit is 1 if individual i was
privately insured in period t but publicly insured in period t+ 1.
To analyze switching decisions between systems, we split the sample into two sub-samples:
one ‘public sample’ and one ‘private sample’. The assignment is based on initial insurance
status. The full data set contains 65,901 observations (55,626 public and 10,275 private),
and there are a reasonable number of switches (705 switches from public to private and 539
from private to public).
3.3.2 Sample Selection
Sample selection is governed not only by Germany’s health insurance institutions and
its regulations but also by the research question we want to answer. First of all, we restrict
ourselves to individuals aged between 26 and 53 years. The exclusion of individuals under
26 years minimizes the risk of measuring effects that are rooted in expiring family insurance.
The upper limit guarantees that all switchers from public to private actually make the same
decision. As it is impossible to switch from private to public once an individual is 55 years or
older, switching for a person at least 54 year old would also be irreversible. We have further
restricted the sample to observations with a maximum of one switch between systems, as
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Table 3.4: Explanation of variables
Variable Explanation
Dependent variables
SAH5t Self-assessed health status, 1 = bad, 2 = not so good,
3 = satisfactory, 4 = good, 5 = very good
SAH2t 1 = if SAH5t ≥ 4, 0 = if SAH5t ≤ 3 (cut-off 3/4)
PUB2PRIVt 1 = switch from public into private system (public in t and private in t+ 1)
PRIV2PUBt 1 = switch from private into public system (private in t and public in t+ 1)
Explanatory variables
DISABt 1 = disability or incapacity to work
VISITSDOCt Number of visits to doctors during the last three month
HOSPITALt 1 = hospital stay during the last year
SICKSIXt 1 = work disability for longer than 6 weeks during the last year
LNINCOMEt Natural logarithm of net income of the last month
INCOMEGRt Gross income of the last month divided by 100
CIVILSERVt 1 = if civil servant
SELFEMPt 1 = selfemployed
UNEMPt 1 = unemployed
FEMALEt 1 = female
AGE26 30t* 1 = age between 26 and 30
AGE31 35t 1 = age between 31 and 35
AGE36 41t 1 = age between 36 and 41
AGE42 47t 1 = age between 42 and 47
AGE48 53t 1 = age between 48 and 53
MARRIEDt 1 = married
CHILDNUMt Number of children
TRAININGt 1 = if receiving educational training
EDUt Number of years completed in the education system
GERMANt 1 = German nationality
PUBLEMPt 1 = if public employee
FULLTIMEt 1 = full time employed
JOBWESTt 1 = job in western part of Germany
YEAR20XXt 1 = year XX=00*, . . . , 06
PUBCOMPt 1 = compulsory public insurance
PUBHOLDERt 1 = holder of public insurance contract (not covered by
public family insurance)
PRIVHOLDERt 1 = holder of private insurance contract (not covered by
private family insurance)
Notes: * indicates that the variable is a reference category in our estimation.
If not otherwise indicated all variables are measured at present (time of interview).
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Table 3.5: Mean and standard deviation for all variables
Public Private
Non-switcher Switcher Non-switcher Switcher
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
SAH5 3.5931 0.8161 3.8268 0.7781 3.7110 0.7958 3.7826 0.8382
SAH2 0.5968 0.4905 0.7314 0.4437 0.6583 0.4743 0.6680 0.4719
DISAB 0.0469 0.2114 0.0113 0.1058 0.0353 0.1845 0.0237 0.1525
VISITSDOC 1.8950 3.1422 1.5959 2.8167 1.9296 3.2880 1.5692 2.5589
HOSPITAL 0.0763 0.2656 0.0519 0.2221 0.0700 0.2551 0.0514 0.2212
SICKSIX 0.0423 0.2013 0.0203 0.1412 0.0298 0.1699 0.0435 0.2043
LNINCOME 7.2792 0.7104 7.6394 0.6711 7.9149 0.6279 7.6445 0.7291
INCOMEGR 28.4760 20.2596 40.4062 24.5142 49.4750 41.3687 39.2497 27.7336
CIVILSERV 0.0060 0.0775 0.1467 0.3542 0.4165 0.4930 0.2846 0.4521
SELFEMP 0.0151 0.1221 0.0497 0.2175 0.0385 0.1924 0.0949 0.2936
UNEMP 0.0082 0.0904 0.0023 0.0475 0.0003 0.0175 0.0040 0.0629
FEMALE 0.4930 0.5000 0.3567 0.4796 0.3245 0.4682 0.3399 0.4746
AGE 40.1943 7.4027 38.1558 7.4646 42.2026 7.0429 40.8339 7.6529
AGE26 30 0.1209 0.3261 0.1828 0.3870 0.0611 0.2395 0.1304 0.3374
AGE31 35 0.1719 0.3773 0.2302 0.4215 0.1430 0.3501 0.1462 0.3541
AGE36 41 0.2577 0.4374 0.2686 0.4437 0.2369 0.4252 0.2292 0.4212
AGE42 47 0.2492 0.4326 0.1716 0.3774 0.2760 0.4471 0.2490 0.4333
AGE48 53 0.2002 0.4002 0.1467 0.3542 0.2831 0.4505 0.2451 0.4310
MARRIED 0.6819 0.4658 0.5711 0.4955 0.6824 0.4656 0.6285 0.4842
CHILDNUM 0.8589 1.0057 0.6704 0.9295 0.8159 0.9726 0.8340 1.0893
TRAINING 0.0371 0.1891 0.0670 0.2554 0.0399 0.1957 0.0672 0.2509
EDU 12.2205 2.4581 14.2088 2.9040 14.8794 2.9240 13.4387 2.8248
GERMAN 0.9155 0.2782 0.9413 0.2353 0.9701 0.1704 0.9407 0.2366
PUBLEMP 0.1146 0.3186 0.1535 0.3609 0.2400 0.4271 0.1779 0.3832
FULLTIME 0.7372 0.4402 0.8600 0.3473 0.8800 0.3250 0.8617 0.3459
JOBWEST 0.6485 0.4774 0.6569 0.4753 0.7241 0.4470 0.6482 0.4785
YEAR2000 0.1602 0.3668 0.1287 0.3352 0.1198 0.3248 0.1779 0.3832
YEAR2001 0.1497 0.3568 0.1783 0.3832 0.1146 0.3186 0.1225 0.3285
YEAR2002 0.1494 0.3564 0.1828 0.3870 0.1671 0.3731 0.1976 0.3990
YEAR2003 0.1430 0.3501 0.1467 0.3542 0.1609 0.3675 0.1225 0.3285
YEAR2004 0.1381 0.3450 0.1084 0.3112 0.1517 0.3588 0.1225 0.3285
YEAR2005 0.1279 0.3339 0.1220 0.3275 0.1425 0.3496 0.1107 0.3143
YEAR2006 0.1317 0.3382 0.1332 0.3402 0.1433 0.3504 0.1462 0.3541
PUBCOMP 0.7949 0.4037 0.4515 0.4982
PUBHOLDER 0.9514 0.2150 0.9661 0.1811
PRIVHOLDER 0.9641 0.1861 0.8893 0.3143
N 40185 443 6518 253
76
Chapter 3 Public and Private Health Insurance in Germany
there are strong indications of measurement error when more than one switch has occurred
(see Table 3.6).11
Table 3.6: Sample selection
Total Public Private
Data Selection Process All Switches All Switches All Switches
Full Sample 65901 1244 55626 705 10275 539
Age 26-53 48358 921 41155 552 7203 369
Max. 1 Switch 47399 696 40628 443 6771 253
The resulting samples consist of two types of individuals. The first type is allowed to
switch from one system to the other and the second type is not. A switcher analysis based
on these samples, thus, measures the sum of two forms of risk selection, namely, active and
passive risk selection. Active risk selection refers to the insurers’ ability to screen out the
healthy from the pool of those who are allowed to switch. If the pool of those who are
allowed to switch is healthier on average than the pool of those who are not, risk selection
is a direct consequence of the regulatory environment described in Section 3.2.4. We refer
to this form of selection as passive risk selection. As we are interested in the full extent of
selection, we do not distinguish between active and passive risk selection.12
We arrive at an analysis sample that comprises 40,628 (443) and 6,771 (253) observations
(switches) for the public system and private system, respectively. Thus, within our observa-
tion period, there is a 1.1 (3.7)% probability that a publicly (privately) insured individual
purchases the private (public) alternative. Without revealing a clear time pattern, Table 3.7
shows a considerable variation in switching probabilities over time.
11This is unproblematic for our analysis, as only persistent changes are relevant for risk selection.
12In fact, for the private sample, such a distinction is impossible, as the information needed to categorize
individuals is not available in the SOEP. In contrast, this information is available for the public sample. In
an earlier version of our analysis, we concentrated on active risk selection and found no evidence for it (see
Grunow and Nuscheler 2010, for details). We find no evidence for selection for the (larger) public sample
considered here so that a distinction between the two forms of selection is unnecessary.
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Table 3.7: Distribution of switchers
Public Private
Year All Switcher % All Switcher %
2000 6496 0.88 826 5.45
2001 6096 1.30 778 3.98
2002 6083 1.33 1139 4.39
2003 5811 1.12 1080 2.87
2004 5597 0.86 1020 3.04
2005 5192 1.04 957 2.93
2006 5353 1.10 971 3.81
Total 40628 1.09* 6671 3.74*
Note: * Mean share of switchers over time.
3.3.3 Self-Assessed Health Status
We approximate individual risk using the SOEP variable ‘self-assessed health at present’.
As usual, this variable has five outcomes ranging from very good health to bad health, and
we denote it by SAH5. The distributions of self-assessed health conditional on switcher
status reveal a clear pattern (see Table 3.8): switchers tend to be healthier. Note, however,
that the correlation between switching and self-assessed health is less pronounced for private
to public switches.
Table 3.8: Distribution of self-assessed health (SAH5)
Public Private
SAH5 Category non-Switcher Switcher non-Switcher Switcher
1 (Bad) 0.95 0.90 0.63 0.79
2 (Not so good) 8.43 4.51 6.49 5.53
3 (Satisfactory) 30.94 21.44 27.05 26.88
4 (Good) 49.73 57.34 52.82 48.22
5 (Very good) 9.96 15.80 13.01 18.58
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: Shares of respondents in each category averaged over years.
For the purposes of this analysis (see Section 3.4 for details), we collapse the variable
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SAH5 into the binary variable SAH2, where SAH2 assumes the value 1 if self-assessed health
is ‘good’ (SAH5 = 4) or ‘very good’ (SAH5 = 5) and zero otherwise. Given the concentration
of responses on categories 3 and 4, the inevitable loss of information when using the more
aggregate measure SAH2 instead of SAH5 is minimized.13
SAH2 reflects the share of individuals with good or very good health. As Table 3.9 shows,
there is a downward trend in self-assessed health for those who remain in their respective
health system (health deteriorates as individuals grow older). There is no such pattern
for switchers. Table 3.9 also shows correlations between switching decisions and individual
health. Similar to SAH5, this correlation is stronger for public to private switches. More
precisely, there is a positive correlation between health and the propensity to switch from
public to private health insurance, while no clear health effect is observed for switches from
private to public health insurance. Taken together, Table 3.9 suggests advantageous selection
in favor of private insurers, a conjecture that will be confirmed in Section 3.5. Note, however,
that the econometric analysis reveals an insignificant health effect for a switch from public to
private health insurance and a significantly negative health effect for the opposite direction.
Table 3.9: Mean self-assessed health (SAH2)
Public Private
Year non-Switcher Switcher non-Switcher Switcher
2000 0.6024 0.7544 0.6825 0.6957
2001 0.6101 0.6835 0.6734 0.7576
2002 0.5953 0.7160 0.6639 0.6600
2003 0.6013 0.7846 0.6749 0.6875
2004 0.6015 0.7917 0.6491 0.7097
2005 0.5837 0.6852 0.6301 0.6071
2006 0.5795 0.7288 0.6381 0.5000
Mean 0.5968 0.7314 0.6583 0.6680
Note: SAH2 = 1 if self-reported health is good or very good.
13Our results are largely robust to altering the cut-off (see Section 3.5 for details).
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3.4 Empirical strategy
In order to identify risk selection between public and private health insurance, we inves-
tigate the impact of health on switching behavior. As already mentioned in the previous
section, the analysis sample contains several variables that can be used as proxies for indi-
vidual health (Table 3.4). Self-rated health is a natural candidate, but the more objective
health and health care utilization measures are also qualified measures of individual health.
Although all these variables could be used as regressors in a switcher analysis, the inherent
problem is identification. To identify risk selection, all coefficients of all health measures
need to have the same sign. Otherwise, the incomplete ordering of the n-dimensional space
would yield inconclusive results.
We solve this problem by constructing a health index that summarizes all relevant health
information in a single one-dimensional index. Like van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) and
Nuscheler and Knaus (2005), we use a regression of self-assessed health on the more objective
health measures and some additional explanatory variables to obtain such an index. In the
switcher analysis, this index is then used as an explanatory variable. This gives rise to the
following recursive two-stage regression model:
SAH2it = Z
′
itα+X
′
itβ + λ1t + v1it (3.1)
SWITCHit = γŜAH2it +X
′
itδ + λ2t + v2it. (3.2)
At the first stage, the binary measure of self-assessed health, SAH2it, is regressed on more
objective health measures, Zit, and some additional covariates, Xit. The respective prediction
yields the probability of being in good or very good health – a continuous measure that we
interpret as health index. The matrix Z contains the following health measures: (legally
obtained) disability status at present,14 the number of visits to a doctor during the 3 months
prior to the interview, whether the individual was in hospital during the previous year, and
14To legally obtain disability status, an individual has to undergo an audit. The auditor grants disability
status only if limitations add up to at least 50%.
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whether the individual experienced a sickness absence from work of 6 weeks or more during
the previous year. Finally, Z contains the natural logarithm of net individual income. This
variable captures that more affluent individuals may invest more funds in the production of
health (see, e.g., Grossman 1972).
Necessary conditions for our approach to be valid are that (i) the first stage does not
suffer from simultaneity bias, (ii) the variables contained in Z have no independent effect
on the probability to switch between systems, and (iii) self-rated health is an appropriate
measure for risk as measured by future expenses on health care. Three out of four objective
health measures and net income refer to a time period prior to the interview so that causality
can hardly run from self-rated health to these measures. Disability status is more critical,
as it is measured at present just like self-rated health. It is hard to imagine, however, how
a low subjective health rating affects the chance of legally obtaining the disability status.
Thus, it is more plausible that disability causes a low health rating so that we are confident
that requirement (i) is met. The second requirement is an identifying assumption. It implies
that the health index captures all information contained in Z that is relevant to individual
switching behavior. Health care utilization measures could only have an independent effect
on switching if there was differential access to care between systems. In fact, there is not
much room for such a difference, as the set of available providers in the two systems is almost
identical. Moreover, Table 3.5 reveals no systematic difference in health care utilization
between systems. The strong correlation between self-rated health and disability status
prevents an independent effect of the latter variable. As gross income governs the incentives
to switch between systems, net income can barely have an additional effect. Finally, self-
rated health needs to be a predictor of future health care expenses. The literature on risk
adjustment generally finds that self-rated health significantly contributes to explaining the
variance in health care expenses (see van de Ven and van Vliet 1992 for an overview).
At the second stage, the health index ŜAH2it is used to identify risk selection. The de-
pendent variable SWITCHit is either PUB2PRIVit for the public sample or PRIV 2PUBit
for the private sample. Note that SWITCHit assumes the value 1 if individual i switched
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between periods t and t + 1. Thus, in a regression of SWITCHit on the estimated health
index and a set of control variables, Xit, reverse causality is ruled out, as all covariates refer
to a time prior to the switch. This regression yields the individual probabilities to switch
between systems.
In addition to solving the above-mentioned dimensionality problem, our two-stage esti-
mation procedure comes with a second advantage: the approach mitigates attenuation bias.
Self-rated health may be measured with considerable error (see Crossley and Kennedy 2002)
so that such a bias may actually arise. As the health measures contained in Z are likely to
be measured with smaller error, our health index is less plagued by measurement error.
Finally, we have to address the question of how to deal with the panel structure of the
data. Tables 3.7 and 3.9 revealed a notable variation over time of both health and switching
decisions. Equations (1) and (2) show that we generally control for unobserved heterogeneity
that affects all individuals likewise using time fixed effects, λkt, k = 1, 2.
Without further assumptions about the error terms, vkit, Equations (1) and (2) simply
describe a pooled regression where observations on one and the same individual in different
years are considered independent. This approach clearly understates standard errors so that
internal validity would be compromised (significance levels are not met). In addition, the
resulting estimates may be biased due to omitted variables. This is the case if individual
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables.
Consequently, we need to specify a panel data model. As usual, this requires assumptions
about the error terms in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. Let vkit = µki + ukit; then, we arrive
at a random effects model if the individual error component µki is uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables. In case of a correlation, we obtain the fixed effects model. To select
between models we conduct a Hausman test that generally rejects the random effects model.
Accordingly, the next section concentrates on the fixed effects model.
Before we turn to the results, we have to address two questions: how do we estimate the
model given by Equations 3.1 and 3.2 and how do we interpret its results? At both stages,
the dependent variable is binary so that discrete choice models would have been in order. As
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there is no estimator available for the resulting highly non-linear recursive panel data model,
we opt for a linear model at both stages. The model can then be estimated using two-stage
least squares and STATA’s xtivreg command is used.15
As usual, identification in fixed effects models rests on within-subject variation of covari-
ates; that is, on variation of individual characteristics over time. This implies that we cannot
estimate the impact of time invariant variables (e.g., gender) and only imprecisely measure
the effect of those variables with little variation over time (e.g., years in the education system
and the number of children). In short, identification rests on changes in variables and not
on their levels. We can, thus, only estimate the effect of changes in health on the probability
to switch between systems and this effect is – due to our two-stage procedure – identified
off changes in the explanatory variables contained in Equation 3.1 but not in Equation 3.2,
i.e., the variables contained in Z. Our approach may thus not measure the full extent of risk
selection.16 This may well be the case if (i) the health differential between switchers and
non-switchers of Table 3.9 is not the result of health shocks but of systematic differences in
health levels and (ii) the motivation to switch originates in health levels and not in health
changes. This potential problem calls for an estimator that also uses between subject varia-
tion for identification, and the natural candidate is the random effects estimator. However,
as already mentioned above, this specification was rejected by the Hausman-Test so that we
are left with the fixed effects model.
15This also implies that second stage standard errors take into account that the health index is estimated
at stage 1.
16We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Switcher analysis
Risk selection
In Section 3.2.5, we discussed individual switching incentives and summarized them in
Table 3.3. One of the predictions was that health (SAH2) positively affects the probability
to switch from public to private health insurance. Our second-stage regression results show
that the estimated coefficient (0.0087) has the predicted sign but is statistically not different
from zero (see Table 3.10). Private insurers are, thus, unable to select the healthy from the
public pool.
At first sight, this result is somewhat surprising. With community rating in the public
system and underwriting and pre-existing condition clauses in the private system, the healthy
are expected to lean more toward private health insurance. One can think of several reasons
for the lack of statistical significance. It may be, for instance, that the health questionnaire
used by private insurers is not all that informative about individual risk. Applicants may
overstate their health, and this could prevent insurers from selecting the healthy. However,
even if the health questionnaire was informative, a sufficiently large public-private premium
differential could render private health insurance attractive (almost) independent of an in-
dividual’s risk type. Insufficient variation of the health index may undermine identification.
As about 80% of responses fall in two adjacent categories of self-assessed health (categories 3
and 4, see Table 3.8), insufficient variation is likely an issue. Aggravating this problem is the
source of identification in fixed effects models: advantageous selection is identified off changes
in individual health and not off its levels (see the discussion at the end of Section 3.4).
The results for a switch from private to public health insurance are more clear cut.
As predicted, we find a negative effect of health on the probability to switch (−0.0618,
Table 3.10). A 10 percentage point increase in the health index leads to a 0.6 percentage
point decrease in the probability to switch. Given the baseline switching probability of 3.7%,
this is a sizeable effect.
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As already argued in Section 3.2.5, this effect may be driven by both demand side forces
and supply side incentives. If an individual experiences a health shock, then health care
utilization is likely to increase in the future. This makes the public system more attractive
as benefits are provided in-kind. A switch to the public system allows the individual to
avoid the hassle of seeking reimbursement for consumed health care services. Private health
insurers can use the ‘reimbursement channel’ strategically to dump unprofitable customers
into the public system. There is anecdotal evidence that private insurers delay or even deny
reimbursement of services that are covered by the insurance contract. To eventually obtain
reimbursement, the individual has to sue the insurer. This not only involves monetary costs
(lawyers, opportunity costs, and risk) but also non monetary costs (stress) so that many
patients eschew to go to court (see, e.g., Focus Online 2009).17 Effective patient copayments
may therefore be considerable so that a switch to the public system can be an attractive
option.
Although we are unable to separate demand side effects from supply side implications,
we can draw a firm policy conclusion. As it is impossible for public insurers to deny coverage
(provided that the insured is legally allowed to switch), the costs of the health shock that
should be borne by the private insurer are ‘socialized’. Via the risk adjustment mechanism,
the receiving public insurer is compensated by all other public insurers. The private insurer
should then, in turn, compensate the public system. Obviously, such a compensation must
be risk adjusted in order to guarantee just competition between insurance systems. Ideally,
such a risk-adjusted transfer would eliminate private insurers’ incentives to dump individuals
that were subject to a health shock and also correct the distortions that originate in the
demand-driven switching activities.
A potential concern about our empirical strategy is the aggregation of self-assessed health
(SAH5) to the binary measure (SAH2). As about 80% of responses fall into categories 3 and
4 of SAH5 (see Table 3.8), the loss of variation is moderate. For our results, it appears
more important how the cut-off to define SAH2 is chosen. We opted for a cut-off between
17It may also be that some individuals (at least partially) lose insurance cover when they get caught
cheating on the health questionnaire.
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Table 3.10: Fixed effects model for switching behavior
Public Private
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
SAH2 0.0087 0.0079 -0.0618** 0.0308
INCOMEGR -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
CIVILSERV 0.0094 0.0163 -0.0230 0.0235
SELFEMP 0.0043 0.0044 -0.0075 0.0123
UNEMP -0.0011 0.0069 0.2298** 0.0907
AGE31 35 0.0068** 0.0027 -0.0297** 0.0141
AGE36 41 0.0123*** 0.0039 -0.0324* 0.0191
AGE42 47 0.0098** 0.0050 -0.0435* 0.0234
AGE48 53 0.0042 0.0061 -0.0446 0.0274
MARRIED -0.0018 0.0027 0.0016 0.0108
CHILDNUM 0.0021 0.0013 0.0004 0.0057
TRAINING -0.0091*** 0.0031 0.0125 0.0124
EDU 0.0070*** 0.0023 0.0013 0.0081
GERMAN -0.0209** 0.0088 -0.0286 0.0840
PUBLEMP 0.0024 0.0018 0.0062 0.0066
FULLTIME 0.0064** 0.0025 -0.0110 0.0137
JOBWEST -0.0012 0.0017 -0.0057 0.0078
YEAR2001 0.0092*** 0.0015 0.0133* 0.0080
YEAR2002 0.0042** 0.0020 0.0030 0.0086
YEAR2003 0.0073*** 0.0021 0.0078 0.0094
YEAR2004 0.0068*** 0.0022 0.0094 0.0098
YEAR2005 0.0091*** 0.0025 0.0138 0.0112
YEAR2006 0.0125*** 0.0027 0.0288** 0.0120
PUBCOMP -0.0121*** 0.0020
PUBHOLDER 0.0142*** 0.0047
PRIVHOLDER -0.0102 0.0122
CONSTANT -0.0741** 0.0298 0.1441 0.1508
N 40628 6771
χ24Age Dummies 22.84 5.25
Prob > χ2 0.0001 0.2624
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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categories 3 and 4. Given the distribution of SAH5, the resulting variable SAH2 is the
one with the highest variance among the alternative binary health variables. Table 3.11
shows that our risk selection results are relatively robust to variations in cut-offs. For a
cut-off between categories 2 and 3, the results are almost exactly the same for both the
public (the coefficient changes from 0.0087 to 0.0094 and remains insignificant) and the
private sample (the coefficient changes from −0.0618 to −0.0739 and statistical significance
is slightly weaker). A cut-off between categories 4 and 5, however, implies a large loss of
information – the negative health effect on the probability to switch from private to public
health insurance disappears (the coefficient, −0.0732; remains relatively stable though). This
is perhaps not too surprising. Remember, the health effect is identified off health shocks,
but if bad health already includes the four lowest out of five health categories, then there is
not much room for a negative health shock.
Control variables
Gross income (INCOMEGR) has a negative effect on the probability to switch from
public to private health insurance. This is surprising as a sufficiently high gross income is
one way to obtain the eligibility to switch. As we can only speculate about the reasons and
refrain from interpreting the coefficient. Table 3.10 also shows a significant negative effect of
income on the probability to switch from private to public health insurance. The directional
effect is as predicted, although significance is lacking.
When it comes to switching behavior, civil servants (CIVILSERV) and self-employed
individuals (SELFEMP) are not different from other individuals. At least for the civil
servant status, the insignificance comes at a surprise but only if one disregards the source
of identification in fixed effects models. Insufficient within-subject variation in both, civil
servant status and self-employment may explain why these variables fail to reach statistical
significance.
If an individual is registered as unemployed (UNEMP), his or her income is below the
compulsory public health insurance threshold. The individual, thus, must remain in the
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Table 3.11: Fixed effects model for switching behavior for alternative cut-offs of SAH2
Public Private
cut-off 2/3 cut-off 4/5 cut-off 2/3 cut-off 4/5
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
SAH2 0.0094 0.0090 -0.0035 0.0314 -0.0739* 0.0420 -0.0732 0.1439
INCOMEGR -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
CIVILSERV 0.0091 0.0163 0.0096 0.0163 -0.0203 0.0235 -0.0269 0.0240
SELFEMP 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 0.0045 -0.0124 0.0120 -0.0117 0.0121
UNEMP -0.0013 0.0069 -0.0014 0.0070 0.2357*** 0.0901 0.2449*** 0.0927
AGE31 35 0.0067** 0.0027 0.0067** 0.0029 -0.0293** 0.0141 -0.0280** 0.0142
AGE36 41 0.0122*** 0.0039 0.0124*** 0.0041 -0.0318* 0.0190 -0.0305 0.0191
AGE42 47 0.0097* 0.0050 0.0099* 0.0051 -0.0434* 0.0233 -0.0423* 0.0234
AGE48 53 0.0040 0.0061 0.0042 0.0063 -0.0446 0.0273 -0.0436 0.0276
MARRIED -0.0019 0.0027 -0.0020 0.0027 0.0031 0.0107 0.0009 0.0112
CHILDNUM 0.0020 0.0013 0.0019 0.0013 -0.0026 0.0056 -0.0014 0.0056
TRAINING -0.0091*** 0.0031 -0.0092*** 0.0031 0.0140 0.0123 0.0138 0.0127
EDU 0.0070*** 0.0023 0.0071*** 0.0023 0.0009 0.0081 0.0008 0.0089
GERMAN -0.0205** 0.0088 -0.0205** 0.0089 -0.0132 0.0832 -0.0456 0.1052
PUBLEMP 0.0023 0.0018 0.0024 0.0018 0.0065 0.0066 0.0055 0.0067
FULLTIME 0.0063** 0.0025 0.0062** 0.0026 -0.0143 0.0136 -0.0129 0.0139
JOBWEST -0.0012 0.0017 -0.0012 0.0017 -0.0071 0.0078 -0.0071 0.0079
YEAR2001 0.0092*** 0.0015 0.0091*** 0.0015 0.0137* 0.0080 0.0122 0.0087
YEAR2002 0.0041** 0.0020 0.0038* 0.0021 0.0062 0.0083 0.0046 0.0095
YEAR2003 0.0072*** 0.0021 0.0069*** 0.0022 0.0103 0.0092 0.0076 0.0118
YEAR2004 0.0067*** 0.0022 0.0063*** 0.0023 0.0119 0.0095 0.0106 0.0139
YEAR2005 0.0088*** 0.0024 0.0083*** 0.0026 0.0179* 0.0106 0.0155 0.0165
YEAR2006 0.0120*** 0.0026 0.0114*** 0.0030 0.0338*** 0.0113 0.0307* 0.0176
PUBCOMP -0.0121*** 0.0020 -0.0120*** 0.0020
PUBHOLDER 0.0140*** 0.0047 0.0138*** 0.0047
PRIVHOLDER -0.0113 0.0122 -0.0114 0.0123
CONSTANT -0.0768** 0.0304 -0.0689** 0.0296 0.1667 0.1555 0.1431 0.2065
N 40628 40628 6771 6771
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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public system. The expected negative effect of unemployment status on the probability to
switch to the private system is not reflected in our regression results. Again, the insignificance
is due to insufficient variation in unemployment status. Although a similar argument applies
to the opposite switching direction, the few individuals that get laid-off are sufficient to obtain
a positive and significant effect. The reason is that regulation may dictate enrollment in the
public plan (see Section 3.2.4).
Due to the requirement to build up old-age provisions in the private system, we expected
a negative effect of age (AGE) on the probability to switch from public to private health
insurance (see Section 3.2.5). Our results show that individuals aged between 48 and 53
years are as likely to switch as 26 to 30 year-old individuals and that the middle-aged are
more likely to switch. This points to the general attractiveness of the private system for all
age groups despite the above-mentioned requirement. As expected, age has a significantly
negative effect on the probability to switch from private to public health insurance.18
The availability of public family insurance makes the public system more attractive to
married couples (MARRIED) and to families with children (CHILDNUM). This relative
attractiveness is not mirrored in our results. Again, this may be due to insufficient within
subject variation – only a change in marital status or in the number of children is used for
identification. Obviously, the effect of gender is buried in the individual fixed effects.19
The coefficients of the year dummies show that the tendency to switch from public
to private health insurance (slightly) increased over time. There is no clear pattern for
the opposite direction. There are three additional variables that significantly affect the
probability to switch from public to private health insurance.
Finally, if an individual is compulsorily insured in the public system (PUBCOMP), a
switch to the private system is ruled out, and this is reflected in a significantly negative co-
efficient. Public insurance holders (PUBHOLDER) are more likely to switch to the private
18In our fixed effects model, we de facto measure the effects of ageing rather than the effects of age; that
is, ageing has differential effects on switching probabilities and these depend on age. As all individuals age
one year per year, the effects of ageing are partially picked up by the time fixed effects complicating the
interpretation of age effects.
19As we had no prior how the variables TRAINING, EDU, GERMAN, PUBLEMP, FULLTIME, and
JOBWEST affect health insurance choice, we do not interpret their coefficients.
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system than those covered by public family insurance. The likely reason is that insurance
holders have more opportunities to switch. While the insurance holder may switch to the
private system (if eligible), the family stays in the public system; a family insured member
must not switch to the private systems if the insurance holder remains in the public sys-
tem. In contrast, private insurance holders (PRIVHOLDER) are as likely to switch to the
public system as those who are covered by private family insurance. This mirrors the more
symmetric switching opportunities: the family may switch to the public system while the
insurance holder remains in the private system. In short, independent switching decisions of
family insured members are more likely in the private system than in the public one.
3.5.2 Health index
Table 3.12 shows the regression results of the first stage. Self-assessed health (SAH2) is
regressed on health care utilization measures (visits to a doctor, VISITSDOC, and hospital
stays, HOSPITAL), disability status (DISAB), sickness absenteeism from work of more than
six weeks (SICKSIX), the natural logarithm of net income (LNINCOME), and some addi-
tional controls. The first four variables are more objective health measures than self-rated
health. For all of them, we find the expected negative sign for both samples. For the private
sample, however, two of these variables fail to reach significance. For both samples, we find
a negative time trend; individuals rate their health lower and lower – individuals grow older
and health deteriorates. That the effect of ageing is (partially) picked up by the time fixed
effects is the likely reason for the insignificance of the age dummies. For the most part, the
remaining control variables are insignificant.
We use the linear instrumental variables panel data estimator implemented in STATA to
estimate our econometric model. As should be clear from Section 3.4, this does not imply
that we have an endogeneity problem. Switching the health insurance system and self-
assessment of health are not simultaneous decisions. Consequently, when checking for valid
instruments, we do not have to argue why the instruments (the Zit variables) are exogenous,
we only have to make sure that our analysis does not suffer from weak instruments. The
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respective F-statistics are well above 10 (151 for the public sample and 32 for the private
sample) so that weak instruments are not an issue.
3.6 Conclusion
One of the potential problems of competitive health insurance markets is risk selection.
Public policy has several measures at its disposal that are suited to prevent specific forms
of risk selection; e.g., open enrollment prevents direct selection on observable characteristics
and regulation of benefit packages prevents indirect selection on unobservable characteristics.
Other measures aim at mitigating the incentives to engage in risk selection, most prominently
risk adjustment. Research has largely concentrated on selection issues within social health
insurance. Risk selection between public and private branches of health care financing was
largely ignored. To the best of our knowledge, Sapelli and Vial (2003) is the only study that
deals risk selection between public and private insurers.
This chapter contributes to the scarce literature on this matter, taking the German health
system as an example. Given the institutional structure, risk-rated premiums in the private
system and community-rated premiums in the public system, advantageous selection in favor
of private insurers is expected. Using 2000 - 2007 data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel, we find clear evidence for such selection. Interestingly, this selection occurs because
privately insured individuals that have experienced a health shock have a higher probability
to switch from private to public health insurance as compared to those without such a shock.
As a health shock will typically lead to an increase in health care spending down the
road, these costs accrue in the public system rather than in the private one. Due to the
public system’s risk adjustment mechanism, the receiving public insurer is compensated by
all other public insurers. The former private insurer should then compensate the public
system, and because of the 2009 reform, such compensation can easily be administered. The
reform included a switch from internal to external risk adjustment so that the private insurer
can simply transfer the required funds to the central fund called “Gesundheitsfonds”. To
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make ends meet, such a transfer should be risk adjusted.
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Table 3.12: Fixed effects model for health status
Public Private
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
DISAB -0.0804*** 0.0200 -0.0416 0.0554
VISITSDOC -0.0190*** 0.0008 -0.0211*** 0.0019
HOSPITAL -0.0499*** 0.0088 -0.0536** 0.0231
SICKSIX -0.0446*** 0.0117 -0.0478 0.0341
LNINCOME -0.0016 0.0115 0.0297 0.0243
INCOMEGR 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003
CIVILSERV 0.0200 0.0755 0.0089 0.0608
SELFEMP 0.0134 0.0206 0.0712** 0.0312
UNEMP -0.0354 0.0330 -0.0382 0.2349
AGE31 35 0.0031 0.0126 -0.0257 0.0365
AGE36 41 0.0099 0.0181 -0.0466 0.0493
AGE42 47 0.0112 0.0230 -0.0346 0.0603
AGE48 53 0.0043 0.0282 -0.0229 0.0708
MARRIED -0.0211* 0.0124 -0.0151 0.0278
CHILDNUM -0.0087 0.0059 0.0297** 0.0145
TRAINING -0.0147 0.0146 -0.0529* 0.0319
EDU 0.0055 0.0107 -0.0252 0.0209
GERMAN 0.0215 0.0409 -0.2528 0.2159
PUBLEMP 0.0058 0.0084 0.0063 0.0171
FULLTIME -0.0182 0.0122 0.0368 0.0360
JOBWEST 0.0037 0.0078 0.0172 0.0201
YEAR2001 -0.0001 0.0071 -0.0067 0.0207
YEAR2002 -0.0366*** 0.0103 -0.0463* 0.0238
YEAR2003 -0.0313*** 0.0105 -0.0314 0.0258
YEAR2004 -0.0498*** 0.0110 -0.0838*** 0.0258
YEAR2005 -0.0765*** 0.0117 -0.1124*** 0.0283
YEAR2006 -0.0972*** 0.0124 -0.1219*** 0.0299
PUBCOMP 0.0200** 0.0095
PUBHOLDER -0.0340 0.0220
PRIVHOLDER 0.0095 0.0315
CONSTANT 0.6463*** 0.1523 1.1099*** 0.4100
N 40628 6771
F (m, n) 35.05 (27, 29764) 9.22 (27, 4712)
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Instruments (Z-variables)
F (m, n) 150.55 (5, 29764) 31.62 (5, 4712)
Prob > F 0.0000 0.000
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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4.1 Introduction
Cancer is the third leading cause of death worldwide and the second leading cause of death
in Europe after cardiovascular diseases and caused 21.4% of all deaths in 2011. Among
women in Europe breast cancer (IC-D10 C50) is the most prevalent form of cancer and
approximately 154.5 thousand women died from this disease in 2011 which accounts for 18%
of all deaths from malignant neoplasms and 3.5% of all deaths among women in Europe
(WHO 2013). In Germany breast cancer accounted for 28% of all cancer diseases among
women in 2009 and is by far the most frequent form of cancer. Approximately 12% of all
women come down with breast cancer during their life. With a standardized mortality rate of
24.6 per 100 000 in 2008 breast cancer causes the most cancer related deaths among women
in Germany (RKI 2010).
Several individual behaviors like smoking, regular alcohol intake, and late or no child
birth are associated with an increased risk for breast cancer. Nevertheless, results from
cross-country studies suggest an important role of environmental and non-behavioral factors
like early menarche and late menopause, breast cancer history in the family for the individual
risk to develop the disease (Vaionio & Bianchini 2002). The limited prevention possibilities
highlight the importance of improving the treatment of breast cancer. Therefore – at first
glance – it is seemingly self-evident that the early detection of breast cancer is a useful tool
to improve the treatment possibilities.
However, it is important to distinguish between opportunistic mammography screening
and organized screening programs. Opportunistic mammography screening is one of several
useful diagnosis tools for females with a known elevated risk of developing breast cancer. For
example, a gynecologist may apply opportunistic screening as a tool for further investigation
after a manual breast exam. Organized mammography screening, on the other hand, refers
to a mass-screening of the healthy population without clinical symptoms in order to increase
the chance of early cancer detection.
Since the screening and subsequent diagnosis methods are associated with several negative
side-effects, the mass-screening of healthy women raises a trade-off between costs (monetary
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and non-monetary) and benefits of the program. One obvious shortcoming is the high number
of false-positives. Since the mammography cannot perfectly discriminate between women
who actually have breast cancer and healthy ones, there can be a large number of patients
who are wrongfully classified as having cancer. These women undergo a number of subsequent
diagnostic checks until they are correctly re-classified as healthy women and these additional
checks potentially have negative side-effects. Or, these women are ultimately treated as if
they had breast cancer. A second negative aspect of organized screening programs is the
detection and subsequent treatment of mild forms of cancer that would never cause any
medical problems. This kind of
”
over-diagnosis“ causes a chain of
”
over-treatment“ that
once again carries the risk of negative side-effects (Kalager et. al. 2012, Becker 2008, and
Becker 2002).
The potential benefit of organized mammography screening is the reduction of the breast
cancer mortality rate compared to a situation without an organized screening program. In
order to assess such a potential benefit, we exploit the fact that the organized screening
program in Germany was sequentially introduced. The program was started in three
”
pilot-
regions“ during 2001 and 2002 and it was extended to Germany as a whole in 2005. Hence,
this institutional setup provides randomization at the regional level. Our data set covers the
years 1998 to 2010 and allows us to analyze whether the mortality rates in the pilot regions
exhibit a different pattern over time compared to appropriate control regions.
The main result of the analysis in this chapter is that we do not find evidence for a
reduction of breast cancer mortality induced by the organized screening program. The
mortality rates in the pilot and control regions show a very similar pattern over time. There
are a number of possible channels why there is no association between the organized screening
program and breast cancer mortality. For example, the overall progress in medical treatment
possibilities may overhaul the effectiveness of the organized screening program and a small
take-up rate may render the program ineffective. The currently available data do not allow
to investigate these channels. However, the missing evidence for a reduction of breast cancer
mortality induced by the organized screening program suggests to reassess the findings once
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more data are available.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview
and brief discussion of the recent literature on the effectiveness of organized mammography
screening programs. Section 4.3 explains in detail how the organized screening program was
set up in Germany. Section 4.4 introduces our data set. Our empirical strategy for the
estimation of the effect of the screening program on breast cancer mortality is presented
in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 provides results from various regression models. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 Literature
During the last decades, many countries introduced organized mammography screening
programs. Consequently, there is a large and growing literature that attempts to evaluate
the effectiveness of these programs. Focusing on the studies for European countries, the
results range from no reduction in breast cancer related mortality at all up to a reduction of
25% that is attributed to the screening.
A highly influential study by Olsen et al. (2005) analyzed the effectiveness of the mam-
mography screening program in Denmark. They estimate a reduction in relative breast
cancer mortality by 25% and attribute this reduction to the screening program. While the
empirical strategy in this study is convincing from the outset, the interpretation of the esti-
mated results by the authors is problematic. The only sizable (and statistically significant)
reduction in breast cancer mortality was found three years after the implementation of the
program. The point estimate of this one-time reduction in relative mortality is equal to
25%. However, after this single drop in mortality, there are no further significant changes.
This single reduction in mortality after three years cannot be attributed to the organized
screening program for two main reasons. First, as time goes by an increasing number of
women is covered by the screening program and therefore reductions in mortality due to the
screening are expected to increase as well. Hence, the observed pattern of a single drop does
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not match the expected pattern of a continuous reduction of mortality over time.
Second, reductions in breast cancer mortality that emerge earlier than five years after the
implementation of the program cannot be attributed to the screening. The mechanism of
organized screening is the detection of breast cancer at an early and better treatable stage.
Early detection allows a more appropriate treatment according to stage and thus increases
the chance to avoid a lethal course of the disease (Vaionio and Bianchini 2002). This means
that reductions in mortality due to the screening program cannot be found shortly after
its implementation but the effects from a better treatment need a certain time to affect
mortality rates. Therefore, the one-time reduction in mortality found by Olsen et al. (2005)
cannot be attributed to the screening program. Furthermore, a reduction in mortality has
only been found for Copenhagen but not for other counties in Denmark.
Jørgensen et al. (2010) raise additional concerns about this study regarding sample
selection and inappropriate choice of control groups. Using an additional screening region
and more years of follow-up they cannot confirm the findings by Olsen et al. (2005) and
conclude, that the mammography screening program in Denmark has no effect on the breast
cancer mortality.
Gøtzsche and Olsen (2000) conducted a meta-analysis in order to shed light on the con-
tradictory results from different studies on the effectiveness of the Swedish mammography
program. They find that the results of six out of eight studies were biased due to inade-
quate randomization in the trials. With adequate randomization they find no effect of the
mammography screening on breast cancer mortality in Sweden.
Autier et al. (2011) compared three pairs of European countries. They find that although
these countries have time differences of 10 - 15 years in the implementation of mammography
screening programs, the reductions in breast cancer mortality developed similar over time.
The authors conclude that screening did not play a direct part in the reductions of breast
cancer mortality.
In Germany three pilot projects were started in 2001 and 2002 before the organized
screening program was implemented nationwide between 2005 and 2009. Since then, the
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program was repetitively evaluated by the Kooperationsgemeinschaft Mammographie (2006
and 2009), the same institution that is in charge for the implementation of the program.
To the best of our knowledge, apart from the publications by the Kooperationsgemein-
schaft Mammographie, the only study on the evaluation of the German screening program is
provided by Biesheuvel et al. (2011); nevertheless, the authors are associated with the Koop-
erationsgemeinschaft Mammographie. The evaluation by Biesheuvel et al. (2011) is limited
to the quality of program implementation in the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia
since 2005. Although the authors emphasize that the primary aim of the German mammog-
raphy screening program is the reduction of breast cancer mortality by early detection they
only compare performance indicators (surrogate parameters) to reference values taken from
the European guidelines for Quality Assurance in Breast Cancer Screening and Diagnosis
(Perry et al. 2006). Biesheuvel et al. (2011) argue that besides the relatively low atten-
dance rate of approximately 53% the implementation of the German organized breast cancer
screening program was successful.
However, surrogate parameters can only be interpreted as short-term proxies for the long-
term goal of each screening program - the reduction of the disease specific mortality. The
performance of surrogate parameters delivers at most necessary but not sufficient evidence
regarding the effectiveness of organized screening programs (Becker 2006). In light of this,
our analysis is the first study that exploits the available variation in the mortality rates over
time in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the German organized screening program.
4.3 Institutional Background
Until 2001 Germany had no organized mammography screening program. Females cov-
ered by public health insurers were entitled to opportunistic mammography services only in
two cases: first, if they displayed clinical breast cancer symptoms and second if they had
a known elevated risk for developing breast cancer (e.g. with breast cancer history in the
family). In 2001 and 2002 a population based organized mammography screening program
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Figure 4.1: Treatment and control regions in Germany
(a) treatment regions (b) control regions
has been implemented first as pilot projects in three regions in Germany. Between 2005
and 2009 the organized screening program was extended nationwide. The “Planungsstelle
Mammographie-Screening” has been in charge for implementation and monitoring of the
pilot project. The “Planungsstelle” was composed of two equally sized groups of delegates
of the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (ASHIF) and the National
Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (ASHIP). Since 2003 the “Kooper-
ationsgemeinschaft Mammographie” (KoopM) is responsible for the co-ordination, quality
control and evaluation of the German mammography screening program and is again a com-
position of agents from the ASHIF and ASHIP.
The pilot projects started in 2001 and 2002 in three different regions in Germany: Weser-
Ems in Lower Saxony, the city of Bremen, and the Wiesbaden/Rheingau-Taunus district in
Hesse (Figure 4.1a). In the following we will describe the treatment regions in more detail.
Weser-Ems was an administrative district in the Federal State of Lower Saxony (Fig-
ure 4.2a). The pilot project started in April 2002. Not all communities in the area of
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Weser-Ems took part in the pilot project (see Urbschat et al. 2004 and Figure 4.2b). While
in the district Wittmund all communities were treated, one community in the district Fries-
land was not under treatment (Varel). In the district Aurich only two communities and in
the district Ammerland only one community were treated. In total, the treated area had
about 200,000 inhabitants and 22,000 women in screening age. Given the small number of
treated communities within Aurich and Ammerland, these two districts are excluded from
our data set, and therefore avoiding a mixed population with and without treatment in our
analysis. Hence, the remaining districts Wittmund and Friesland comprise the Weser-Ems
treatment group in our analysis (Figure 4.2c); the Federal State of Lower Saxony (excluding
the treatment area in Weser-Ems and the districts Aurich and Ammerland) is the corre-
sponding control group (Figure 4.1b). The Federal state of Bremen is composed of two
cities: the city of Bremen and the close city of Bremerhaven. Both cities are surrounded by
the Federal state of Lower Saxony. Since Bremerhaven was not part of the pilot project, it is
essential to separate the data for the city of Bremen and Bremerhaven for the analysis (Fig-
ure 4.3). Within the treated region (city of Bremen) about 70,000 women were in screening
age. The organized mammography screening program started in July 2001. Once again, we
use the Federal state of Lower Saxony (excluding the treatment area Weser-Ems and the
districts Aurich and Ammerland) as the control group (Figure 4.1b). Within the Federal
State of Hesse, the entire administrative district Rheingau-Taunus and the city of Wiesbaden
were chosen as pilot regions (Figure 4.4). The entire pilot region had about 456,000 inhab-
itants and 58,000 women in screening age. The pilot project started in July 2001. As the
corresponding control group we use the rest of the Federal State of Hesse (Figure 4.1b).
The Federal Council and the German Parliament requested the nationwide implemen-
tation of an organized mammography screening program already in 2002. Following this
request, the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) decided in 2003 the nationwide introduction.
The organized screening program was set up between 2005 and 2009; in total 94 screening
units started to operate (see Figure 4.5). Since then all women of age 50 to 69 are eligible
for mammography every two years.
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Figure 4.2: Treatment regions in Lower Saxony
(a) administrative district Weser-Ems in Lower Saxony
(b) pilot project communities in Weser-Ems, source: Urb-
schat et al. 2004
(c) screening area in Weser-Ems for analysis
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Figure 4.3: Treatment regions in Bremen
Figure 4.4: Treatment regions in Hesse
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The decision for a nationwide implementation of the screening program was made at the
same time when the pilot project had just been started. This may raise questions about the
information base for this decision and the intention of the pilot projects. Nevertheless, the
early implementation in only three regions and the time-delayed nationwide implementation
allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of the organized screening program in the framework
of a natural experiment. Mammography screening in the pilot regions was available for all
women between 50 and 69 years, i.e. all women of this age group with no clinical breast cancer
symptoms and without diagnosed breast cancer were invited to make use of mammography.
As any organized screening program is targeted at the reduction of breast cancer mortality,
we can exploit the randomization induced by the pilot regions and compare the mortality
rates (separately for each age group) across treated and non-treated regions. This difference-
in-difference approach allows to analyze whether the organized screening program affected
mortality rates.
As explained above, the focus of our study is the analysis of the organized screening
program as a whole. However, in Section 4.7 we will also briefly summarize a few channels
that can influence the effectiveness of the program, for example, self-selection depending on
individual risk, advances in treatment methodologies, and the take-up rate. As discussed,
distinguishing between these channels is orthogonal to our research question, as we are
interested in the effectiveness of the organized screening program as a whole and not in a
separate analysis of each part of the program.
A crucial part of our empirical strategy is the necessary length of the data set that
allows to observe changes in the mortality rates that can be attributed to the screening
program. As mentioned earlier, any change in mortality that occurs earlier than 5 years
after implementation of the program cannot be attributed to the program, while any effect
on mortality should be seen between five to ten years after implementation (Vaionio and
Bianchini 2002). The pilot projects in Germany started in 2001 and 2002. In our analysis we
use breast cancer mortality data from 1998 to 2010. Therefore, our data follow mortality up
to 9 (8) years after the program was implemented. Starting in 2005, the organized program
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was implemented in Germany as a whole. Hence, our aggregate data covering the years up
to 2010 comprise most of the available control groups. Figure 4.5 illustrates the effect of the
gradual implementation of the German organized mammography screening program with
94 screening units in total on the number of possible control groups. In each year between
2005 and 2009 a certain number of new screening units started to operate. Whenever a new
screening unit starts to operate, it becomes a fully effective screening region after five years.
Hence, the pool of control groups rapidly starts to shrink in 2010 (five years after 2005) and
from 2014 no control group is available anymore. In the following section we describe the
data in more detail.
4.4 Data
For our analysis we use breast cancer specific mortality data from 1998 to 2010 from
the statistics on the causes of death provided by the Statistical Offices of Lower Saxony,
Bremen, and Hesse. We observe the number of fatalities due to breast cancer among women
on the regional level of communities and by 10 year age classes. In order to standardize the
number of fatalities by population size, we merge the mortality data with population statis-
tics provided by the Federal Statistical Office at the same observational level and calculate
mortality rates.
Lower Saxony
Table 4.1 shows mortality rates for treatment and control regions by age classes in Lower
Saxony averaged over years. As described in Section 4.3, not all communities in the district of
Weser-Ems have been under treatment during the pilot project. Therefore, we only analyze
the communities of Wittmund and Friesland as the treated region in Lower Saxony. In
order to analyze a reasonable number of observations, we merge both communities into one
screening area. We observe mortality rates in the screening area and in 49 control regions
over 13 years. Therefore, our analysis sample for Lower Saxony includes 13 observations for
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Figure 4.5: Timeline of mammography program implementation in Germany
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the screening area and 637 observations for the control area. The age gradient in the risk of
dying from breast cancer is reflected in the clearly increasing levels of mortality rates in the
age classes. In the screening area we observe a positive number of deaths from breast cancer
for all age classes and years. In the control areas at least one administrative district reports
zero deaths from breast cancer in each age class. In all age classes the average mortality rate
is higher in the screening area than in the control area. Nevertheless, potential differences
due to the screening cannot be seen from raw means over time.
Figure 4.6 provides more detailed information about mean mortality rates for the screen-
ing and control area by years and age classes in Lower Saxony. The vertical line in year 2002
indicates the begin of the pilot project. The dashed line indicates the first year a change
in mortality can be attributed to the organized screening program. Women of age 50 to 69
were the target population in the treatment region.
Moving to the age class 60 - 69, the development of breast cancer mortality over time
shows a similar pattern for the screening and control region.1 Breast cancer mortality seems
to be almost constant with a slight decrease in the screening region at the end of the obser-
vation period.
For the age class 50 - 59 the picture is not that clear. Between 2000 and 2004 mortality
rates are lower in the screening area than in the control area. Since 2005 the mean mortality
rate in the screening area is above the mean mortality rate in the control area and increases
until 2009. For 2010 the mortality rate drops to the same level which was almost constant
for the control area over time.
Finally, for the untreated age groups 40 - 49 and 70 - 792 the mortality rates seem to be
nearly constant over time for both the screening and the control area.
1At first glance, the mortality rate in the screening region seems to be more volatile than in the control
regions. However, the higher volatility is mainly driven by the small number of observations and fatalities in
the screening area and therefore reflect a larger amount of sampling error compared to the control regions
(see Table 4.1).
2Although the age class 70 - 79 is not directly subject to the treatment, this group is indirectly affected
from the screening. In each year after 2002 an additional cohort that was prior subject to the screening
program enters this age class. Therefore, one should expect an increasing reduction of mortality in this age
group over time if the organized screening program would have an effect on breast cancer mortality.
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Table 4.1: Mean breast cancer mortality rates in Lower Saxony*
Screening Area Control Area
Age Mean SD Min/Max Mean SD Min/Max
40 - 49 24.83 14.59 7.58/ 56.97 22.64 15.76 0/ 91.54
50 - 59 60.89 30.61 29.45/150.98 54.45 27.31 0/181.96
60 - 69 94.06 30.04 49.39/143.99 85.18 33.52 0/246.04
70 - 79 120.81 44.34 76.98/229.48 115.24 42.84 0/322.97
N 13 637
*fatalities per 100 000
Bremen
Table 4.2 shows mortality rates for the screening area Bremen and the control areas in
Lower Saxony by age classes and averaged over years. Again, we observe mortality rates in
the screening area Bremen and in 49 control regions over 13 years. Therefore, our analysis
sample for Bremen includes 13 observations for the screening area and 637 observations for
the control area. In the screening area we observe for all age classes and years a positive
number of deaths from breast cancer whereas in the control areas in each age class at least
one administrative district reports zero deaths from breast cancer. In contrast to descrip-
tive results in Lower Saxony, the screening areas in Bremen exhibit higher mortality rates
compared to their control areas for all but the highest age class.
Figure 4.7 provides more detailed information about mean mortality rates for the screen-
ing and control area by years and age classes in Bremen. The vertical line in year 2001
indicates the start of the pilot project in Bremen. Breast cancer mortality seems to be al-
most constant in all age classes over time. Only for the class 60 - 69 it seems that mortality
rates in the screening and control area are diverging since 2007 due to a decrease in mortality
rates in the screening region.
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Figure 4.6: Breast cancer mortality rates in Lower Saxony
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Hesse
Due to privacy protection, observations for Hesse were censored by the Statistical Office
if the number of fatalities was 1 or 2 in an administrative district and a respective age
class. As such low numbers mainly occur in lower age classes, our analysis data set is almost
unaffected. Nevertheless, we imputed the censored cells in three ways: replacement with 1
for each censored observation (we refer to this imputation as “positive”), replacement with
2 for each censored observation (“negative” imputation), and replacement with the ratio of
the difference in total fatalities3 and observed fatalities and the number of censored cells
(“mean” imputation). Our results are robust to all three imputations. In this section the
descriptive statistics for the positive imputation are presented. The corresponding results
for the negative and mean imputations are relegated to the Appendix (Tables 4.16 and 4.17
and Figures 4.15 and 4.16).
3The total number of fatalities over all age classes in each administrative district and for each year was
delivered by the Statistical Office.
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Table 4.2: Mean breast cancer mortality rates in Bremen*
Screening Area Control Area
Age Mean SD Min/Max Mean SD Min/Max
40 - 49 18.93 6.97 11.88/ 32.09 22.64 15.76 0/ 91.54
50 - 59 48.69 14.14 21.62/ 68.38 54.45 27.31 0/181.96
60 - 69 78.89 17.74 48.90/116.61 85.18 33.52 0/246.04
70 - 79 122.03 23.62 82.31/153.23 115.24 42.84 0/322.97
N 13 637
*fatalities per 100 000
The descriptive analysis of the positive imputed data for Hesse does not suggest a sys-
tematic difference between the screening and control area. Table 4.3 shows mortality rates
for the screening and control area in Hesse by age classes and averaged over years. We
observe mortality rates in the screening area and in 25 control regions for 13 years. There-
fore, our analysis sample for Hesse includes 13 observations for the screening area and 325
observations for the control area. In both areas we observe a positive number of fatalities
from breast cancer for all age classes and years. The differences in mortality levels between
screening and control areas alter between age classes and show no systematic pattern.
Figure 4.8 provides more detailed information about mean mortality rates for the screen-
ing and control areas in Hesse by age classes over years. The vertical line in year 2001
indicates the begin of the pilot project in Hesse. There is a slight downward trend in mor-
tality for the age class 50 - 59. Nevertheless, this trend seems to be similar in the screening
and the control area. In general, mortality rates in Hesse seem to be constant over time both
in the screening and the control areas.
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Figure 4.7: Breast cancer mortality rates in Bremen
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Table 4.3: Mean breast cancer mortality rates in Hesse*
Screening Area Control Area
Age Mean SD Min/Max Mean SD Min/Max
40 - 49 15.10 9.57 6.04/ 30.60 17.42 11.45 0/ 66.66
50 - 59 50.81 23.09 14.91/ 80.63 46.48 21.56 0/134.77
60 - 69 68.63 19.65 34.33/ 93.97 78.44 27.96 0/183.56
70 - 79 113.60 31.38 64.42/173.36 108.21 35.22 12.49/207.88
N 13 325
*fatalities per 100 000
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Figure 4.8: Breast cancer mortality rates in Hesse
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4.5 Empirical Strategy
We use different regression models to compare the evolution of mortality over time in
the treated regions with the time patterns in the respective control regions. As mortality is
increasing in age, we fit separate models for each age group as outlined in Section 4.4. Al-
ternatively, we could interact the whole set of covariates with age group dummies. However,
in terms of presenting and interpreting the coefficients, we prefer separate regressions.
Following the previous literature, our main model is a Poisson regression that models the
number of fatalities in a specific region. As the number of females and hence the number of
fatalities is increasing in the number of inhabitants of a specific region, the number of females
of the respective age groups is entered as an exposure variable in the Poisson specifications.
We inquire the robustness of these results by two alternative models that use the mortality
rate as the dependent variable. The first model is a simple linear model fitted by OLS.
While a linear OLS estimation is a useful robustness check, the bounded nature of the
response variable may render the linear model as inappropriate. From the outset, all models
that constrain the predictions to values between zero and one are equally suitable. We use
the standard generalized linear models to handle this bounded response variable, and in
particular, we use the probit model. Generalized linear models (GLM) are due to Nelder
and Wedderburn (1972), who provide a common framework to estimate a large class of
models including the probit, poisson and the linear model by maximum likelihood (see also
McCullagh and Nelder 1989). The application of the probit model to fractional response
data was also suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).
In a first set of specifications, the set of explanatory variables consists of a constant
α, year fixed effects T imet for each available year t, a dummy Screening indicating those
regions where organized mammography screening was introduced during the pilot project
and interaction terms between the year dummies and the screening dummy. Effectively, this
model plots the average mortality numbers and rates over time in two completely separate
plots: one for the treatment regions and a second for the control regions.
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Formally, the poisson version of the model for a specific age group reads:
log (E (y|x)) = log(exposure) + α + Screening +
∑
t∈T
Timet + Timet × Screening (4.1)
where y is the number of fatalaties, T = [1999, ..., 2010] and the year 1998 is the omitted
base line year.
The equation of the linear version of the model reads
E(y|x) = α + Screening +
∑
t∈T
Timet + Timet × Screening (4.2)
where y is now the mortality rate.
Finally, the generalized linear (probit) version of the model is given by
Φ−1 (E(y|x)) = α + Screening +
∑
t∈T
Timet + Timet × Screening (4.3)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the Normal distribution. We refer
to this first set as “time-flexible” models in the following.
In the second set of models, the time variable is recoded to a version with only three levels.
The first time frame models the years before screening was introduced. The second time
frame indexes the years when screening was introduced in the treatment regions but could
not have an effect yet (5 years after implementation), while the third time frame indexes
those years when the screening program could have an effect on mortality. Once again, we
consider a Poisson, a linear and a Probit version. The equations have the same structure
as the time-flexible models. The only difference is the time index t ∈ {1, 2, 3} which now
denotes the following time frames: t equals 2 for the years 2001(2) - 2006(7) and t is equal
to 3 for the years 2006(7) - 2010. The omitted baseline category is t = 1 which indicates
the years 1998 - 2001(2). The denoted differences of one year account for the fact that the
organized screening was introduced in Bremen and Hesse in 2001 and one year later in Lower
Saxony.
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4.6 Results
In this section we present and discuss the main regression results. As described in Sec-
tion 4.5, the most flexible models include interaction terms between each year dummy and
the screening indicator. These models effectively plot the average mortality rate within the
screening and respective control regions over time; a separate model for each age group is
estimated. The year 1998 is the omitted baseline category in these regressions. The results of
the three different estimators are virtually identical to the descriptive results in Section 4.4.
We therefore discuss only the results obtained from the Poisson model and relegate the re-
sults of the linear and the Probit models to the Appendix. As seen in the descriptive analysis
in Section 4.4, the number of observations for the screening areas is small. This raises is-
sues regarding the precision of the most flexible model. Therefore, we focus on the more
restrictive models that consider three time frames. The first time frame comprises those
years before screening in the pilot regions was introduced. The second time frame consists
of those years when screening was introduced in the screening regions but cannot have an
effect. Finally, the third time frame covers the years when screening could have an effect on
breast cancer mortality.
Lower Saxony
Table 4.4 shows the results obtained from the most flexible Poisson model. As discussed
in Section 4.2, a possible treatment effect of the organized screening programme is only
visible after five years. Hence, the time period covering the years 2008 - 2010 is the most
interesting one. Starting the discussion for the women who are between 50 and 59 years
old and therefore could benefit from screening, the coefficients in Table 4.4 indicate that
the mortality rates in the control area are very similar for the years 2008 - 2010. A slightly
different pattern is found for the treatment area. Here, the mortality rates in 2007 and 2008
are identical, while the point estimate for 2009 is about 40% larger than the 2008 estimate.
After this peak in 2009, the mortality rate in 2010 drops to the 1998 level.
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Table 4.4: Results from Poisson regression for Lower Saxony by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.7247*** 0.0738 0.0786* 0.0456 -0.0839* 0.0468 -0.1894*** 0.0378
1999 -0.0162 0.0959 0.0398 0.0681 -0.0655 0.0610 -0.0302 0.0549
2000 -0.1384 0.0999 -0.1488** 0.0704 0.1078* 0.0588 -0.0080 0.0531
2001 -0.0682 0.0950 -0.1305 0.0815 -0.0062 0.0619 0.0617 0.0571
2002 -0.0391 0.0916 -0.0459 0.0637 -0.0258 0.0608 0.0701 0.0532
2003 -0.2524** 0.1104 0.0021 0.0634 0.1116 0.0727 0.0008 0.0550
2004 -0.1561* 0.0922 -0.2597*** 0.0697 0.0847 0.0633 -0.0138 0.0519
2005 -0.3890*** 0.1027 -0.2789*** 0.0790 0.0906 0.0635 0.0489 0.0481
2006 -0.2604*** 0.0987 -0.2054*** 0.0714 0.0843 0.0631 0.0436 0.0490
2007 -0.4073*** 0.1079 -0.3475*** 0.0692 0.0535 0.0585 0.0306 0.0502
2008 -0.3872*** 0.1174 -0.3538*** 0.0661 0.0914 0.0583 -0.0574 0.0574
2009 -0.4726*** 0.1124 -0.3382*** 0.0738 -0.0461 0.0660 0.0393 0.0528
2010 -0.3348*** 0.0906 -0.3725*** 0.0686 0.0274 0.0588 0.0449 0.0533
Screeningx1999 -0.6889*** 0.0959 0.7349*** 0.0681 0.7097*** 0.0610 0.1587*** 0.0549
Screeningx2000 -0.2939*** 0.0999 -0.1695** 0.0704 -0.0551 0.0588 0.2570*** 0.0531
Screeningx2001 -1.0822*** 0.0950 -0.4042*** 0.0815 0.5126*** 0.0619 0.2112*** 0.0571
Screeningx2002 -1.8313*** 0.0916 -0.2772*** 0.0637 -0.1064* 0.0608 0.0931* 0.0532
Screeningx2003 -0.9531*** 0.1104 -0.8521*** 0.0634 0.5007*** 0.0727 0.7291*** 0.0550
Screeningx2004 -0.1690* 0.0922 -0.6002*** 0.0697 0.0048 0.0633 0.0363 0.0519
Screeningx2005 -0.4679*** 0.1027 0.0759 0.0790 0.1323** 0.0635 0.8391*** 0.0481
Screeningx2006 -1.7144*** 0.0987 0.1457** 0.0714 0.4051*** 0.0631 -0.2293*** 0.0490
Screeningx2007 -0.8983*** 0.1079 0.2803*** 0.0692 -0.1757*** 0.0585 0.0371 0.0502
Screeningx2008 -1.6293*** 0.1174 0.2752*** 0.0661 0.1583*** 0.0583 0.3899*** 0.0574
Screeningx2009 -0.1618 0.1124 0.3908*** 0.0738 0.0835 0.0660 0.0401 0.0528
Screeningx2010 -0.2943*** 0.0906 -0.0608 0.0686 -0.4532*** 0.0588 -0.2492*** 0.0533
Constant -8.1950*** 0.0738 -7.3491*** 0.0456 -7.1035*** 0.0468 -6.7757*** 0.0378
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Figure 4.9: Poisson estimated breast cancer mortality in Lower Saxony – time restricted
model
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For the women who are too young to benefit from screening (40 - 49), a similar pattern
emerges. Mortality rates in the control regions are very similar for the years 2008 - 2010,
while there is a peak in 2009 for the screening areas. In 2010, the mortality rate in the
screening areas is slightly below the 1998 level. The same pattern is found for women who
are too old to be eligible for the organized screening program (70 - 79). Overall, the results
do not indicate that mortality rates in the screening regions differ from the corresponding
rates in the control regions.
Figure 4.9 presents the predictions obtained from the more parsimonious model. Table 4.5
provides the corresponding coefficients. For women who are too young to benefit from
screening (40 - 49), the model indicates a reduction of mortality over time. In line with that,
the time effects are precisely estimated, while all the coefficients of the interaction terms are
noisy, i.e. the screening and the control areas exhibit the same pattern over time.
For women aged 50 - 59 years, a similar pattern emerges: mortality decreases over time,
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Table 4.5: Results from time restricted Poisson regression for Lower Saxony by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.1127 0.2536 0.1677 0.2500 0.1705 0.1413 -0.0396 0.0462
Time2 -0.2421*** 0.0436 -0.1691*** 0.0366 0.0815*** 0.0271 0.0083 0.0238
Time3 -0.3310*** 0.0537 -0.2985*** 0.0392 0.0167 0.0303 -0.0083 0.0293
ScreeningxTime2 -0.0926 0.3499 -0.2086 0.2910 -0.0479 0.1845 0.2125 0.1999
ScreeningxTime3 0.0749 0.3746 0.1223 0.2758 -0.2836 0.2080 -0.0732 0.1351
Constant -8.2459*** 0.0283 -7.3963*** 0.0251 -7.0975*** 0.0187 -6.7586*** 0.0181
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
but the differences between the screening and control regions are small. For this age group,
the estimated number of fatalities before screening was introduced (years 1998 - 2002) is
higher in the screening regions than in the control regions. This positive difference is even
higher in the years 2008 - 2010 which would indicate that mortality increases after the intro-
duction of the organized screening program. Note that the interaction term that picks up the
difference-in-difference estimate of this effect of the screening program (Screening x Time3 ),
is only imprecisely estimated. The associated 95% confidence interval is [−0.42, 0.66]. The
predicted number of fatalities in the control areas before screening was introduced is roughly
equal to 61 per 100, 0004. Using this as a baseline, the confidence interval of the interaction
term translates into an interval for the estimated effect in terms of fatalities of [−21, 57]5.
This means that the estimated difference in mortality ranges between 21 fatalities less and
57 fatalities more per 100,000 in the screening area compared to the control area.
Moving to women aged 60 - 69 (who are eligible for screening), mortality in the second
time frame is slightly higher than in the first time frame. Once again, for this age group,
the estimated number of fatalities before screening was introduced (years 1998 - 2002) is
higher in the screening regions than in the control regions. This pattern is reversed in the
4exp(−7.4) ∗ 100, 000 ≈ 61
5The predicted number of fatalities at the lower bound of the confidence interval is equal to
exp(−7.4−0.42)∗100, 000≈ 40. This would imply an effect of −21 compared to the baseline of 61. Similarly,
the predicted number of fatalities at the upper bound is equal to exp(−7.4 + 0.66) ∗ 100, 000 ≈ 118 which
implies a change of 57 compared to the baseline of 61.
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third time frame, since mortality in the screening regions is notably smaller in the third
time frame compared to the years before. While the direction of the effect is in line with a
reduction of mortality due to the screening program, the point estimate of this effect is once
again imprecisely estimated. The associated 95% confidence interval is [−0.69, 0.12].
For women aged 60 - 69, most of the estimates are noisy, including the coefficient modeling
the treatment effect of the screening program. Finally, moving the discussion to women aged
70 - 79, there is also no clear pattern. For this age group, mortality in the screening regions
increases in the second time frame and decreases in the third. All corresponding coefficients
are imprecisely estimated.
Overall, there is no evidence in support of the organized screening program in Lower
Saxony. For women aged 40 - 49 and 50 - 59, there are discernable reductions in mortality
over time. However, the time effects for both groups are similar across treatment and control
regions. Furthermore, women aged 40 - 49 were not eligible for screening. Hence, the
observed reductions in mortality cannot be attributed to the organized screening program.
They could, for example, be driven by advances in treatment methodology.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the Appendix provide the results for the time-flexible OLS and
GLM probit model, respectively, and Figure 4.12 plots the predictions obtained from the
time-restricted OLS and GLM models. These alternative models provide the same evidence
as the Poisson model and therefore corroborate the conclusions so far.
Bremen
As discussed in Section 4.4, there is some evidence for time trends that affected both
treatment and control regions in Bremen. For instance, within the screening region, the
mortality rate of women who are too young to be eligible for the organized screening program
(40 - 49) decreases over time. Furthermore, the plots suggest that this decline is slightly
more pronounced in the screening regions, especially in the early 2000s. The magnitude of
these two patterns is visible in the Poisson estimates (Table 4.6). For example, for this age
group, the coefficients modeling the mortality rate in the control areas obtain values of −0.1
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Table 4.6: Results from Poisson regression for Bremen by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.0298 0.0755 -0.1191*** 0.0437 0.0581 0.0466 0.0983*** 0.0367
1999 -0.0507 0.0958 0.0709 0.0680 -0.0328 0.0615 -0.0328 0.0531
2000 -0.1686* 0.0996 -0.1462** 0.0682 0.1049* 0.0586 -0.0114 0.0515
2001 -0.1126 0.0953 -0.1514* 0.0802 0.0151 0.0613 0.0548 0.0559
2002 -0.0996 0.0944 -0.0537 0.0615 -0.0317 0.0615 0.0664 0.0517
2003 -0.3041*** 0.1122 -0.0180 0.0624 0.1295* 0.0702 0.0141 0.0528
2004 -0.1756* 0.0926 -0.2784*** 0.0683 0.0860 0.0625 -0.0199 0.0505
2005 -0.4081*** 0.1019 -0.2769*** 0.0758 0.1010 0.0627 0.0727 0.0492
2006 -0.3194*** 0.1018 -0.2076*** 0.0690 0.0971 0.0618 0.0269 0.0497
2007 -0.4459*** 0.1070 -0.3376*** 0.0653 0.0521 0.0581 0.0228 0.0490
2008 -0.4214*** 0.1162 -0.3503*** 0.0645 0.0962* 0.0574 -0.0490 0.0560
2009 -0.4720*** 0.1150 -0.3184*** 0.0727 -0.0305 0.0650 0.0360 0.0510
2010 -0.3601*** 0.0909 -0.3813*** 0.0662 0.0160 0.0592 0.0299 0.0524
Screeningx1999 0.1363 0.0958 -0.4557*** 0.0680 -0.1052* 0.0615 0.0928* 0.0531
Screeningx2000 0.0638 0.0996 0.3197*** 0.0682 -0.3067*** 0.0586 0.0468 0.0515
Screeningx2001 -0.0075 0.0953 0.1587** 0.0802 0.0325 0.0613 0.0416 0.0559
Screeningx2002 -0.5492*** 0.0944 0.0159 0.0615 0.3294*** 0.0615 0.1048** 0.0517
Screeningx2003 -0.3634*** 0.1122 -0.2530*** 0.0624 -0.0259 0.0702 0.1807*** 0.0528
Screeningx2004 -0.5057*** 0.0926 -0.0632 0.0683 -0.1597** 0.0625 -0.3025*** 0.0505
Screeningx2005 -0.2916*** 0.1019 0.2159*** 0.0758 -0.3246*** 0.0627 -0.1858*** 0.0492
Screeningx2006 -0.2335** 0.1018 -0.0382 0.0690 -0.0211 0.0618 0.1267** 0.0497
Screeningx2007 -0.1179 0.1070 -0.3898*** 0.0653 -0.2335*** 0.0581 -0.4493*** 0.0490
Screeningx2008 -0.4860*** 0.1162 0.5264*** 0.0645 -0.4287*** 0.0574 -0.0163 0.0560
Screeningx2009 -0.4356*** 0.1150 0.2664*** 0.0727 -0.2855*** 0.0650 -0.1343*** 0.0510
Screeningx2010 -0.3579*** 0.0909 -0.5943*** 0.0662 -0.5874*** 0.0592 -0.3862*** 0.0524
Constant -8.1600*** 0.0755 -7.3448*** 0.0437 -7.1099*** 0.0466 -6.7742*** 0.0367
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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and −0.3 for the years 2002 and 2003. The corresponding coefficients for the screening areas
are −0.55 and −0.36.
Moving to women aged 50 - 59 who could benefit from screening, a different pattern
emerges. While the mortality rate in the control area in the years 2004 - 2010 is smaller
than in 1998, mortality in the treated area hovers around the baseline 1998 level.
The opposite pattern is visible for women aged 60 - 69. While the mortality rate is hardly
changing in the control regions, there is a decrease over time in the screening regions. Hence,
for this age group the flexible model would suggest weak evidence for a positive treatment
effect for women aged 60 - 69 as mortality decreases in the treatment regions in the years
2008 - 2010 and it stays constant in the control region.
Once again, the more parsimonious model provides more precise estimates. Table 4.7 and
Figure 4.10 summarize the results. For women who are too young to benefit from screening
(40 - 49), the model confirms the aforementioned time trends. Mortality decreases over time
and this decrease is more pronounced in the screening regions.
Table 4.7: Results from time restricted Poisson regression for Bremen by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.0802 0.0535 -0.1006 0.0993 -0.0334 0.0551 0.1433*** 0.0267
Time2 -0.1759*** 0.0448 -0.1126*** 0.0399 0.0539* 0.0293 0.0299 0.0258
Time3 -0.3417*** 0.0510 -0.2960*** 0.0391 0.0112 0.0292 0.0081 0.0278
ScreeningxTime2 -0.4405*** 0.0662 -0.0388 0.1162 0.0657 0.0979 -0.0405 0.0890
ScreeningxTime3 -0.3905*** 0.0992 0.0414 0.2453 -0.2817*** 0.0892 -0.2797*** 0.0837
Constant -8.2423*** 0.0326 -7.3957*** 0.0295 -7.0861*** 0.0213 -6.7713*** 0.0202
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
Moving to women aged 50 - 59, the pattern is less clear. Mortality decreases in the second
time frame and the extent of this decrease is similar across treatment and control regions. In
the third time frame, mortality in the treatment regions increases and reaches a level slightly
above the level in the control regions.
For women aged 60 - 69, mortality during the first two time frames is very similar across
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Figure 4.10: Poisson estimated breast cancer mortality in Bremen – time restricted model
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treatment and control regions. In the years 2007 - 2010, the estimated number of fatalities
decreases sharply in the treatment regions. The point estimate of the interaction term
Screening x Time3 is equal to −0.28. It is precisely estimated with a corresponding 95 %
interval of [−0.46,−0.11]. The estimated number of fatalities in the control region for the
first time frame is roughly equal to 56 per 100, 000. Using this as a baseline, the confidence
interval translates into an interval for the estimated number of reduction due to the screening
program of [17, 32].
For women who are too old to (fully) benefit from screening (70 - 79), mortality in the
screening areas decreases over time. Once again, the point estimate of the corresponding
interaction term is precisely estimated.
The results for Bremen are mixed. While the estimates for women aged 60 - 69 would
indicate a reduction of mortality due to the screening program, the results as a whole do not
support this conclusion for two main reasons. First, for the women who are too young to
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benefit from screening, the interaction term for this placebo-effect of the screening program
is sizable and precisely estimated too. Second, mortality of women aged 50 - 59 who are
fully eligible for screening, is seemingly not affected. By contrast, there is a reduction of
mortality in the age group 70 - 79 in the screening regions. However, this age group is only
partially affected. In summary, the results as a whole are mixed and do not provide evidence
in favor of the organized screening program. With respect to the robustness of the results,
the alternative specifications generate once again the same findings as the Poisson model.6
Hesse
Table 4.8 summarizes the Poisson regression results for the positive imputed data for
Hesse (see Section 4.4). As before, due to the small number of observations for each time
effect, clear patterns are hardly discernable. The model indicates a reduction of mortality
for the two younger age groups (40 - 49 and 50 - 59). This finding is in line with the previous
results.
The parsimonious model (Figure 4.11 and Table 4.9) summarizes these trends more
clearly. Similar to Bremen, the mortality rates of the two youngest age groups (40 - 49
and 50 - 59) decrease over time; one exception is the increase of mortality in the screening
regions in the third time frame for the youngest group (40 - 49). No clear pattern is found
for the two older groups (60 - 69 and 70 - 79).
Overall, there is once again hardly any evidence for an association between the mortality
rate and treatment status. For women aged 50 - 59, mortality decreases in both screening
and control regions. Although the Screening x Time3 -estimate of−0.40 indicates a reduction
of mortality in the treatment regions that is attributable to screening, the coefficient is only
very imprecisely estimated. Therefore, the estimation does not indicate any difference from
the overall time trend. For women aged 60 - 69, mortality is slightly increasing over time.
Here, the coefficient Screening x Time3 would even suggest that mortality increases after the
6See Tables 4.12 and 4.13 in the Appendix of this chapter for the time-flexible OLS and GLM models,
respectively, and Figure 4.13 for the corresponding time-restricted models.
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Table 4.8: Results from Poisson regression for Hesse by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening -1.1049*** 0.1085 0.3835*** 0.0700 -0.3675*** 0.0674 0.2145*** 0.0460
1999 0.0418 0.1640 0.0165 0.1008 0.1938** 0.0892 0.0069 0.0751
2000 0.1250 0.1523 0.0588 0.0980 0.0992 0.0831 -0.0404 0.0767
2001 -0.1050 0.1650 0.0122 0.1004 0.0289 0.0864 0.0207 0.0731
2002 -0.1160 0.1705 -0.1970* 0.1091 0.1395 0.0981 -0.0334 0.0687
2003 -0.2527 0.1705 -0.1809* 0.1067 0.0581 0.0896 0.0507 0.0651
2004 -0.1693 0.1677 -0.1066 0.0973 0.1097 0.0792 -0.0408 0.0834
2005 -0.2382 0.1471 -0.1915* 0.1003 0.2355** 0.0922 -0.0509 0.0644
2006 -0.3831** 0.1648 -0.0312 0.0946 0.1856** 0.0941 -0.0104 0.0734
2007 -0.1977 0.1806 -0.3664*** 0.1167 -0.0451 0.0915 -0.0442 0.0872
2008 -0.6170*** 0.1813 -0.3020** 0.1174 0.1039 0.0869 -0.1340 0.0833
2009 -0.3009* 0.1640 -0.2541*** 0.0931 -0.0602 0.0910 -0.0480 0.0673
2010 -0.6271*** 0.1768 -0.4960*** 0.1027 -0.0252 0.0898 -0.0399 0.0827
Screeningx1999 0.6453*** 0.1640 -0.0165 0.1008 0.2291** 0.0892 -0.4657*** 0.0751
Screeningx2000 -0.1468 0.1523 -0.1518 0.0980 -0.4283*** 0.0831 -0.7384*** 0.0767
Screeningx2001 1.4545*** 0.1650 -0.0934 0.1004 0.4045*** 0.0864 0.0988 0.0731
Screeningx2002 1.4396*** 0.1705 -0.3044*** 0.1091 -0.5399*** 0.0981 0.2445*** 0.0687
Screeningx2003 0.8532*** 0.1705 -0.1640 0.1067 0.4283*** 0.0896 -0.2029*** 0.0651
Screeningx2004 0.0448 0.1677 -0.5784*** 0.0973 0.2596*** 0.0792 -0.2438*** 0.0834
Screeningx2005 0.0957 0.1471 -0.7461*** 0.1003 -0.2499*** 0.0922 -0.1371** 0.0644
Screeningx2006 0.2176 0.1648 -0.9250*** 0.0946 0.3226*** 0.0941 -0.1976*** 0.0734
Screeningx2007 1.6280*** 0.1806 -0.0454 0.1167 0.6518*** 0.0915 -0.2070** 0.0872
Screeningx2008 1.8148*** 0.1813 -1.3775*** 0.1174 0.4179*** 0.0869 -0.0540 0.0833
Screeningx2009 0.1077 0.1640 -1.4340*** 0.0931 0.4804*** 0.0910 -0.7055*** 0.0673
Screeningx2010 1.5441*** 0.1768 0.1823* 0.1027 0.2033** 0.0898 -0.2623*** 0.0827
Constant -8.4172*** 0.1085 -7.5065*** 0.0700 -7.2091*** 0.0674 -6.7833*** 0.0460
N 338 338 338 338
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Figure 4.11: Poisson estimated breast cancer mortality in Hesse – time restricted model
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introduction of the organized screening program. This effect is also visible in Figure 4.11,
as mortality in the third time frame increases in the screening regions, but decreases in the
control regions.
Finally, also for the oldest age group, the estimation results reveal no clear pattern over
time.
In summary, the estimates suggest that there are some time trends, but there is no
evidence for a reduction of mortality due to the organized screening program. For women
aged 50 - 59, mortality decreases in both screening and control regions to the same extent
and for women aged 60 - 69 the estimates would even suggest an increase of mortality due
to screening. Once again, the alternative specifications support the results from the main
Poisson model.7 The corresponding results of the time-restricted Poisson estimations for
the negative and mean imputations are presented in Tables 4.18 and 4.19 and Figures 4.17
7See Tables 4.14 and 4.15 in the Appendix of this chapter for the time-flexible OLS and GLM models,
respectively, and Figure 4.14 for the corresponding time-restricted models.
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Table 4.9: Results from time restricted Poisson regression for Hesse by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening -0.4463 0.3070 0.3193*** 0.0415 -0.2669* 0.1522 -0.0025 0.1698
Time2 -0.2484*** 0.0813 -0.1600*** 0.0484 0.0633 0.0407 -0.0134 0.0373
Time3 -0.4360*** 0.0967 -0.3732*** 0.0548 -0.0875** 0.0420 -0.0622 0.0437
ScreeningxTime2 0.0411 0.4362 -0.4582*** 0.1207 0.0006 0.2050 0.1235 0.1915
ScreeningxTime3 0.7522* 0.3912 -0.4027 0.2978 0.3491** 0.1728 -0.0726 0.1995
Constant -8.3989*** 0.0585 -7.4845*** 0.0352 -7.1259*** 0.0290 -6.7863*** 0.0282
N 338 338 338 338
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
and 4.18 in the Appendix. Only for the negative imputation, the estimated coefficient for
Screening x Time3 in the age class 50 - 59 becomes significant at the 10%-level. Therefore,
in the case of overestimating the number of fatalities a slightly significant higher reduction
in mortality is found for the screening area compared to the control area in this age class
and would suggest an effect of the screening program. But still, this result is contradicted by
the findings for the age class 60 - 69 where the results suggest an increase in breast cancer
mortality in the screening area compared to the control area for all imputations.
4.7 Conclusion
In summary, both descriptive and model-based results do not provide evidence for a
reduction of the target population’s breast cancer mortality rate. The findings are in line
with recent observational studies for Denmark and Norway (Jørgensen et al. 2010 and 2013)
that also cannot find any reduction in breast cancer mortality that can be attributed to an
organized screening program.
There are a number of possible reasons why there is no discernable impact of the organized
screening program on breast cancer mortality. First, it is possible that advances in treatment
methodology are more important for a successful treatment of cancer than early detection
(cf. Autier 2011). If treatment of cancer is successful whether or not it is detected early, the
overall progress in medical treatment possibilities could overhaul the potential effect of an
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organized screening program on breast cancer mortality. In this case the organized screening
program is limited in its effectiveness to additionally reduce mortality.
A second and closely related channel is that awareness of breast cancer has increased
over time. For example, a higher level of cancer awareness could imply that women make
more use of other prevention and early detection possibilities, e.g. manual breast exams.
Both channels are compatible with the observed reductions in the mortality during the years
2001(2) and 2006(7) when it is too early to measure effects due to the screening program.
These channels are also in line with the reduction in the number of fatalities in the age group
of 40 - 49 which is entirely composed of women who are not eligible for mass-screening.
A further possible explanation is the relatively small take-up rate of approximately 53%
in Germany (Biesheuvel et al. 2011). The take-up rate is a surrogate parameter that delivers
necessary evidence for the effectiveness of the program. Naturally, insufficient acceptance
of the program by the target group could severely hamper any potential effectiveness of the
organized screening program. Further detailed analyses of the determinants of utilization
and acceptance of the program could increase the understanding why the program shows no
effect on breast cancer mortality so far.
Finally, as participation is voluntary, it is possible that women’s individual risk to devel-
oping cancer is correlated with their individual decision to participate in the program and
that healthy females have a higher propensity to make use of the mammography screening.
This would imply that mainly healthy women without cancer are screened, and thereby driv-
ing down the probability that a serious cancer is detected due to the program which, in turn,
would affect the effectiveness of the program. However, our main conclusions are unaffected
by this. For instance, even if there is self-selection of healthy females into screening, there is
no reason to believe that such self-selection differs systematically between pilot and control
regions. The same holds for the other channels, e.g. the take-up rate.
Overall, our results suggest no effect on breast cancer mortality rates that can directly
be attributed to the organized breast cancer screening program in Germany. Therefore,
more detailed analyses of what determines and constrains the effectiveness of the program
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should be conducted in the future. A deeper understanding of these factors would allow the
adjustment of the program such that it could develop its potential ability to reduce breast
cancer mortality. Once detailed data at the individual level is available, it will be possible
to analyze these different factors.
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4.8 Appendix
Table 4.10: Results from OLS regression for Lower Saxony by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 27.6886*** 3.2429 6.5381* 3.9376 -5.2213 5.1383 -21.9960*** 5.9953
1999 -0.5106 4.1823 10.8576* 6.1091 -0.6515 7.0855 -6.5003 8.7556
2000 -2.7340 4.1889 -5.7215 5.4899 7.3835 6.9092 -5.9741 8.5024
2001 -3.9941 3.8571 -8.0319 6.0842 2.3402 7.0842 -3.3548 8.4248
2002 -2.8557 3.9419 -3.0769 5.5884 -5.4242 6.2276 2.6318 9.1715
2003 -11.4255*** 3.6799 -0.4650 5.6539 5.9982 7.5868 2.4664 10.0024
2004 -4.1468 3.8778 -13.4067** 5.5141 7.0506 7.1298 -7.8881 8.4501
2005 -10.6975*** 3.7885 -10.8992** 5.1595 12.0685* 7.1829 4.0877 8.5864
2006 -10.4531*** 3.7509 -9.8168* 5.7679 8.5561 7.1012 -3.3115 8.0835
2007 -9.8490*** 3.7213 -19.2697*** 4.8793 4.5235 6.6797 3.4610 8.9408
2008 -10.6774*** 3.9161 -18.6885*** 5.0282 11.9011* 7.1931 -4.5694 8.0206
2009 -9.9753*** 3.8455 -16.3861*** 5.0350 -1.2301 7.2638 0.2947 8.1365
2010 -9.0684** 3.6152 -16.7824*** 4.9201 4.1615 6.8628 3.2098 8.4887
Screeningx1999 -28.3135*** 4.1823 70.5482*** 6.1091 69.0379*** 7.0855 19.4541** 8.7556
Screeningx2000 -17.2652*** 4.1889 -13.2468** 5.4899 -3.2964 6.9092 32.6760*** 8.5024
Screeningx2001 -34.9480*** 3.8571 -20.7814*** 6.0842 47.5040*** 7.0842 32.9785*** 8.4248
Screeningx2002 -45.3416*** 3.9419 -16.1361*** 5.5884 -3.9340 6.2276 14.1123 9.1715
Screeningx2003 -28.4829*** 3.6799 -39.3723*** 5.6539 57.8567*** 7.5868 99.0461*** 10.0024
Screeningx2004 -11.6654*** 3.8778 -26.7225*** 5.5141 0.0299 7.1298 10.0377 8.4501
Screeningx2005 -22.0934*** 3.7885 -1.8797 5.1595 6.8116 7.1829 130.9652*** 8.5864
Screeningx2006 -38.6145*** 3.7509 5.7843 5.7679 39.1697*** 7.1012 -12.6858 8.0835
Screeningx2007 -31.6852*** 3.7213 14.7438*** 4.8793 -13.2232** 6.6797 3.1586 8.9408
Screeningx2008 -38.7134*** 3.9161 13.4334*** 5.0282 9.5464 7.1931 41.8141*** 8.0206
Screeningx2009 -16.7878*** 3.8455 20.1378*** 5.0350 4.1132 7.2638 7.5029 8.1365
Screeningx2010 -17.5342*** 3.6152 -7.6831 4.9201 -30.3761*** 6.8628 -20.6562** 8.4887
Constant 29.2860*** 3.2429 63.0375*** 3.9376 80.8234*** 5.1383 116.4247*** 5.9953
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Table 4.11: Results from GLM (binomial) regression for Lower Saxony by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.6658*** 0.1086 0.0987 0.0613 -0.0668 0.0624 -0.2096*** 0.0506
1999 -0.0176 0.1411 0.1590* 0.0872 -0.0081 0.0864 -0.0575 0.0762
2000 -0.0980 0.1463 -0.0952 0.0897 0.0875 0.0808 -0.0527 0.0737
2001 -0.1467 0.1355 -0.1364 0.1030 0.0286 0.0849 -0.0293 0.0721
2002 -0.1026 0.1368 -0.0501 0.0893 -0.0695 0.0774 0.0224 0.0764
2003 -0.4946*** 0.1446 -0.0074 0.0883 0.0716 0.0887 0.0210 0.0832
2004 -0.1527 0.1367 -0.2393** 0.0979 0.0837 0.0833 -0.0702 0.0739
2005 -0.4547*** 0.1499 -0.1899** 0.0877 0.1393* 0.0819 0.0345 0.0712
2006 -0.4416*** 0.1464 -0.1694* 0.0990 0.1007 0.0824 -0.0289 0.0691
2007 -0.4100*** 0.1424 -0.3650*** 0.0890 0.0545 0.0794 0.0293 0.0742
2008 -0.4536*** 0.1587 -0.3518*** 0.0924 0.1375* 0.0820 -0.0401 0.0689
2009 -0.4166*** 0.1510 -0.3012*** 0.0901 -0.0153 0.0889 0.0025 0.0685
2010 -0.3706*** 0.1334 -0.3097*** 0.0876 0.0502 0.0816 0.0272 0.0706
Screeningx1999 -0.6877*** 0.1411 0.6166*** 0.0872 0.6530*** 0.0864 0.1862** 0.0762
Screeningx2000 -0.3345** 0.1463 -0.2233** 0.0897 -0.0348 0.0808 0.3020*** 0.0737
Screeningx2001 -1.0041*** 0.1355 -0.3986*** 0.1030 0.4784*** 0.0849 0.3024*** 0.0721
Screeningx2002 -1.7683*** 0.1368 -0.2733*** 0.0893 -0.0627 0.0774 0.1410* 0.0764
Screeningx2003 -0.7113*** 0.1446 -0.8430*** 0.0883 0.5413*** 0.0887 0.7100*** 0.0832
Screeningx2004 -0.1725 0.1367 -0.6210*** 0.0979 0.0059 0.0833 0.0928 0.0739
Screeningx2005 -0.4026*** 0.1499 -0.0131 0.0877 0.0838 0.0819 0.8548*** 0.0712
Screeningx2006 -1.5337*** 0.1464 0.1096 0.0990 0.3892*** 0.0824 -0.1569** 0.0691
Screeningx2007 -0.8960*** 0.1424 0.2977*** 0.0890 -0.1768** 0.0794 0.0385 0.0742
Screeningx2008 -1.5635*** 0.1587 0.2732*** 0.0924 0.1125 0.0820 0.3729*** 0.0689
Screeningx2009 -0.2181 0.1510 0.3537*** 0.0901 0.0528 0.0889 0.0769 0.0685
Screeningx2010 -0.2587* 0.1334 -0.1238 0.0876 -0.4763*** 0.0816 -0.2317*** 0.0706
Constant -8.1355*** 0.1086 -7.3686*** 0.0613 -7.1199*** 0.0624 -6.7545*** 0.0506
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Figure 4.12: OLS and GLM estimated breast cancer mortality in Lower Saxony
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Figure 4.13: OLS and GLM estimated breast cancer mortality in Bremen
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Table 4.12: Results from OLS regression for Bremen by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.1667 3.2429 -5.6965 3.9376 5.7593 5.1383 9.6744 5.9953
1999 -0.5106 4.1823 10.8576* 6.1091 -0.6515 7.0855 -6.5003 8.7556
2000 -2.7340 4.1889 -5.7215 5.4899 7.3835 6.9092 -5.9741 8.5024
2001 -3.9941 3.8571 -8.0319 6.0842 2.3402 7.0842 -3.3548 8.4248
2002 -2.8557 3.9419 -3.0769 5.5884 -5.4242 6.2276 2.6318 9.1715
2003 -11.4255*** 3.6799 -0.4650 5.6539 5.9982 7.5868 2.4664 10.0024
2004 -4.1468 3.8778 -13.4067** 5.5141 7.0506 7.1298 -7.8881 8.4501
2005 -10.6975*** 3.7885 -10.8992** 5.1595 12.0685* 7.1829 4.0877 8.5864
2006 -10.4531*** 3.7509 -9.8168* 5.7679 8.5561 7.1012 -3.3115 8.0835
2007 -9.8490*** 3.7213 -19.2697*** 4.8793 4.5235 6.6797 3.4610 8.9408
2008 -10.6774*** 3.9161 -18.6885*** 5.0282 11.9011* 7.1931 -4.5694 8.0206
2009 -9.9753*** 3.8455 -16.3861*** 5.0350 -1.2301 7.2638 0.2947 8.1365
2010 -9.0684** 3.6152 -16.7824*** 4.9201 4.1615 6.8628 3.2098 8.4887
Screeningx1999 3.1443 4.1823 -29.1753*** 6.1091 -10.5120 7.0855 14.2929 8.7556
Screeningx2000 -0.1963 4.1889 16.5836*** 5.4899 -23.2068*** 6.9092 10.5201 8.5024
Screeningx2001 0.6612 3.8571 8.4526 6.0842 1.8787 7.0842 16.1192* 8.4248
Screeningx2002 -11.2021*** 3.9419 0.9540 5.5884 35.4517*** 6.2276 20.9248** 9.1715
Screeningx2003 -2.9181 3.6799 -13.1480** 5.6539 3.4550 7.5868 24.6619** 10.0024
Screeningx2004 -10.4043*** 3.8778 -3.1881 5.5141 -13.2000* 7.1298 -26.8660*** 8.4501
Screeningx2005 -4.1246 3.7885 7.5094 5.1595 -29.4183*** 7.1829 -17.5742** 8.5864
Screeningx2006 -2.0575 3.7509 -2.6799 5.7679 -1.7258 7.1012 24.2334*** 8.0835
Screeningx2007 -2.8429 3.7213 -10.3644** 4.8793 -18.8853*** 6.6797 -47.2468*** 8.9408
Screeningx2008 -6.8898* 3.9161 29.7282*** 5.0282 -36.3885*** 7.1931 -3.4004 8.0206
Screeningx2009 -7.5941** 3.8455 13.4817*** 5.0350 -22.2289*** 7.2638 -12.1004 8.1365
Screeningx2010 -6.0193* 3.6152 -18.9422*** 4.9201 -41.8489*** 6.8628 -41.0014*** 8.4887
Constant 29.2860*** 3.2429 63.0375*** 3.9376 80.8234*** 5.1383 116.4247*** 5.9953
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Table 4.13: Results from GLM (binomial) regression for Bremen by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening 0.0057 0.1086 -0.0948 0.0613 0.0689 0.0624 0.0799 0.0506
1999 -0.0176 0.1411 0.1590* 0.0872 -0.0081 0.0864 -0.0575 0.0762
2000 -0.0980 0.1463 -0.0952 0.0897 0.0875 0.0808 -0.0527 0.0737
2001 -0.1467 0.1355 -0.1364 0.1030 0.0286 0.0849 -0.0293 0.0721
2002 -0.1026 0.1368 -0.0501 0.0893 -0.0695 0.0774 0.0224 0.0764
2003 -0.4946*** 0.1446 -0.0074 0.0883 0.0716 0.0887 0.0210 0.0832
2004 -0.1527 0.1367 -0.2393** 0.0979 0.0837 0.0833 -0.0702 0.0739
2005 -0.4547*** 0.1499 -0.1899** 0.0877 0.1393* 0.0819 0.0345 0.0712
2006 -0.4416*** 0.1464 -0.1694* 0.0990 0.1007 0.0824 -0.0289 0.0691
2007 -0.4100*** 0.1424 -0.3650*** 0.0890 0.0545 0.0794 0.0293 0.0742
2008 -0.4536*** 0.1587 -0.3518*** 0.0924 0.1375* 0.0820 -0.0401 0.0689
2009 -0.4166*** 0.1510 -0.3012*** 0.0901 -0.0153 0.0889 0.0025 0.0685
2010 -0.3706*** 0.1334 -0.3097*** 0.0876 0.0502 0.0816 0.0272 0.0706
Screeningx1999 0.1033 0.1411 -0.5441*** 0.0872 -0.1301 0.0864 0.1176 0.0762
Screeningx2000 -0.0068 0.1463 0.2688*** 0.0897 -0.2895*** 0.0808 0.0882 0.0737
Screeningx2001 0.0265 0.1355 0.1437 0.1030 0.0191 0.0849 0.1258* 0.0721
Screeningx2002 -0.5463*** 0.1368 0.0123 0.0893 0.3676*** 0.0774 0.1491* 0.0764
Screeningx2003 -0.1730 0.1446 -0.2638*** 0.0883 0.0321 0.0887 0.1742** 0.0832
Screeningx2004 -0.5287*** 0.1367 -0.1026 0.0979 -0.1574* 0.0833 -0.2525*** 0.0739
Screeningx2005 -0.2451 0.1499 0.1290 0.0877 -0.3631*** 0.0819 -0.1478** 0.0712
Screeningx2006 -0.1115 0.1464 -0.0766 0.0990 -0.0247 0.0824 0.1826*** 0.0691
Screeningx2007 -0.1538 0.1424 -0.3626*** 0.0890 -0.2360*** 0.0794 -0.4563*** 0.0742
Screeningx2008 -0.4540*** 0.1587 0.5280*** 0.0924 -0.4702*** 0.0820 -0.0253 0.0689
Screeningx2009 -0.4913*** 0.1510 0.2492*** 0.0901 -0.3009*** 0.0889 -0.1009 0.0685
Screeningx2010 -0.3475*** 0.1334 -0.6662*** 0.0876 -0.6220*** 0.0816 -0.3838*** 0.0706
Constant -8.1355*** 0.1086 -7.3686*** 0.0613 -7.1199*** 0.0624 -6.7545*** 0.0506
N 650 650 650 650
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Table 4.14: Results from OLS regression for Hesse by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening -12.9234*** 2.6720 31.0357*** 4.6881 -16.6675*** 4.9252 29.9641*** 6.2836
1999 1.3364 3.9498 8.7113 6.6842 21.0584*** 7.7837 -0.2277 9.8662
2000 5.2678 3.7238 10.3501 6.8252 12.3887* 7.1255 -3.1000 10.1493
2001 -1.1824 3.6662 7.3340 6.7977 6.3051 7.0236 2.1065 9.5414
2002 -2.4221 3.7446 -5.7418 6.5761 13.6268 9.0197 -3.2519 8.9223
2003 -3.5841 3.2989 -3.7929 6.0186 12.9671* 6.9305 8.5434 9.3132
2004 -2.2603 3.5477 -1.9356 5.9707 13.9390** 6.1353 -2.8522 10.9197
2005 -1.6578 3.3680 -5.0800 5.9271 24.6552*** 7.7477 -3.8313 8.9869
2006 -5.1161 3.2473 0.8231 6.2771 16.4788** 8.0964 -1.7926 9.6576
2007 -4.9679 3.1405 -15.2357*** 5.8778 1.5115 7.2451 -6.4374 10.1906
2008 -8.6602*** 3.2372 -10.5790* 6.1640 13.2306* 7.7507 -10.8706 9.8888
2009 -4.7874 3.4649 -7.7156 5.8297 -2.7617 7.1660 -3.9345 8.6027
2010 -8.6649*** 3.1368 -17.6494*** 5.4782 3.6359 7.2921 -2.7929 9.6860
Screeningx1999 5.8964 3.9498 -8.7113 6.6842 5.9135 7.7837 -51.4123*** 9.8662
Screeningx2000 -5.4257 3.7238 -17.5129** 6.8252 -26.7552*** 7.1255 -72.8434*** 10.1493
Screeningx2001 22.0879*** 3.6662 -13.6228** 6.7977 21.4890*** 7.0236 15.7198 9.5414
Screeningx2002 22.6055*** 3.7446 -26.0503*** 6.5761 -30.5304*** 9.0197 36.2485*** 8.9223
Screeningx2003 9.6105*** 3.2989 -19.7290*** 6.0186 19.1298*** 6.9305 -28.3568*** 9.3132
Screeningx2004 1.4032 3.5477 -38.0495*** 5.9707 8.9422 6.1353 -31.9110*** 10.9197
Screeningx2005 0.6859 3.3680 -43.9815*** 5.9271 -25.3882*** 7.7477 -20.2194** 8.9869
Screeningx2006 3.9995 3.2473 -50.4643*** 6.2771 17.4488** 8.0964 -24.5710** 9.6576
Screeningx2007 28.2502*** 3.1405 -11.9858** 5.8778 41.2279*** 7.2451 -24.7389** 10.1906
Screeningx2008 25.5932*** 3.2372 -55.0178*** 6.1640 21.8659*** 7.7507 -13.1831 9.8888
Screeningx2009 3.5012 3.4649 -58.0101*** 5.8297 29.5218*** 7.1660 -70.3533*** 8.6027
Screeningx2010 19.6598*** 3.1368 -4.0596 5.4782 6.3502 7.2921 -33.8110*** 9.6860
Constant 20.2446*** 2.6720 49.5964*** 4.6881 67.8970*** 4.9252 110.3957*** 6.2836
N 338 338 338 338
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
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Table 4.15: Results from GLM (binomial) regression for Hesse by age groups
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening -1.0172*** 0.1270 0.4863*** 0.0910 -0.2818*** 0.0698 0.2404*** 0.0548
1999 0.0639 0.1816 0.1619 0.1203 0.2704*** 0.0956 -0.0021 0.0862
2000 0.2313 0.1603 0.1896 0.1209 0.1677* 0.0932 -0.0285 0.0901
2001 -0.0602 0.1794 0.1380 0.1233 0.0889 0.0954 0.0189 0.0824
2002 -0.1274 0.1903 -0.1231 0.1361 0.1830 0.1133 -0.0299 0.0790
2003 -0.1949 0.1692 -0.0796 0.1207 0.1749* 0.0908 0.0746 0.0781
2004 -0.1184 0.1781 -0.0398 0.1177 0.1869** 0.0820 -0.0262 0.0970
2005 -0.0855 0.1655 -0.1081 0.1201 0.3100*** 0.0935 -0.0354 0.0799
2006 -0.2914* 0.1730 0.0165 0.1210 0.2175** 0.1013 -0.0164 0.0851
2007 -0.2816* 0.1641 -0.3672*** 0.1347 0.0220 0.1015 -0.0601 0.0924
2008 -0.5583*** 0.1979 -0.2400* 0.1343 0.1782* 0.0996 -0.1038 0.0920
2009 -0.2699 0.1871 -0.1692 0.1209 -0.0416 0.1039 -0.0363 0.0764
2010 -0.5587*** 0.1865 -0.4400*** 0.1248 0.0522 0.1006 -0.0257 0.0858
Screeningx1999 0.6232*** 0.1816 -0.1619 0.1203 0.1529 0.0956 -0.4572*** 0.0862
Screeningx2000 -0.2531 0.1603 -0.2827** 0.1209 -0.4970*** 0.0932 -0.7511*** 0.0901
Screeningx2001 1.4099*** 0.1794 -0.2193* 0.1233 0.3448*** 0.0954 0.1008 0.0824
Screeningx2002 1.4512*** 0.1903 -0.3786*** 0.1361 -0.5836*** 0.1133 0.2414*** 0.0790
Screeningx2003 0.7955*** 0.1692 -0.2656** 0.1207 0.3119*** 0.0908 -0.2270*** 0.0781
Screeningx2004 -0.0061 0.1781 -0.6455*** 0.1177 0.1826** 0.0820 -0.2587*** 0.0970
Screeningx2005 -0.0569 0.1655 -0.8301*** 0.1201 -0.3244*** 0.0935 -0.1528* 0.0799
Screeningx2006 0.1259 0.1730 -0.9732*** 0.1210 0.2911*** 0.1013 -0.1919** 0.0851
Screeningx2007 1.7122*** 0.1641 -0.0450 0.1347 0.5850*** 0.1015 -0.1913** 0.0924
Screeningx2008 1.7563*** 0.1979 -1.4401*** 0.1343 0.3440*** 0.0996 -0.0845 0.0920
Screeningx2009 0.0767 0.1871 -1.5196*** 0.1209 0.4621*** 0.1039 -0.7179*** 0.0764
Screeningx2010 1.4758*** 0.1865 0.1261 0.1248 0.1260 0.1006 -0.2769*** 0.0858
Constant -8.5048*** 0.1270 -7.6085*** 0.0910 -7.2943*** 0.0698 -6.8077*** 0.0548
N 338 338 338 338
Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01,
Table 4.16: Mean mortality rates in Hesse* - negative imputation
Screening Area Control Area
Age Mean SD Min/Max Mean SD Min/Max
40 - 49 22.30 0.99 12.07/ 36.72 24.38 12.17 0/ 66.66
50 - 59 56.19 18.97 29.81/ 88.70 52.56 19.18 0/134.77
60 - 69 72.11 15.60 42.91/ 93.97 82.16 25.40 0/183.56
70 - 79 72.03 17.06 46.35/105.37 67.51 19.48 14.34/129.95
N 13 325
*fatalities per 100 000
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Figure 4.14: OLS and GLM estimated breast cancer mortality in Hesse
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Figure 4.15: Breast cancer mortality rates in Hesse - negative imputation
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Table 4.17: Mean mortality rates in Hesse* - mean imputation
Screening Area Control Area
Age Mean SD Min/Max Mean SD Min/Max
40 - 49 18.66 10.94 6.46/ 36.72 20.40 11.45 0/ 66.66
50 - 59 52.68 21.70 18.63/ 83.86 49.28 20.01 0/134.77
60 - 69 70.40 18.24 36.86/ 93.97 80.23 26.56 0/183.56
70 - 79 70.04 19.01 40.77/105.37 66.35 20.44 13.96/129.95
N 13 325
*fatalities per 100 000
Figure 4.16: Breast cancer mortality rates in Hesse - mean imputation
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Table 4.18: Results from time restricted Poisson regression for Hesse - negative imputation
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening -0.1950 0.2009 0.2890*** 0.0499 -0.2206** 0.1082 0.0323 0.1322
Time2 -0.2054*** 0.0563 -0.1683*** 0.0408 0.0299 0.0362 -0.0971*** 0.0324
Time3 -0.4268*** 0.0737 -0.3110*** 0.0476 -0.0665 0.0409 -0.1448*** 0.0426
ScreeningxTime2 0.1671 0.2794 -0.3137*** 0.0847 0.0678 0.1466 0.0942 0.1508
ScreeningxTime3 0.2806 0.3017 -0.3812* 0.2092 0.2306* 0.1230 -0.0964 0.1649
Constant -8.1648*** 0.0431 -7.4283*** 0.0317 -7.0981*** 0.0263 -7.2186*** 0.0247
N 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in second column
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 4.17: Poisson estimated breast cancer mortality in Hesse: time restricted model –
negative imputation
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Table 4.19: Results from time restricted Poisson regression for Hesse - mean imputation
40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 70 - 79
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Screening -0.2962 0.3006 0.3029*** 0.0432 -0.2606* 0.1451 -0.0005 0.1617
Time2 -0.2201*** 0.0670 -0.1840*** 0.0435 0.0336 0.0378 -0.0972*** 0.0343
Time3 -0.4512*** 0.0854 -0.3325*** 0.0518 -0.0681 0.0428 -0.1420*** 0.0443
ScreeningxTime2 0.2642 0.3898 -0.3505*** 0.0933 0.1011 0.1828 0.1214 0.1795
ScreeningxTime3 0.3850 0.4010 -0.5390 0.3373 0.2873* 0.1567 -0.0832 0.2031
Constant -8.2963*** 0.0509 -7.4577*** 0.0330 -7.1131*** 0.0276 -7.2300*** 0.0263
N 338 338 338 338
Standard errors in second column
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 4.18: Poisson estimated breast cancer mortality in Hesse: time restricted model –
mean imputation
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